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Abstract
This dissertation traces the emergence of the global human rights movement,
investigates the role of popular culture as a vehicle for mobilization, and critically
examines why the movement has failed to adequately politicize its supporters in the
process. Beginning in the mid-1970s, a broad shift began to take place in which ordinary
people were routinely confronted with human suffering, as conflict and crisis assumed a
role as ritualized news events. The public response to these phenomena demonstrated a
capacity for solidarity and engagement based on cosmopolitan premises. The inception of
a collective ethos of compassion, an awareness of the other based on empathy, can be
considered a symptom of globalization, of a moral variety, and is a byproduct of shifting
economic trends, advances in technology, and efforts toward transnational organization.
Support for human rights advocacy has gained traction as a mainstream social cause and
provides a set of principles with which average people mediate the world and their role in
it. Yet, this transformation did not occur spontaneously, but rather was deliberately
cultivated by movement architects through a series of popular culture mechanisms.
However, the methods and strategies deployed to enlist the public in defense of human
rights shaped the substance of their engagement. This dissertation addresses the
discrepancy between the political content of advocacy campaigns and the failure of the
campaigns to politicize supporters, suggesting flaws in the foundation of the human
rights movement. In order to set itself on a path toward relevance and effectiveness, the
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movement must inculcate political engagement, maintain an alignment of principle and
action, and resist the seductive features of the age of consumerism.
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CHAPTER 1 – MOBILIZING THE MASSES FOR THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
Introduction
This dissertation traces the emergence of the global human rights movement,
investigates the role of popular culture as a vehicle for mobilization, and critically
examines why the movement has failed to adequately politicize its supporters in the
process. Beginning in the mid-1970s, a broad shift began to take place in which ordinary
people were routinely confronted with human suffering, as conflict and crisis assumed a
role as ritualized news events. The public response to these phenomena demonstrated a
capacity for solidarity and engagement. The inception of a collective ethos of
compassion, an awareness of the other based on empathy, can be considered a symptom
of globalization, of a moral variety, and is a byproduct of shifting economic trends,
advances in technology, and efforts toward transnational organization. Support for human
rights advocacy has gained traction as a mainstream social cause and provides a set of
principles with which average people mediate the world and their role in it. Yet, this
transformation did not occur spontaneously, but rather was deliberately cultivated by a
host of activists and movement architects. Over this period, human rights and
humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) grew and expanded their
operations, largely in response to a series of profound shocks in international affairs:
famines, wars, and genocides. However, the methods and strategies deployed to enlist the
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public in defense of human rights shaped the substance of their engagement. This
dissertation addresses the discrepancy between the political content of advocacy
campaigns and failure of the campaigns to politicize supporters, suggesting flaws in the
foundation of the human rights movement.
Human rights emerged as a mainstream cause due to its integration with elements
of popular culture. Trends in consumer behavior, visual media, and corporate advertising
were leveraged by human rights organizations to attract supporters and raise the profile of
their issues. While specific expressions of pop culture—celebrity-infused benefit
concerts, sensational media coverage, and branded advertising—allowed the movement
to expand, they also informed its operations. As will be demonstrated, these venues
effectively encourage participation from new cross-sections of the population. Thousands
and millions of ordinary people who would have otherwise remained on the sidelines
became involved in these campaigns by donating money, attending an event, and calling
their elected officials. However, the apolitical nature of this involvement is what lies at
the core of this project.
Citizen engagement with global affairs is evidence of the prospects for fostering a
collective response to crisis based on compassion and morality. Trends evidence the
possibility for engagement drive on cosmopolitanism and solidarity, in which borders
matter little and the protection human welfare is of universal concern. It is clear that the
possibility exists for human rights to take shape as the basis for a progressive global
movement based on principles of equality, autonomy, and dignity and structured to
challenge transgressions. Yet, when human rights participation is facilitated by popular
culture mechanisms, these tendencies are not translated into meaningful political action.
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This passion is prone to produce surges of energy that are plagued by short attention
span, capriciousness, and internal inconsistency: crises flare up, outrage and grief fuel a
public response, and then audiences once again become deflated and detached. There
seems to be no threshold for engagement; no specific death toll or regional specificity
that motivates average people to become involved. The uneven outpouring of emotion
and protest projects an image of the movement as, at times, meandering
schizophrenically, unguided by universal principles or political commitment. To address
these tensions, this dissertation presents an historical analysis of the contemporary human
rights movement and an evaluation of its effectiveness in addressing global calamity. Still
the question remains, can the human rights movement be taken seriously despite its
apolitical tendencies, or are these perpetual troublemakers merely a band of gadflies, only
superficially committed and therefore able to be co-opted, manipulated and
marginalized? I suggest that it is possible to overcome these institutional and fundamental
shortcomings, but not without blazing a different path that relies less on popular appeal
and more on the political content of human rights challenges.
By forging the association between human rights and pop culture, the lighter side
of popular culture has had a negative influence. As modes of popular culture became
vehicles for human rights, substance of a severe nature (human rights abuse) was filtered
through channels most commonly reserved for entertainment and commercialism. The
venues that serve as platforms for human rights mobilization frame crisis and suffering as
apolitical matters to be remedied by modest investments and expressions. If outlets of
entertainment and commercialism provide contexts in which human rights messages are
communicated, then what is the effect on the movement, on its campaigns, and on its
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ability to be relevant? Is human rights protection bolstered or harmed through these
associations? What is the viability for the human rights movement going forward, should
it continue to straddle the line between politicized engagement and levity?
Human rights demand political and politicized responses due to the essential
qualities of human rights ideals, principles, and content. By “human rights” I refer to the
catalogue of rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights are
afforded to all members of the human species and serve to guarantee individuals
protections against violations of their autonomy, dignity, and security. Human rights are
“political” because they establish a particular relationship between human beings and the
political communities in which they are situated. Individuals are rights-bearers and make
claims against the state that is the entity primarily responsible for protection and
provision of rights. They place limits on state behavior and provide checks against the
arbitrary and unjust exercise of power. Individuals are prioritized in political decision
making, ahead of other considerations; the well-being of individuals and groups cannot
be sacrificed to serve the interests of geopolitics, capital, or other forms of entrenched
power.
For these reasons, this dissertation regularly describes human rights engagement
as demanding of “political” or “politicized” engagement because the failure to recognize
the political dimensions of human rights, I contend, contributes to the weakness and
shortcomings of the movement. Human rights organizations operating with these
principles and values conduct outreach campaigns and raise awareness of human rights
abuse in an attempt to empower both the vulnerable, as well as their advocates. So, on the
one hand, organizations provide an anchor for the expression of these political principles,
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but also have the need to translate these, at times, abstract ideals to average people and
motivate them to become involved in campaigns and events. It is at this juncture that the
substance of this dissertation occur: in order to transmit political ideals to the general
public and solicit their support, human rights organizations have chosen to traffic in
popular culture. In the process, the political nature of human rights is compromised;
therefore failing to politicize those involved in human rights campaigns, in turn affecting
their salience. A core challenge for human rights organizations is to construct a bridge
between the public and the larger movement, which is why the means by which this is
attempted are so crucial. The social aspect of global human rights activism—that
relationship between a Western advocate and a suffering stranger—is fraught with deep
tensions, yet remains a prevalent bond that constitutes for many a uniquely 21st century
global experience.
Social Relations and Human Rights Movements
There are discrete forms of human rights engagement that require distinction and,
in order to do so, I introduce a dichotomy that captures two prevalent types: selfdetermining and other-regarding human rights movements. The former is closely tied to
the classic social protest model (that may or may not include a resort to violence):
American Revolution, French Revolution, worker’s general strikes, anti-imperial national
liberation, the Suffragettes, civil rights freedom rides, the Stonewall riots, the 1989
revolutions, and possibly the 2011 Arab Spring. While diverse in their own right, it is
important for our current purposes to identify the way in which these movements have all
been self-determining. To utilize an Hegelian (1977) understanding of “selfdetermination,” actors in these movements seek to determine for themselves their own
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lives through action in the world. This is clearly true of the more technical definition of
self-determination, usually reserved for national independence, but is also appropriate for
personal, or group-level, determination. The social protest model consists in individuals
standing up for themselves, claiming their own rights, and grappling with power. An
overriding theme throughout this model is the self-interested initiative, the directness of
the engagement, and the willingness to take on risk in the process. This model contrasts
with the form of human rights activism that this dissertation takes as its subject.
In addition to self-determining activism, there are also “other-regarding”
expressions of activism. Even within the social protest model, evidence of this is clear.
Intergroup alliances and defections created diverse communities of supporters throughout
many of these movements: anarchists joined with socialists to form the First International
(Ishay 2008, 145-6), men advocated for the female franchise, white American
Northerners marched down south with black brothers and sisters, and queer-straight
alliances help mainstream the drive for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender rights.
There are traces in history when actors are engaged in the struggles of others, in
solidarity, without ostensible personal gains to be won, besides moral victories. This
trend may be yet another expression of the term “universal” that is inherently tied to
human rights discourse—when the plight of a particular group becomes a universalized
imperative for groups with no self-interest to flex. The cases and episodes explored in
this research project focus mainly on other-regarding human rights movements that have
as their referents the suffering of other people in another country. For instance, why do
Western television viewers come to care about innocent strangers caught in the crosshairs
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of conflict and how do these viewers respond when they experience this feeling of
concern?
This analysis attempts to consider the role of social relations in human rights and
searches for explanations of phenomena of this sort. It has been argued that human rights
derive from the “creative praxis of social movements” (Stammers 2009, 9); which is to
say our ideas about human rights have evolved due to the actions of protest movements.
Traditionally, as mentioned above, these social movements have been self-determining.
However, I contend, that other-regarding movements have not only been present
throughout the history of human rights, but also must be considered as a foundational
component of the contemporary human rights landscape and an important source for
ideas about the praxis of rights.
If this is the case, then what can we come to understand through an investigation
into the social praxis of other-regarding human rights movements? Historically, this
refers to movements such as those opposed to slavery and the slave trade, as well as that
surrounding reform of the Congo Free State at the turn of the 20th century. In fact, the
Congo Reform Movement is more uniquely distinct than abolition because of how
removed the issue was from the locale of the activists (which is a remark on geography,
as well as on the consciousness of ordinary people in the early 1900s). In the case of
abolition, slavery was something occurring in the West—something that could be
witnessed first-hand and may even serve the interests of neighbors and fellow nationals.
The abuse of Congolese by the Belgian King Leopold II, however, transpired at a
distance and is a predecessor to the campaigns and movements common in the twentyfirst century.
	
  

7

Ordinary people in Europe and North America began to hear of the atrocities
through communiqués and pamphlets from missionaries who visited the Congo Basin.
Quite specifically, advocates for reform of the Congo came into contact with the cause
through expressions of popular culture, predating those that will be discussed in this
dissertation: celebrity, visuality, and publicity. The Congo Reform Association (CRA),
the hub of the movement, spearheaded by E.D. Morel and Roger Casement, was aware of
the challenge of raising awareness of a vile system operating well out of the view of the
Western public (Inter alia Sliwinski 2006, 334). They enlisted the support of two literary
titans and venerable celebrities of the day: Mark Twain (a.k.a. Samuel Clemens) and Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle (Heerten 2009, 175). Both penned vitriolic responses to King
Leopold’s crimes, including Twain’s King Leopold’s Soliloquy (2006) written satirically
in the King’s first person, gained personal access to power brokers, and elevated the
profile of the movement.
In addition to the presence of famous people among the ranks of supporters,
photography performed an invaluable service. Remarkably, John and Alice Harris,
Christian missionaries operating in the Congo, were first to return with graphic imagery
of severed hands that had become King Leopold’s brutal trademark. These photographs
were trafficked widely in print publications, such as books, pamphlets, and newspapers,
and also became a key component to a series of traveling lantern shows. Organized
largely by missionaries-turned-activists, these live productions featured imagery
projected by light shown through stencils. Coupled with fire-and-brimstone preaching
and a generous dose of phantasmagoric and macabre spectacles these shows traveled
furiously and were performed in front of thousands of audience members at a time
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(Sliwinski 2006, 340-2). All in all, the deployment of celebrity and graphic imagery
composed the pillars of what was a broad and sophisticated publicity campaign waged by
Morel and Casement. While the ultimate effect of the Congo Reform Movement remains
the subject of controversy, its legacy resonates in twenty-first century human rights
movements (Hochschild 1999, 203). The strategy of the CRA was a deliberate attempt to
build a mass base of support for action in the Congo. They were convinced that if enough
people learned about the horrific situation, they would be morally compelled to act and to
demand a response from their governments. “Among its supporters, it kept alive a
tradition, a way of seeing the world, a human capacity for outrage at pain inflicted on
another human being, no matter whether that pain is inflicted on someone of another
color, in another country, at another end of the earth” (Hochschild 1999, 305). Thus,
Morel and Casement set out to reach as many people as possible, through avenues they
thought would be most effective in achieving a critical mass and, therefore, they looked
to popular culture.
Human Rights and Popular Culture: Chapter-by-Chapter Overview
The chapters of this dissertation are arranged historically and thematically, each
designed to describe the global human rights movement at a particular moment and
contribute to a fluid, coherent story about the rise of the movement as a whole. Each
episode features a particular tactic or method introduced into the human rights toolbox by
activist organizations and demonstrates a process of learning over time. Popular culture is
the organizing concept within which each of the cases is subsumed, and in each chapter a
distinct expression of popular culture is highlighted. Motivating these determinations is
an investigation undertaken in each chapter into the forces operating to inform popular
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culture and the effect of these forces on the human rights community. As these forces are
identified, their influence is detailed through specific human rights campaigns and their
consequences are evaluated in terms of policy accomplishments, contribution to the
evolution of human rights consciousness, and lasting effect on the movement. The
narratives in each chapter are woven through flash points in world politics—wars,
famines, disasters, and crises—and anchored by shifts in the economic, political, and
technological contexts in which human rights activism takes place.
Chapter 2, “Constituencies of Compassion and Consumerism: Amnesty
International, Live Aid, and the Anti-Apartheid Movement,” emphasizes the role of
celebrity-laden benefit concerts that first emerged in the late-1970s and grew to become a
mass phenomenon in the 1980s. Beginning modestly with theater performances in the
United Kingdom, Monty Python’s Flying Circus hosted the earliest events whose
proceeds were donated to Amnesty International (AI). Several years later, Sir Bob
Geldof, captivated by footage of an Ethiopian famine, was inspired to take action on a
grander scale. Geldof, an alumnus of these early AI shows, went on to expand on this
model as he executed Live Aid in 1985, a grandiose concert featuring the most famous
rock stars of the decade and benefitting famine relief. Finally, the strident Anti-Apartheid
Movement followed in the footsteps of its predecessors and made similar use of celebrity,
benefit concerts, and cultural products generally, but with a more political and politicized
tenor. Consumer culture provides the backdrop for this chapter and the tension brought
on by the compulsion of mass consumption emblematic of the period: while consumerism
possesses an inherent tendency toward self-indulgence and superficiality, human rights
organizations sought to channel this commercial energy into ethical behavior. With the
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cultural impact of Live Aid and successful outcome in South Africa, a development was
underway in which ordinary people shared concern for suffering strangers and
demonstrated an ability to act on their behalf.
Chapter 3, “Spectacles of Suffering and Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia
and Bosnia,” focuses on visual media culture in the aftermath of the Cold War and the
interaction between audiences and those individuals suffering on television. Through the
crisis in Somalia and the genocide in Bosnia, television viewers were afforded a prime
vantage point from which to watch it all happen. Due to advances in satellite
communication and the initiation of twenty-four-hour news networks, these human
tragedies and acts of unfathomable violence became spectacular events unfolding in realtime. However, throughout these episodes, the audience’s response was uneven,
inconsistent, and susceptible to manipulation. There were glimmers of engagement and
consciousness amidst waves of detachment and distraction. During the 1990s, it became
impossible to defend inaction by virtue of not knowing about the commission of
atrocities; a standard refrain in previous eras. Yet, even capturing brutality on tape was
insufficient to galvanize the public behind a unified response, leaving in question the
capacity of the audience for moral and political solidarity with those suffering on
television, at a distance. Lessons learned from these periods suggest that, in considering
the process of raising awareness of human rights issues, the medium matters. Therefore,
when a movement emerges armed with the force of Madison Avenue, this premise is
tested once more.
Chapter 4, “Bumper Sticker Activism and the Corporate Branding of the Save
Darfur Movement,” pivots on the use of branded advertising as an outreach tactic for
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human rights purposes. Corporate culture describes the milieu around the turn of the 21st
century, in which commercial marketing became a ubiquitous feature of urban landscapes
and media platforms. While in business and marketing literature “corporate culture”
refers to an internal organizational dynamic, in its current usage this term suggests the
external effect of corporations on the social world. When grassroots energies began to
mobilize to address the violence in Darfur, in which government-proxy militias were
targeting civilians, an organization was founded to confront the conflict and to serve as a
permanent institution for genocide prevention. However, the methods used by the Save
Darfur Coalition (SDC) to conduct its campaign mimicked the branding strategies of
corporations, and produced detrimental effects for the movement. Despite all the fervor
surrounding Darfur, the branding strategy was a central cause of the loss of credibility
SDC suffered due to their reliance on disputed facts in their advertising. Just as
corporations are interested in selling a branded identity and projecting their products as
components of that identity, Save Darfur may have gotten lost in their own branding
when advertising became an end unto itself, rather than a means to another end.
At the heart of this inquiry is a curiosity about the relationship between average
citizens and human rights movements, and the way in which popular culture has been
used to bridge the gap and forge a lasting association. These categories of culture are not
static and, as will be evidenced, are frequently reproduced and actually overlap one
chapter to the next. For instance, there are heavily visual elements in the anti-famine
campaign in the 1980s, and the Save Darfur movement trafficked in celebrities and mass
events. Yet, I do hope to distill each of these pop culture strategies within the period in
which they emerged and matured. Interestingly, as these methods are instantiated and
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institutionalized, they become components of an evolving model of advocacy that
organizations deploy when confronted with crisis. This is as true in violent conflict, as it
is in natural disaster. Relief agencies and activist groups appeal to popular culture to
attract ordinary people to their cause and solicit donations or petition signatures. On the
one hand, this is a decidedly reasonable approach to campaigning because popular culture
provides a familiar vehicle with which to reach an enormous number of people. However,
the tendency in popular culture is not toward politicization, but commercialism. To
unpack this tension, each episode will make reference to three critically illuminating
indicators: motivation of the activists; expression of the form of activism; and
commitment of activists to resolution of the problem.
“Motivations” refer to underlying forces that compel participation in these most
unusual public happenings—and it is the case that these activities should be thought of as
unusual. It is bizarre, in a sense, for average Western audience members to experience an
awakening as to the plight of strangers in another country and feel a compulsion to do
something to help alleviate suffering. It is simply not something that has ever been a
regular or sustained component of social life. Individuals naturally feel affinity with those
within their communities, but concern for Ethiopians, Somalis, or Bosnians has
historically been experienced by Ethiopians, Somalis, and Bosnians respectively. So, a
persistent question throughout the dissertation is, “Why?” Why do people take it upon
themselves to act in ways that do not necessarily serve their narrow self-interest? What
motivates people to join these campaigns, donate money, or attend a rally? While it may
be the case that a $10 donation is a $10 donation no matter what the reason, identifying
participants’ motivations is crucial to understanding the human rights consciousness that
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I suggest is developing and useful for the purpose of channeling specific motivations
toward political ends. A driving impetus of this project is the way in which popular
cultural mechanisms are used to mobilize ordinary people to participate in extraordinary
campaigns. The role of emotional, moral, social, and political motivations will return
throughout each episode and will help explain the expressions of human rights generated
at each moment.
“Expression” refers to the form and substance of the campaigns that are produced
through the use of popular culture. What do these kinds of human rights campaigns look
like? What do they consist of? How are they perceived? Keeping in mind the discussion
above about self-determining versus other-regarding movements, the latter will contain
elements of the former, but must also design a new set of devices. These devices will
reflect the motivations of those involved and attempt to capitalize off spurts of public
energy. Through a combination of traditional methods, such as direct action and letterwriting, and creative new platforms such as those linked to emergent technologies and
social media, the manifestations of these campaigns are often diverse and multi-faceted.
The demands made by human rights movements are concrete expressions of these
campaigns. Finally, and somewhat more amorphously, the perception of human rights in
the eyes and minds of the world is a component of this picture as well; and this bears
consideration specifically in the context of commercialism. When the association is made
between human rights and popular culture, is the expression sufficiently serious and
political to carry the weight of its demands? Are there negative impressions being made
that simultaneously imply a lack of credibility and competence? The answers to these
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questions suggest one ingredient on which success of a campaign may hinge, while yet
another is the commitment of the activists to the issue at hand.
“Commitment” is a key factor in this discussion because it ultimately determines
the viability and salience of the norms the movement purports to embody. Once ordinary
people have been motivated to become involved, what is asked of them, how do they
respond, and for how long? Historically, in reference to self-determining movements,
commitment is a product of the ability of individuals to withstand violence, simply put.
When human rights movements are waged as challenges to arbitrary power through
methods of direct action, the durability and fortitude of the participants in the face of
brutal crackdowns dictates how long the campaign will last. The self-sacrifice of activists
decides the duration of the enterprise, as do ancillary concerns about resources, broadly
conceived. However, when the object of this question is an other-regarding movement,
the issue of commitment is more elusive. Since human rights interventions in these cases
are executed at a distance, there are potentially lower costs involved in participation: a
letter-writer in the United Kingdom does not risk the harm of the baton or the billy club.
Yet, a cost-benefit analysis cannot account for the kinds of inputs that will be explored in
the chapters that follow: short attention span, fatigue, and distraction. If these factors are
included as intervening variables, the calculus becomes less clear-cut, but hopefully more
explanatorily satisfying. With these considerations, media, technology and culture figure
heavily and simplistic issues of cost-benefit and self-interest fall away.
Therefore, one central objective of this project is to describe the motivations,
expressions, and commitments of the global human rights movement and its participants.
However, there is also a decidedly normative project underway that revolves around the
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practice of human rights activism: Do these strategies and these models provide effective
tools with which to defend human dignity and welfare? Is the human rights movement
more resolute and more relevant as a result of these methods? Are human rights norms
appropriately reflected in and represented by the advocates that speak in their name? By
investigating, in depth, the actors, organizations, and events that constitute the human
rights movement through various snapshots of recent world affairs, conclusions can be
gleaned as to how well their goals are being met.
The final chapter synthesizes the cases in light of these questions and evaluates
the effects of consumerism, spectacle, and branding in the context of contemporary
controversies in human rights. That the human rights movement fails to politicize its
supporters may be an unintended consequence of the strategies it employs, but what
alternatives exist? What other manifestations of global human rights activism can be
reasonably expected? By bringing back the other-self dichotomy introduced above,
Chapter 5 further dissects the concept of politicization and identifies elements of
politicized engagement. Ultimately, an agenda of this project is to determine the
possibility for the emergence of a politicized constituency of human rights advocates
concerned for the rights of others. Because this is constituted by a one-off relationship,
the classic social protest model cannot be simply duplicated, which means that a third
way must be discovered that transcends the dialectic and bridges the gap between
solidarity and charity. This dissertation is a critical exploration of the human rights
movement and offers a descriptive account of its emergence, as well as proposes a
normative framework with which to approach questions of strategies and objectives.
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Conclusion
If successful, this dissertation will help provide guidance on some of the bevy of
questions presented in this introduction. At least, this project presents a narrative
detailing the emergence of global human rights activism, the events that serve as
signposts, and the organizations that constitute this broad and diverse movement. The
episodes in each chapter are compelling in and of themselves, and in the aggregate
compose a story that represents a critical, new look at the contemporary global landscape.
It is a subject familiar to most, because these strategies continue to frame the way we
think about human rights and humanitarianism. Investigating the forces and influences
that give credence to these advocacy methods tell us a great deal about the organizations
whose actions these are, as they do about ourselves as audience members.
If the critical questions are ignored, the core of this narrative describes the
significant pressures facing non-governmental organizations in the twenty-first century.
The market for donor funding, media coverage, and grassroots support is inherently
limited and, therefore, enormously competitive. News outlets, philanthropic foundations,
and other civil society actors are constrained by their own set of resources and must make
difficult decisions in an environment with no shortage of demands. Priorities and
preferences are set through a complicated process of wrangling, negotiating, and
ultimately compromise. Despite the utopian and uncompromising nature of human rights
norms, the reality of the world is that non-profit managers are forced to arrive at policies
for their organizations, which necessarily entails sacrificing the optimal for the best
possible, hopefully without allowing “the perfect to be enemy of the good.” This
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dissertation focuses in on the space where the ideal and the practical, the noumenal and
the phenomenal, collide.
To reiterate the thesis, human rights emerged as a mainstream cause through its
integration with expressions of popular culture: consumerism, visual media, and
advertising. While these channels allowed the movement to expand, they also shaped the
movement. Scholars and journalists have tried to make sense of successes and failures in
this relatively brief history of global human rights activism. In the process, certain
mantras have developed through the movement’s learned experience with crisis and
conflict. As the chapters describe, three foundational maxims emerged, each from a
distinct time period: mobilize masses, expose abuse, and make noise. To mobilize masses
of supporters is to flex the power of numbers. To expose abuse is to be a witness, as well
as to lay bear the power of shame. To make noise is to attempt to motivate political will
among resistant policymakers. These lessons emerge from hard fought campaigns and,
more often than not, from shortcomings and failures in the face of brutality and
catastrophe. The human rights movement is engaged in a process of learning, yet, this
dissertation contends, it has not learned all the right lessons. Human rights mantra may
provide necessary indicators of an effective movement, but the sufficient balance has yet
to be struck. The research that follows tests these mantras in practice and assesses the
future of the movement.
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CHAPTER 2 – CONSTITUENCIES OF COMPASSION AND CONSUMERISM:
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, LIVE AID, AND THE ANTI-APARTHEID
MOVEMENT
“…a populist, non-governmental constituency…A constituency of
compassion” – Sir Bob Geldof (1986, 250)
“…this analysis views Bob Geldof as a kind of hapless hip Jerry Lewis
who takes up starving Africans as his ‘kids’ and holds the biggest telethon
in history” – TV Reed (2001, 101)
Introduction
The model of human rights advocacy developed in the 1980s began under modest
circumstances, but evolved into a series of phenomena that set human rights on a course
for mass appeal. As celebrities became involved in activist campaigns through their
performances at benefit concerts, human rights emerged as a mainstream social cause in
which average citizens participated. From a twenty-first century perspective, however, it
is commonplace for actors and rock stars to lend their fame to human rights campaigns
on behalf of Ugandan street children, Afghan women, Tibetan exiles, New Orleans
refugees, or Haitian earthquake victims. Celebrities are useful spokespersons when it
comes to raising awareness and raising money because of the way in which the audience
perceives these familiar faces and voices. This familiarity allows for unfamiliar issues to
be brought into focus. Ostensibly, celebrities that engage in human rights and
humanitarian campaigns are genuine about their ethical and political commitments. As
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performers at benefit concerts, goodwill ambassadors, telethon phone bank operators, and
editorial contributors, popular cultural figures have come to occupy a central position in
human rights—especially with respect to communicating a message to the previously
uninformed and unconcerned spectator. The possibility that popular culture can provide a
platform for ordinary people to become aware of and involved in human rights is, at first
glance, a decidedly positive feature of the contemporary landscape. If scholars and
activists take seriously the desire to inculcate a “human rights culture,” the ability to
reach out to new communities of supporters is essential. However, the question addressed
in this chapter is whether the message communicated through celebrities and popular
culture can be of a political nature that advances human rights norms, overcoming the
commercial tendencies of these platforms.
Recent examples illustrate that the employment of celebrities in campaigns for
disaster relief or humanitarian aid can have profound effects. Masses of audience
members respond with charitable donations and letters to elected officials at the behest of
the famous advocate. The ability to rouse the consciousness of the general public and
place a dire issue on the agenda is powerful. Celebrities provide credibility to foreign
issues and concentrate attention on problems that might otherwise go unnoticed in a sea
of confusing crises. By a range of metrics—dollars raised, membership figures, or
intensity of public outcry—the role played by popular cultural figures has helped elevate
the profile of human rights to the ranks of other mainstream liberal causes, such as
environmentalism or the treatment of animals.
While celebrities have lent their fame to many diverse causes in the past, the
period discussed in this chapter (1975-1990) signals the institutionalization of the use of
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the celebrity-infused benefit concert by human rights organizations. Recruitment,
advocacy and fund-raising strategies were developed in this period to sustain a
burgeoning movement and advance its causes effectively among wider swaths of the
population. Celebrity appearances at benefit concerts provided the vehicle for
accomplishing such a set of objectives and quickly rose to prominence as a key indicator
of a cause’s public salience and viability. These types of events were not new per se, but
their routinization during the 1980s introduces new avenues for popular participation in
human rights campaigns, as well as provokes a range of new questions.
The initiation of these mass cultural events fundamentally transformed activism,
as movement architects sought to expand the base of human rights supporters within the
mainstream of Western societies. Human rights in the late-twentieth century was
associated with two central threads: grassroots struggles for self-determination, women’s
liberation, and equality for blacks in the US on the one hand, and in the context of
international legal battles waged in courts by trained jurists, on the other. Therefore,
while a range of actors were involved in human rights in the period since the drafting of
the Universal Declaration, there was largely a divide between the radical flank engaged in
direct action and those who take up the bureaucratic, legalistic approach. Yet, in the
waning years of the Cold War, human rights was guided along a mainstream path and it
became common to participate in activism without either being a member of an
oppressed group or an international lawyer. With an expanding pool of affluent observers
from which to draw support, human rights organizations situated themselves as relevant
actors in the new global civil society. The mainstreaming of human rights signified the
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potential for masses of people to be invested and involved in the defense of human
dignity, in a sustained capacity as part of a larger movement.
However, the means through which ordinary people became involved in human
rights campaigns is the critical subject of this discussion. As will be detailed below, due
to standard financial pressures associated with operating a growing organization, the
human rights movement was driven to commercialization early on. In order to generate
operations resources, organizations turned to popular cultural figures and their talents to
attract donors. As well, organizations began to sell products to bring in money: concert
tickets, t-shirts, posters, videos, and albums. Merchandising serves an obvious purpose,
but also presents human rights protection in a new light, framing the ethical imperative to
help the vulnerable as sufficiently fulfilled through shopping. As human rights and
humanitarian organizations utilized various types of commercial exchange—membership
dues, commodity consumption, divestment/boycott—a linkage was forged during this era
between spending money and the alleviation of suffering. A model for human rights
campaigns emerged during these years that relied on consumerism and popular culture
for the development of a donor-base and a standing constituency of advocates. These
mechanisms in turn influence the methods human rights organizations deploy in practice,
and these practical concerns will have consequences that demonstrate both the
opportunities presented by the market, as well as its dangerous pitfalls.
The episodes presented below offer examples of commercialized activism that
awakened the consciousness of new participants and provided formal channels for a mass
audience to connect themselves to human rights. The first snapshot captures Amnesty
International (AI) in its formative years and describes the simple events that laid the
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foundation for the strategic model that followed. While AI is the pre-eminent example of
the membership-based organization, the payment of dues by supporters was
supplemented by charitable giving at benefit events. This trend continues with the
Ethiopian famine alleviation campaigns of Live Aid and “We Are the World,” both of
which are solely donor-based and result in the height of frivolous humanitarian
consumerism. Finally, the anti-Apartheid movement idealizes the potential for an
effective human rights campaign in its utilization of divestment and boycotts, two forms
of consumption dependent on the consciousness and empowerment of the consumer.
To frame the pitfalls specifically, I focus on the costs associated with popular
culture and commercialization through appeal to critical theorists of the Frankfurt School.
For Theodor Adorno, popular culture is a homogenizing force that operates as an
extension of late-capitalism. The “culture industry” is that which is now responsible for
the production of music, film, and literature to be sold to the masses as a commodity—
instead of for its aesthetic merits, or political content. Herbert Marcuse, similarly,
describes popular culture as a consequence of the society of mass consumption that arose
in the West following the Second World War. “One-dimensionality” is the product of the
cultural environment that conditions assimilation and compliance. The critical
perspective has been absorbed into dominant modes of living; culture has become an
arena for alienation and repression, rather than for emancipation and radicalism. In terms
of human rights, this style of critique is salient with respect to the political content of
campaigns. If the integration of the culture industry with human rights contributes to its
one-dimensionality, then we should see a draining of politics from the movement. A
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human rights movement devoid of politics may see successes in its mass appeal, but risks
relegation and irrelevance.
This period proves to be formative in setting the trajectory of human rights
activism and the diffusion of a consciousness surrounding solidarity with suffering
strangers. Yet, the 1980s is an era defined by excess and luxury, calling into question the
viability of a political movement filtered through trends of mass consumption. In fact, for
most people, this decade was less about limousines and Wall Street and more about
stagnant wages and unemployment. Therefore, in the cultural milieu that exalts wealth in
the context of tough times, the rise of personal credit acts as a substitute that permits
mass consumption at one’s own steep expense. Human rights campaigns are designed to
capitalize on the momentum in the marketplace toward consumerism by integrating
popular culture in the form of celebrities and benefit concert events. The consequences of
these campaigns demonstrate whether the superficial features of commercialism
influence human rights, or if these ethical movements are able to channel market forces
in the service of human dignity.
At stake throughout this chapter is the perception of the political content of
human rights in the eyes of the audience. In the expressions of each of the campaigns, a
debate is underway that balances the softer dictates of a charitable cause and the harder
political edge of a human rights movement. With the injection of commercial elements as
tools in global movements, the seductive side of the marketplace—that side occupied by
consumerism—has the potential to affect the substance of the movements and shape the
association participants share of human rights and humanitarianism. The conclusions
drawn from these three vignettes suggest that, ultimately, the strategic model that
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combines popular culture and mass consumption has the potential to produce either an
effective solidarity movement, or an atomized hoard of consumers masquerading as
activists. Consequences depend on the relationship between the motivations of
individuals and the expressions of their participation, as form shapes content. Popular
culture, while effective as a means for raising funds and awareness, can also forge a
consciousness based around apolitical, and, indeed, depoliticized mass consumption.
Instead of committing themselves to the protection of the dignity of others, supporters
merely seek their own satisfaction—self-indulgence cloaked in empathy. However, when
the proper mechanisms are utilized, market-based venues for activism can produce an
empowered grassroots movement with significant international strength. The context for
these events is a decade fraught with contradiction, but provides explanatory power as to
how the consumerism was put to work for human rights.
The Socio-Political Economy of Mass Culture
Personal Finance, the Yuppie, and the Consumer Class
The emergence of affluence and mass consumption in the 1980s is set against the
backdrop of the economic instability of the prior decade. The 1970s were a period of
perpetual crisis and societal despair, highlighted by oil spikes, inflation, and a general
transformation of the economic landscape. The Third World was industrializing and
inviting foreign direct investment away from the West. As early as “1970[,]
manufacturing firms were making about 25 percent of their new investment overseas”
(Schwartz 2000, 200). This trend continued when the cartel known as the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, began to exert control over flows of oil and
money—especially in response to flare ups in conflict between Arab states and Israel
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during the decade. Western economic preponderance was slipping away and the balance
of power was shifting. Growth slowed down dramatically. Recession ensued. Volatility in
the energy market, coupled with the adaptations made by industrial nations to deal with
floating exchange rates and a weak dollar, shaped the 1970s into a period of “anxiety,
fear for the future—in short, crisis” (Beaud 2001, 232).
However, in the 1980s, US markets would tourniquet their wounds and generate
positive flows by opening investment to individuals. With the deregulation of finance in
1975, the exchange of stocks moved from fixed commission rates to competitive
commission rates and initiated the personalization of finance with discount brokerage
firms (Nocera 1994, 106-107).“Deregulation of financial services was oriented toward
creating a consumer rather than business face for stock ownership” (Martin 2002, 23).
Money market funds, first devised in the late-1960s, were the vehicle for introducing
middle-class consumers to the stock market as a mechanism for “saving” money;
traditionally reliable dividends were perceived as interest returned on principal form a
high yield savings account. Inflation compelled this move because as the value of money
fell, actual savings accounts (regulated by federal rates) fell. “A blurring had begun
between saving and investing” (Nocera 1994, 83). Because money market funds were not
backed by the Federal Reserve, they were resistant to inflation. While returns were higher
in the market than in savings, consumers kept their money in these funds and became
accustomed to moving money back and forth according to changes in interest rates
(Nocera 1994, 83). Money market managers profitted by establishing these funds and
charging transaction fees to users. Personal finance extended beyond the savings account
and investment was no longer exclusively for big business. What started as a mechanism
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for individuals to sidestep the pitfalls of inflation accounted for $400 billion in
investment by 1991; this “was the first truly different wrinkle in personal finance since
the credit card” and would facilitate change in “the financial habits of the middle class”
(Nocera 1994, 75). Personal debt, in the form of credit cards and home mortgages, would
accelerate this trend throughout the decade as a reflection of the imperative for
consumption that defined the 1980s.
The presumed profitability of money market funds, however, would be juxtaposed
with an precedented accumulation of debt that “turned ‘the eighties’ into a term of
opprobrium” (Nocera 1994, 297). Accessibility of personal lines of credit ushered in and
perpetuated consumption for the sake of it. By all measures, debt skyrocketed during the
decade and by 1987 the upward trend peaked as total consumer debt had doubled,
revolving credit card balances tripled, home equity loans amounted to $80 billion of new
debt annually, and the ratio of debt payment to disposable income per household was 25
percent (Nocera 1994, 297). Specifically, credit cards were a central driver of this trend.
“By 1984, 71 percent of all Americans between seventeen and sixty-five carried a credit
card” (Nocera 1994, 301). The blurring that had begun with money market funds had
been transferred to the notion of credit and debt as a normal component of one’s financial
portfolio—as if the money one is allowed to borrow from a lender was real earned money
that consumers were entitled to. In actuality, credit provides a false sense of purchasing
power that plays into the hands of the financiers at the expense of the borrower. Personal
finance in the 1980s took the form of market investment and debt and replaced the 1970s
mindset of austerity, saving, and desert. Instead, individuals consumed beyond their class
and beyond their means, in such a way that has been characterized as “a betrayal of
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traditional middle-class values” and “a wholesale surrender to the priorities of profit and
the pleasures of consumerism” (Ehrenreich 1989, 200).
Beyond the pleasurable benefit of purchasing material goods, consumerism is
embedded with social meaning. Finance and banking during this period personified the
upper crust of society because of the way in which it had emerged as the pre-eminent
growth sector. Those employed in this area benefited quickly and directly from changes
in the economy. The credit card industry had become the “most profitable activity in all
of banking” (Nocera 1994, 302) and “by 1985, close to 8 million Americans…were using
them to ring up close to $8 billion in charges” (Nocera 1994, 303). As finance charges
and overdraft fees flooded in, lenders—the companies, their boards of trustees, and their
shareholders—reaped enormous profits. This was true in investment as well, as the
Gordon Gekkos of the world rose to prominence as leaders of industry because the period
produced real-life Gekkos as well, such as Donald Trump and T. Boone Pickens. The
persona of Michael Douglas’s character in the film Wall Street (1987) was a caricature of
the age, but not a fiction. Wealth inequalities were widening and class distinctions
continuing to erode. Penthouse apartments, chauffeur-driven limousine rides to work, and
thousand-dollar suits were projected in a normative fashion as an ideal that everyone
should strive for. And, for some, it was a reality. “In Wall Street’s bustling money
factories, the goal of amassing a million by age thirty was neither uncommon nor entirely
unrealistic. Baby high-rollers were proliferating, and New York’s $50-a-lunch restaurants
were jammed, by the late eighties, with fresh-faced young people barely above the
drinking age” (Ehrenreich 1989, 212).
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These “baby high-rollers” were also known colloquially by another name:
yuppies. When Newsweek declared 1985 to be “The Year of the Yuppie,” its editors were
commenting (not unfavorably) on the compulsion toward mass consumption driven by
these upper class elites (Adler et al. 1984). Derived from the term “young, urban
professionals,” the yuppie was also related to the “yippie” or members of the Youth
International Party, a radical social group from the late-1960s. There was a sense in
which the 1960s, baby boomer generation had grown up and grown out of its youthful
indiscretion in favor of a mature profit-oriented outlook. Their resolve remains the same:
the capacity of this generation to change the course of war, or of society by their own
will. They are confident, optimistic, and undeterred by what seem like structural
obstacles—be they racial discrimination or a traditional middle-class value system. The
political constitution of the baby boomers is called upon by the human rights campaigns
of the period, in the rallying cries of the against issues like famine and Apartheid.
But, beyond this, yuppies are renowned for their consumption: of European cars,
vacation, condos in a gentrified neighborhood, running shoes, gym memberships, and
crème fraiche (Adler et al. 1984). The more exotic, the more expensive, the less like their
parents, the better. A thread through yuppie consumption is the predilection for leisure
and luxury. With more money than one needs, especially if a man was one half of a twoincome family (a relatively recent trend), “the importance of status-motivated
consumption increased significantly”:
A new kind of consumer had emerged for whom consumption itself came
to play a central role in constructing new senses of identity based on and
around the possession of status-conferring goods. Traditional concepts of
social class based on education and occupation were breaking down…
‘Lifestyle’ grew in importance as an indicator of social group
	
  

29

membership, and these group identities, freed from the old restrictions
imposed by social class and fixed status groups, were secured by adopting
appropriate patterns of consumption.” (Mason 1998, 130)
The affluent, comfortable classes embodied the mantra of excess in consumption that
epitomized the 1980s as “Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous” became required viewing
for all. “As the baby boom matured, spending on entertainment and recreation grew
rapidly…With most of Americans’ basic needs met, they have devoted an increasing
share of their spending to having fun” (Russell 1993, 66). To be sure, yuppies were not a
majority of the population and were likely only about 5 percent of their generation
(Ehrenreich 1989, 198). However, the crucial point in this discussion is the influence and
the impact that the objectification of the yuppie as the ideal has on lower classes. The
contradiction of working people striving to obtain the lifestyle of the yuppies in a
sluggish economic environment is fraught with the tensions of the era.
Yet, as the upper classes relished the good life of “champagne dreams and caviar
wishes,” the other 95 percent suffered under stagnating wages, high unemployment, and
aggressive attacks on organized labor. Reaganism and Thatcherism enacted tax cuts for
the rich, which resulted in public spending cutbacks that disproportionately affected
lower classes. “Marginal rates on the very rich were reduced from a partly nominal 70
percent to 50 percent in 1981; then with tax reform the rate on the richest fell to 28
percent in 1986” (Galbraith 1992, 27). Meanwhile, “the number of Americans living
below the poverty line increased by 28 percent in just ten years, from 24.5 million in
1978 to 32 million in 1988” (Galbraith 1992, 107). In the midst of recession, with the gap
between rich and poor continuing to widen, those on the bottom looked upwards for
inspiration and Gordon Gekko smiled smugly right back at them.
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Rising debt from home equity loans and revolving credit card balances were tools
that working people utilized to attain a measure of the yuppie lifestyle, even if it was
perpetually out of reach. Working extra hours, taking an additional mortgage on the
house, and applying for another line of credit might secure a new home stereo system, but
it would also set one further back—like struggling in a pool of quick sand. The cultural
hegemony of consumerism projected by the yuppie against the reality of the working and
middle classes shaped the needs and desires of those worse off. This is so much the case
that, not only were the goods and services that credit cards could help one obtain a
measure of status, but the medium itself was culturally transformed.
Credit cards were a status symbol. Credit cards were temptation incarnate.
Credit cards could get you access to things that were otherwise out of
reach. Credit cards could ruin your life. Credit cards could bring great joy.
Credit cards could bring enormous misery. Of all the symbols of the
American consumer society, credit cards had a hold on the subconscious
that was matched—in a completely different way only by the automobile.
(Nocera 1994, 300)
This final comment is especially appropriate, in terms of the comparison of the 1980s to
the original era of mass consumption in the 1950s, when the automobile was introduced
to the middle-class demographic for the first time. Mass consumption and the affluent
lifestyle never went away, but did suffer setbacks during the 1970s wave of economic
crisis. When, in the 1980s, with the revolutions in personal finance underway, a broader
swath of the population gets swept up in the “joys” of consumerism that cloud selfconsciousness and affect all areas of society, from leisure and family life to labor and
political activism. Thus, the emergence of a human rights movement with mass appeal is
mired in a cultural environment rife with mass consumption, making market-based
platforms for activism worthy of critique.
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Mass Consumption and One-Dimensionality
Questions associated with mass culture and mass consumption first arise as a
response to the affluence in the United States following World War II. Suburban sprawl
and Madison Avenue dominated society and perpetuated the blurring of class lines. With
the integration of working class demands into postwar social welfare arrangements and
the continued disintegration of organized labor generally, lower classes became alienated
from their status in society. The expanding middle and upper classes projected their
lifestyles downward, influencing the desires of working people. For Herbert Marcuse, for
instance, this transition was not coincidental because of the way in which it serves the
interests of capital:
Here the so-called equalization of class distinctions reveals its ideological
function. If the worker and his boss enjoy the same television program and
visit the same resort places, if the typist is as attractively made up as the
daughter of her employer, if the Negro owns a Cadillac, if they all read the
same newspaper, then this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of
classes, but the extent to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the
preservation of the Establishment are shared by the underlying population.
(Marcuse 1964, 8)
The crucial point in this analysis is the change in the composition of society and
its effect on the psychology of those that are getting left behind. In Gramscian terms, the
“hegemony” of upper class ideologies about consumption and the good life are
personified as those values that should be held by all, despite the fact that they fly in the
face of the realization of the self and emancipation from the grips of industrial capital.
For Marcuse, this is manifested in commodity consumption. The more one owns, the
“better” one is, the freer one is. Freedom is exercised by the choices one makes in the
marketplace, without regard for the relations of production. This compulsion for
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consumerism is a form of social control that permeates the lower classes at their own
expense and the deeper consumers buy into this mantra, the further from actualization
they become.
But for Marcuse, this is not simply a story about luxury automobiles and vacation
resorts because of the way that mass consumption affects politics. As the traditional
torchbearers of progressive politics, to the extent the working class and the Left more
broadly are absorbed by the society of mass consumption, radical politics are rendered
impotent. As diverse interests from throughout society converge on the market, a
collapsing effect ripples outward. Consumers are submerged by the notion that any
problem can be alleviated through the purchase of goods and services, thereby making it
unnecessary to politically challenge power structures, be they capital or otherwise. The
misery and pain of daily life can be ignored when consumers are pacified by the newest
home entertainment system or blockbuster action film. Radical challenges to the status
quo are quashed and the society of mass consumption becomes ultimately onedimensional—that is, devoid of nonconformist perspectives. “And if the individuals are
pre-conditioned so that the satisfying goods also include thoughts, feelings, aspirations,
why should they wish to think, feel, and imagine for themselves?” (Marcuse 1964, 50).
One-dimensionality is the collapse of multiple perspectives: the mainstream and those
that project alternative visions for society.
Yet, the society of mass consumption was not confined to the economic and
political realms. The cultural realm was invaded as well through the mechanism of the
“culture industry.” Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer are the pioneers of this area of
critical theory for their insights into the encroachment of the forces of production into
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culture. For them, this advancement is the logical progression of the system of capitalism
that had successfully colonized labor and now was extending its control over non-work,
or leisure time. The culture industry is the expression of the social control being
exercised over consumers in their free time. “The effectiveness of the culture industry
depends not on its parading an ideology, on disguising the true nature of things, but in
removing the thought that there is any alternative to the status quo” (Adorno 1991, 11).
At stake in this analysis is the effect of culture on critical thought, on the ability of the
audience to seek self-consciousness. The claim, emphasized most clearly by Marcuse,
entails the numbing of the general public and the stifling of radical political perspectives
by cultural hegemony: “there is no reason to insist on self-determination if the
administered life is the comfortable and even the ‘good’ life. This is the rational and
material ground for the unification of opposites, for one-dimensional political behavior.
On this ground, the transcending political forces within society are arrested, and
qualitative change appears possible only as a change from without” (Marcuse 1964, 49).
Mass cultural production masks class conflict and obscures contradictions in social life
that could generate revolutionary activity. Instead, the viewer and listener are placated by
feelings of satisfaction, happiness, and freedom that the consumption of popular culture
falsely suggests.
Popular music, as one product of the culture industry, is particularly engineered
for ensuring passivity among its audience due to the standardization with which it is
produced, mirroring the routinization and mechanization inherent in industrial capitalism.
Adorno describes this phenomenon as an expression of the “fetish character in music.”
Hit songs are designed for “regressive listening” that “appears as soon as advertising
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turns into terror, as soon as nothing is left for the consciousness but to capitulate before
the superior power of the advertised stuff and purchase spiritual peace by making the
imposed goods literally its own thing” (Adorno 1991, 47-48). This cultural form sells an
image, an individuality, that it in reality suffocates. It is the illusion of free choice in the
cultural marketplace that consumers succumb to in their search for personal expression.
“[T]he official culture’s pretence of individualism…necessarily increases in proportion to
the liquidation of the individual…The identical character of the goods which everyone
must buy hides itself behind the rigor of the universally compulsory style” (Adorno 1991,
40). Instead of fulfilling the emotional desire to seek out and experience art, popular
music is force fed to the consumer. The culture industry treats consumers like children,
and perpetuates regressive cultural behavior with the rhythmic structure of the songs, as
well as through the production process and manner of delivery (Barber 2007).
Describing mass culture as “pre-digested,” Adorno evokes imagery of a mother
bird ingesting, masticating, and regurgitating food for her young (Adorno 1994, 210).
The young bird is the recipient of nourishing substance, but is not involved in the process
of discovery, procurement, or even natural biological functions like chewing and
swallowing. Passive, the consumer of mass culture falsely associates spending with the
exercise of individuality and audience membership with political engagement. Therefore,
what sense can we make of “charity rock” events or those popular cultural products that
support human rights campaigns? If Adorno is correct, then this represents the successful
commodification of human rights activism by profit-seeking firms, accomplished through
the manipulation of average people. Mass culture may not be the appropriate venue for
human rights campaigns because of the deep, paralyzing disconnect between form and
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content, substance and essence. As Adorno writes, “Those who ask for a song of social
significance ask for it through a medium which deprives it of social significance”
(Adorno 1994, 212). It is difficult, if not impossible, in this context, to execute politically
motivated campaigns without running the risk of dilution, perversion, or outright cooptation. The 1980s was a decade particularly ripe for mass culture and mass
consumption due to changes in class structure, capital accumulation, and social values,
and presents a questionable context for the execution of political human rights
campaigns.
Financial Demands and the Initiation of the Pop Culture Model
Growth amidst Uncertainty
Amnesty International’s genesis story is nearing the status of fabled legend: In
1961, Peter Benenson writes an opinion piece in the Observer entitled “The Forgotten
Prisoners” that detailed the plight of Portuguese students who had been arrested and
imprisoned for toasting to freedom. Much has been said of the organization’s evolution,
the expansion of its mandate, and its role as international “norm entrepreneur” (see
Larsen 1979; Clark 2001; Jonathan Power 2001; Hopgood 2006). From its humble
beginnings in a barrister’s office in London, to its ascent as the face of the global human
rights movement, Amnesty has undergone an amazing transformation in under fifty
years. Yet, the 1970s was a proper moment of maturation for the still-young nongovernmental organization (NGO). Every year during the decade witnessed rapid growth
by all indications. From 1969-1976, membership experienced a six-fold explosion, rising
from 15,000 to 97,000, and the organization’s annual budget expanded by over 1300
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percent from approximately $43,000 to over $579,000.1 This correlation demonstrates
how AI’s central administrative body, the International Secretariat (IS), was forced to
develop its capacities to keep up pace with demand.
These pressures are magnified because of the fact that the organization is set-up in
a simultaneously centralized and de-centralized fashion: the production of profiles of the
Prisoners of Conscience (POCs) is left to the IS and its research wing, while letter writing
and the work of getting Prisoners freed is reserved to local chapters that adopt particular
cases on which to focus. Thus, the greater the number of chapters, the greater the demand
on the IS to support them with reliable information and campaigns behind which to place
their efforts. This tension must be emphasized because growth of this magnitude becomes
a difficult thing to manage; yet it is in the best interest of the movement, and the
Prisoners, to maintain growth at all costs.
However, the strain on resources was tremendous, due not only to the increasing
demand on research, but also due to the global recession during these tough years.
Financially, similar to the division of labor, AI is also arranged through a mixture of
central and de-central relations. National sections are responsible for funding an
overwhelming percentage of the IS budget through the direct contribution of its
membership dues, while the central body is also involved in generating funds through
soliciting donation and sales of its publications. Furthermore, membership dues ranged
widely based on the economic wherewithal of the national sections, their local chapters,
and the individuals themselves. Nobody was excluded from membership due to lack of
payment and the levels of contribution were flexible. Therefore, when oil crises struck
1

Based on this author’s calculations from data in AI Annual Reports.
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particularly hard or inflation rose dramatically, both of which happened throughout the
1970s, individual contributions were inconsistent.
Trepidations about the balance between growth and capital, between the impulse
toward expansion and the financial realities inherent in expansion, were expressed
annually in the Treasurer’s Report. While it is presumably the role of the financial officer
to voice caution and advocate for incrementalism, the tone of each subsequent year’s
report communicates a genuine concern for the future viability of an organization
growing at such an accelerated pace. Kevin T. White, in his Treasurer’s Report of 1974,
articulates this concern clearly:
…as the need for AI’s work grows, a melancholy fact that is all too
evident, there will be continuous calls for the expansion of the
organization.
In our desire to meet every call, we should be conscious of the fact that we
cannot immediately rectify all the ills of the world, that our resources are
limited and that we may have to consider whether it is better to
concentrate on doing effectively within our resources what we can do in a
limited field, rather than spread our efforts too thinly over a broad front
that we risk effectively accomplishing too little for too many…we may
only be building up an expensive machine costing too much to
service…(Amnesty International 1974a, 151)
The risk confronting the organization, of folding under its own weight, was a real one
that was revisited in White’s 1976 Report.
Some of the arguments in favor of expanding present activities and taking
on extra activities are seductive. But succumbing to these pressures would
either result in partial suspension of the work AI was founded to perform
under its statute (…), or in having to increase our budget substantially to
enable us to continue our normal activities while taking on new tasks.
I suggest that the time has come to consider how big do we want this
organization to grow and whether substantial growth in the International
Secretariat will result in greater effectiveness and achievements. In my
view it is essential that we do not allow ourselves to be blindly borne
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along on a wave of enthusiasm without fully considering and appreciating
the consequences. (Amnesty International 1976, 206)
At stake in this debate was the reputation AI had worked so hard to establish—of its
reliable effectiveness—and the future mission of the organization.
The question of mission has always been a crucial one for Amnesty, which had
traditionally framed itself with a limited purview. Originally cast as a protector of
freedom of opinion and religion (and defender of “Prisoners of Conscience”), AI
expanded its scope to focus on torture and the death penalty; these two particular
violations grew out of in-country reporting in 1970s flash points like Uruguay, Argentina,
the Soviet Union, Chile, Iran, and Iraq. While these three pillars—Prisoners of
Conscience, torture, and execution—are commonly grouped together under the heading
of political and civil rights, even AI’s conception of this category is limited. There was
little work done in the areas of self-determination, gender equality, slavery, privacy,
family, children, or voting, each of which is guaranteed by the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, Articles 1, 3, 8, 17, 23, 24 and 25, respectively).
Arbitrary arrest and detention, AI’s initial cause, remained central to the organization’s
work, yet lesser violations of due process were not given much attention. Instead, a more
useful typology to describe the kind of work Amnesty was involved in can be labeled as
“security rights,” or rights protective of physical integrity (Shue 1980; Milner, Poe, and
Leblang 1999).
This mention is not intended for the purpose of maligning Amnesty for its lack of
attention to important violations, or even to cite it for inconsistency; rather it is to
circumscribe the narrow focus with which the seminal human rights organization has
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always operated. This much is emphasized by the institution itself, for example by
Thomas Hammarberg, Chairman of the International Executive Committee in 1978: “We
do not cover a broader spectrum [of rights]. This is not because we ignore the importance
of all the other rights, but because we recognize that we can only achieve concrete results
within set limits” (Amnesty International 1978, 1). Self-consciousness of this degree is
not a reflection of shortcomings, but rather of strength. It is for this reason that debates
over growth and expansion are taken seriously and are looked upon as propitious
moments of opportunity, as well as tenuous points of transition. With this in mind, the
architects of Amnesty International during the 1970s slowly created space, within the
framework of the mandate, to build on areas of strength and, in a controlled fashion, raise
its profile through the production of influential work.
In 1972, Amnesty International launched its Campaign Against Torture, which
would necessitate raising the annual budget projections without knowing well where the
money would come from to support the development of the initial torture report and the
subsequent work in maintaining the campaign (Amnesty International 1973a). The initial
push culminated in a December 1973 international conference in Paris, featuring a fulllength film, The Year of the Torturer, and performances by Joan Baez (Amnesty
International 1973b). Torture campaigns would be ignited periodically hereafter and
remains a central issue (Clark 2001, chap. 2). Also in 1973, the International Executive
Committee voted to take on the worldwide abolition of the death penalty as an addition to
AI’s platform. While not without its controversy (Thompson 2008), this decision
provided further credibility for the organization that now would even defend the lives of
violent offenders facing execution by the state following conviction. Finally, this stance
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would position AI to undertake the phenomenon of “extrajudicial executions,” or
summary political killings of infamy from places like Uganda, Cambodia, and Iraq, and
perpetrated by “death squads” notoriously operating throughout Latin America during
this period (Clark 2001, chap. 5). In these areas and others, Amnesty began producing
targeted reports on specific countries and was recognized for its ground breaking work on
Argentina’s Dirty War with the 1977 awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize. With these
developments, Amnesty International had significantly broadened its scope and burdened
itself with an enormous workload during times of increasingly tighter budgetary
constraints.
There is a spiraling nature to Amnesty’s work: the more its research capacity
improves and the more effectively it exposes violations to the world, the more work it
creates for itself. It is not as if human rights violations spiked during this decade, but
rather that the knowledge of such occurrences becomes more widely available. Therefore,
this tension between growth and capital is not static, but an ongoing semi-crisis that is
self-perpetuating. As Amnesty spread out geographically, opening its first chapter behind
the Iron Curtain in Moscow in 1974 (Larsen 1979, 86), new members solicited for more
prisoners to represent. While the growth of national sections would plateau by the late1970s, local groups would continue to mushroom at nearly the same pace, placing
additional expectations on the IS for research and case adoption. Due to these
rudimentary organizational questions concerning finances and objectives, Amnesty was
compelled to dig deeper and seek out new ways to fund its growing enterprise. Out of this
simple and mundane scenario emerged a strategy for attracting people to the cause of
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human rights, building a membership base, and raising significant amounts of money for
the movement.

The Emergence of the Human Rights Benefit Concert
The financing of the Amnesty International movement has always been a delicate
matter because of the rigid doctrine that governs the raising of funds for this
uncompromising organization. In order to maintain neutrality, which is seen as the
cornerstone of its persona, AI refuses to take government money and only rarely accepts
foundation donations. Forsaking this commitment would amount to surrendering its
ability to assert the universal perspective in defense of human dignity, a stance that
hinges on its non-ideological and unbiased grounding. Amnesty International relies on
the position it has carefully staked out for itself: a reasonable, trustworthy voice of
“moral authority,” untainted by the corruption of self-interest (See throughout Hopgood
2006). During the hyper-ideological years of the late-1970s, criticisms of AI came from
both the right and the left, from democratic and communist governments, from
theocracies and military dictatorships, which signals the fact that Amnesty was
successfully toeing the line.
In this environment, arose the question of how and where to raise the funds
necessary to maintain, as well as expand, Amnesty’s capacities. The International
Secretariat tasked national sections and local groups to begin generating additional funds
with renewed urgency. In the newsletters that served as the main method for
communication and dissemination of directives, the IS solicited for fund-raising ideas to
be submitted and re-printed in the monthly installments. “Sections and groups are invited
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to submit successful techniques they have used for raising funds for AI…Group 2 of
Pinneberg, West Germany, for example raised 1,300 marks (about $250) during the 1972
Prisoner of Conscience Week by the simple device of preparing a huge cauldron of hot
pea soup and dispensing it to passers-by on a cold Saturday morning” (Amnesty
International 1974b). Two months later, it was announced that “Group 4 of the
Norwegian Section raised 20,000 Norwegian kroner last November in a one-day sale of
antiques, paintings, sculpture, books, and other works of art. Group Number 2 of the
Danish Section raised 900 Danish kroner with an evening of folk dancing which was
combined with a fashion show at which sandwiches, coffee and second-hand clothes
were sold” (Amnesty International 1974c). The addition of these local attempts at
resolving the budget crisis presented themselves as cultural gatherings at which
supporters of AI could donate small amounts and contribute to a larger cause. In 1976,
however, the United Kingdom section tread a similar path, but on a grander scale, using
its own national cultural resources, setting into motion a trend that would define the
period.
At this point, Amnesty International’s coffers were essentially empty and the
organization teetered on the edge of bankruptcy, while facing enormous pressures to
produce (Biskind 2004, 44; Harrington 1986). Peter Luff, then Assistant Director of
Amnesty International, received a check at the AI-UK office from an individual donor
signed “J. Cleese” (Scheinman 2008). The check was from John Cleese of Monty
Python’s Flying Circus, and Luff considered the possibility that Cleese would want to be
involved in fundraising in a more central capacity. The possibility of hosting an event
featuring high profile comedians would raise the exposure of Amnesty International
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itself, the general awareness of human rights, as well as much needed funds. Cleese,
collaborating with music and television producer, Martin Lewis, founded the events
known collectively as the Secret Policeman’s Balls. “A Poke in the Eye (with a Sharp
Stick),” as the first official show was called, was held in 1976 at Her Majesty’s Theater
and raised $40,000 for Amnesty by bringing together Cleese and his comedic comrades
(McCall 1991, 46; Harrington 1986). The first three events have become known as
landmark events in the history of British comedy because of the fact that they assembled
two legendary comedy troupes, Beyond the Fringe and Monty Python, on one stage for
the first time ever. Beyond the Fringe was of a previous generation and known for its
erudite commentary and literate characters (Kinmonth 2004). Python was a younger
crew, popular among a wider audience, for its skilled mix of slapstick, non sequitur, and
satire. The third annual show, for the first time termed “The Secret Policeman’s Ball,”
broadened the entertainment to include composer John Williams and guitarist for The
Who, Pete Townshend. As the years went on, the shows grew in prominence, were better
attended, and more lucrative.
Despite its success, the event remained a British show. In 1981, however, its
profile was raised once again by the inclusion of hugely popular musicians like Sting,
Eric Clapton, Phil Collins, and Bob Geldof. Performers, drawn to the event by its
humanitarian impulse, donated their services for no compensation. With hindsight it is
clear, as will be detailed below, how the Secret Policeman’s Ball was the a key impetus
for the mass benefit concerts to follow, including Geldof’s Live Aid. The live events
were recorded and sold as record albums and movies to a larger audience that could not
possibly all fit in the intimate theaters where the events were held. Harvey and Bob
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Weinstein, at the time unproven American film producers who would go on to found
Miramax Pictures and are considered highly influential figures, distributed The Secret
Policeman’s Ball for the American audience. Screening the film at a popular Los Angeles
festival in 1982 would catapult the series to higher levels and would go on to generate $6
million in revenue (Biskind 2004, 46). It is unclear how much of that Amnesty
International ever saw, but, as Martin Lewis has said, “What they’d [the Weinsteins] said
to us was that the theatrical was going to generate more publicity and heat for the home
video and TV. Was Amnesty unhappy? Our expectations on this were minimal, zero.
Amnesty was thrilled beyond words” (Quoted in Biskind 2004, 46). The franchise would
spin-off comedy and music albums and in-theater and at-home versions of the stage
show, all of which sold remarkably well. Having surpassed their modest goals, these
benefit events went on hiatus until their re-emergence in 1987.

Membership, Donation, and Consumption-Based Engagement
The problems faced by AI during this period were, essentially, good problems to
have: How do we carefully grow our organization in the face of vociferous calls for
greater capabilities? Confronted with this dilemma, its engineers made a reasonable
attempt to raise money and awareness for Amnesty’s operations through the use of local
celebrities soliciting for donations from the public. The final analysis of this period in
AI’s history is definitive: these methods successfully bolstered the budget, fostered
immense growth of membership numbers, and transformed Amnesty into a global actor.
By the early 1980s, international membership figures surpassed the half million mark and
the IS budget approached two million. Over the course of a decade, these numbers
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climbed in lock step by approximately ten times and Amnesty International had been
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize—astounding progress by any measure.
However, during this early phase, due to financial pressures, Amnesty exposed
itself to the public as charity recipient. In combination with its continuous membership
drives, the formal appeal for donations rounded off a model that would expand over the
course of the decade in other contexts. Audiences began to associate human rights
participation with their attendance at benefit concerts, celebrity performances, and the
purchase of merchandise. But, in the case of Amnesty, charity did not constitute the
entire relationship because of the membership component. Membership, even when
entered into for a small fee, requires at least a concern for the cause and the desire to
contribute support. Allegiance to a human rights organization did not require that one
vote in a certain way, or believe any certain thing beyond the claim that all humans are
endowed with rights by virtue of their humanity and that human dignity is worthy of
protection.
In addition to dues, Amnesty has always emphasized the dimension of action.
Letter writing, from its very inception, has been the core of AI’s platform. While one
need not be a dues-paying member to write a letter, the format of regular member
meetings at which people gather to focus on case work is the cornerstone of the
movement: local chapters of ordinary people working on behalf of a prisoner or broader
issue half a world away. In important ways, the membership model is that which is most
familiar in the context of a local organization, not a global one. Passing around the basket
at the end of a meeting is a reasonable and limited way for a community group to raise
money. Membership dues are a simple way to invest activists in the organization, as well
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as generate funds for central operating expenses. The possibility of building a permanent,
standing human rights movement was paramount in the minds of the architects and the
membership model was their way of articulating the necessity for investment and
commitment. It was not sufficient for the members to serve as donors and the letter
writing campaigns evidence the participatory nature of Amnesty International.
Yet, the initiation of this design also exposed human rights to the marketplace in
new ways. The involvement of celebrities in human rights and the association of human
rights with charity pose certain problems that will play themselves out over time, kernels
of which can already be gleaned. While Amnesty pioneered letter writing as a human
rights tactic, and continues to deploy this tactic with great success, forging a relationship
with new audiences through the market mixes messages. It personifies human rights
involvement as sufficiently fulfilled through donation and attendance at comedy shows.
Equivocating participation in human rights struggle with giving to a charitable cause
depoliticizes the nature of human rights. Introducing entertainers as key figures in the
human rights movement engages the public on the basis of entertainment and commands
a specific type of participation that potentially impedes the viability of a political stance.
It is this commodification of human rights activism—the direct correlation between
consumption and political engagement—that threatens to relegate this burgeoning
movement to a mainstream trend.
Humanitarian Mass Events and Culture Industry
From the Theater to the Arena
Across the Atlantic, the USA section of AI was feeding off the success of the
American exposure to the Secret Policeman’s Balls and sought to capitalize on the public
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fervor around humanitarian issues. In 1984, following a large donation by U2 derived
from the proceeds of a December 3 show at Radio City Music Hall in New York, AIUSA
Executive Director Jack Healy began pursuing the young Irish rock band to headline a
future concert tour to celebrate Amnesty’s twenty-fifth birthday (McGee 2006). By
August 1985, Healy had a commitment from U2 to headline a tour set to stop in six
American cities, named “The Conspiracy of Hope Tour,” and would feature a reunited
Police, Peter Gabriel, Jackson Browne, Lou Reed, and Joan Baez (a veritable encore of
her 1973 performances in Paris), among others. For Bono of U2 and Sting of The Police,
the root of their affiliation with Amnesty was their association with The Secret
Policeman’s Ball, Bono as a viewer, Sting as a performer (Fricke 1986, 99). The purpose
of the tour was to enlist 25,000 new American members committed to write one letter a
month for one year towards the release of six Prisoners of Conscience adopted for the
tour: Lee Kwang-Ung (South Korea); Hugo de Leon Palacios (Guatemala); Tatyana
Semyonova Osipova (USSR); Riad al-Turk (Syria); Thozamile Gqweta (South Africa);
and Nguyen Chi Thien (Vietnam) (Morley 1986, 56). When the dust had settled on this
first spectacular event, AIUSA had matched its annual budget in revenue ($3 million
raised), tripled its membership (45,000 newly enlisted), and released four of the six POCs
(McGee 2006). This concert tour idealizes the kind of success the synthesis of the benefit
concert format, popular culture, and political action can produce.
Following the enormous success of Conspiracy of Hope, Healey set his sights
higher, hoping to broaden the scope of the project, while readjusting the project’s goals.
Instead of quantitative thresholds, Healey shifted his language toward a more abstract
agenda: “This was always planned as a consciousness-raising event, not a fund-raising
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one” (Henke 1988b, 15). Therefore, the 1988 “Human Rights Now!” tour, coinciding
with the fortieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration, set out to visit and perform in
countries throughout the world over a six-week period, from London, Paris, and Budapest
to India, Zimbabwe, and Brazil. Playing to hundreds of thousands of people, the tour
aimed at promoting the UDHR primarily and Amnesty secondly. However, a project of
this scale would be an overwhelming undertaking even for the ambitious Healey and
shortly after development had begun, it became clear that the financial cost of the tour
was unsustainable.
Therefore, AI sought a partnership to help underwrite the tour and settled on
Reebok, a producer of athletic apparel who agreed to fund 50 percent of the total cost ($8
million) and front overhead as well ($2 million); the other approximately $9 million
would be recouped by ticket prices, merchandising, and the sale of broadcast rights
(Henke 1988b, 15). Given AI’s financial rigidity, forging a private sector partnership was
a new foray for Amnesty. Yet, Healey himself oversaw the negotiations and performed a
thorough background check of all of Reebok’s operations. What he found allayed all
concerns, as Reebok had already pulled out of Apartheid South Africa and subsequently
established the Reebok Human Rights Award, an annual prize still in existence today
(Henke 1988a, 17). It is estimated that 1.2 million people worldwide attended the
concerts and witnessed performances by Sting, Peter Gabriel, Tracy Chapman, Bruce
Springsteen and the E Street Band, the Senegalese sensation Youssou N’Dour, as well as
local featured artists (Rolling Stone 1988, 118). Without question, the Amnesty
International profile had never been grander. The human rights movement had run away
with the concept of the benefit concert and executed its plans effectively. Despite its
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ambitions being considerably larger than its budget could withstand, Amnesty’s ability to
internationalize the benefit concert, coupled with the request for membership dues and
the demand for political action, proved to be a winning formula for the accomplishment
of its objectives.
Humanitarianism, Famine, and Rock ‘n’ Roll
The Amnesty International benefit events that began on a relatively modest scale
expanded quickly from theaters and concert halls to arenas and stadiums; and even wider
audiences were targeted through the marketing and sales of films and albums. This
transition, from intimate shows to mass events, is a crucial transformation in the history
of “charity rock” and is largely attributed to one person: Sir Bob Geldof. Before the
Secret Policeman’s Balls, there was one predecessor that set the tone for the larger
concerts to bloom in the 1980s: George Harrison’s Concert for Bangladesh in 1971, a
singular event staged to generate funds for disaster relief in Southern Asia. With this
model in mind and inspired by his personal involvement with AI, Bob Geldof set off on
his own humanitarian expedition inspired by BBC coverage of the tale of Claire
Bertschinger in a report by Michael Buerk on October 23, 1984, which described a
“biblical famine” underway in war-torn Ethiopia. Bertschinger was a young, British nurse
with the International Committee for the Red Cross in-country for four months before
Buerk arrived with a camera crew (Duffin 2005, 13). In now-infamous imagery, she
became surrounded by upwards of 85,000 starving people, clamoring for rations (Elliot
2005). Geldof, seeing this report on television, was motivated to do something to bring
relief to these suffering from ostensibly remediable circumstances and began to assemble
the organization that would become known as Band Aid and the concert, Live Aid.
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Ironically or not, Band Aid and Live Aid would rival in spectacle the news report
that spawned their existence. In December 1984, Band Aid, composed of UK rockers Phil
Collins, George Michael, David Bowie, Boy George, Queen, U2, Duran Duran and
others, released the ubiquitous “Do They Know Its Christmas?” Additionally, Geldof was
in preparation for Live Aid, a massive concert to be held six months later in three
international cities, Philadelphia, London, and Sydney (Ullestad 1992, 41). The events
were broadcast to a worldwide audience of between 1.5 and 2 billion people, with
syndicated telethons in twenty-two countries, and compelled viewers to give of
themselves to assist those least fortunate (Coleman 1990). Despite modest projections,
the initial take from these mega-events reached $67 million (Garofalo 1992a, 27) and the
subsequent sale of books and miscellaneous merchandise eventually topped $120 million
(Ockenfels and Tannenbaum 1990). This money was earmarked for specific development
projects, such as “the purchase of water-drilling rigs to help with irrigation; various
agricultural projects, including reforestation; medical aid; and the purchase of trucks and
trailers for transportation of food and supplies” (Quoted in Garofalo 1992a, 28). Despite
the panoply of critiques against which Live Aid is vulnerable (some of which will be
explored below), there was a deliberate decision to frame the purpose around emergency
aid for suffering people. “Long-term aid is less exciting than the Seventh Calvary arriving
with food to bring people back to life,” admits Geldof (Quoted in Garofalo 1992a, 28).
Live Aid became a seminal moment in the history of popular culture and politics because
of the wave of copy-cat events it initiated: Farm Aid, Fashion Aid, Sports Aid, Hear’n
Aid, Visual Aid (Pareles 1985), Comic Relief, Sun City, and USA for Africa—all
programs that began or occurred by the end of 1985 and served some social purpose. The
	
  

51

integration of popular culture and ethical campaigns saturated the 1980s, becoming
ubiquitous features of prime time television and mainstream public consciousness.
USA for Africa was the American rejoinder to Band Aid. Coordinated by prodigal
producer Quincy Jones, Michael Jackson and Lionel Richie penned the anthem “We Are
the World,” communicating a latent cosmopolitanism and concern for the welfare of
those suffering from malnutrition and starvation in Africa. This organization emerged
after release of the song and was designed as a short-lived operation “to meet immediate
famine relief needs in Africa, to provide necessary materials and supplies to the destitute
people in Africa to enable them to become self-sufficient, to provide funds for long-term
economic development,…to provide emergency food, clothing, shelter and medical relief
to needy people in the United States…” (Quoted in Scott and Mpanya 1994, 3). This
description includes its domestic work, constituted by 10 percent of its budget, and
resulting in the Hands Across America campaign to combat homelessness and poverty in
the US (Scott and Mpanya 1994, 3). From the proceeds of the song alone, in 1985, USA
for Africa raised $50 million, which would rise to a single-year figure of $98.6 million by
1989, its final year of full operation (Scott and Mpanya 1994, 57). The sheer fact of
having generated numbers of this magnitude from the production of one hit single is
staggering and in significant ways builds on the success of previous events.
The crisis in Ethiopia galvanized the public unlike any other international
humanitarian event. Utilization of benefit concerts and popular culture, and the ability for
imagery and information to be communicated through new communications
technology—by 1990, 56 percent of US households had cable television, up from 12
percent in 1975 (Nielsen Group 2009, 3)—provided the wherewithal for a truly mass
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sentiment to emerge. Furthermore, there is a distinction to be made between the famine
alleviation campaign and Amnesty International: the substance of the campaigns
themselves varied based on subject. For Band Aid, the ideal recipient was a starving,
African child, while for Amnesty International the subject was a political dissident. There
is a significant difference between the certain innocence of a malnourished baby and the
alleged injustice perpetrated against a prisoner of conscience; the former is simply a
product of forces acted upon it, while the latter presents a more complex case. The claim
here suggests that subsistence rights make for a more marketable and more palatable
campaign than security rights violations because of the presumption of innocence and for
the perceived apolitical nature of the violation. For this same reason, natural disaster
victims are another subject group that falls into the category that will perennially receive
sympathetic treatment by a wider audience.
This contrast created the capacity for the campaign for Ethiopia to distinguish
itself from the Amnesty comedy shows and stadium tours. The popularity of a series of
events around a marketable human rights issue, such as denial of the right to food and
sustenance, institutionalized the model for fund- and awareness-raising that had been
developing over a decade. Production of the cause song “We Are the World” signaled a
new approach to marketing human rights that combined thoroughly commercial
approaches to outreach with traditional measures. Celebrity presence at events such as
Live Aid spawned a relationship between humanitarian causes and the rich and famous
that to us today may seem natural. Through this process, however, politics drops out of
the campaigns, favoring an apolitical, charitable appeal.
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Culture Industry and the Politics of Human Rights
The politics of human rights campaigns are a complex matter. As mentioned
above, Amnesty International has consistently projected itself as an apolitical
organization—that is, politically non-ideological. For a global civil society actor to inject
the force of its opinions into the domestic affairs of an abusive country is inherently
political; yet, human rights organizations do so in times of crisis and repression, not
simply during election season. Instead, human rights can be said to be politically nonideological, which is to say is nonpartisan, unaligned, and unparticular. Universalism in
human rights compels this stance and signifies the source of the power of human rights
discourse: there is no position to be taken on who is right or wrong in an armed conflict,
for instance, because universalism motivates the protection of all those involved on both
sides. However, human rights remain a political matter as their advocates engage in
challenging arbitrary and unjust exercises of power. Therefore, how is it that
humanitarian campaigns of this kind find it possible to ignore the political dimension of
an issue, even one that involves presumed “innocents”?
There is no discussion of the politics of the famine or the way in which food was
being used as a weapon of war by Colonel Mengitsu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, who was
engaged in battle with separatist groups from Eritrea and Tigray. Humanitarian expert,
Alex de Waal contends that the 1984 famine was not the product of drought at all, but
that drought accentuated circumstances on the ground, namely “the bombing of markets
in rebel-held areas; restrictions on movement and trade; the forced relocation of
population; and finally the manipulation of relief programs” (de Waal 1997, 117). The
final element on de Waal’s list is the most scandalous when considering the impact of
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humanitarian aid. In order to gain access to rural populations and mediate the flow of
money, the United Nations Emergency Office for Ethiopia made arrangements with
Mengitsu and subsequently defended his policies of military bombardment and
resettlement so as to certify the UN’s in-country presence (de Waal 1997, 123-124).
“There is no doubt that this relief program supported President Mengitsu militarily and
politically. In Tigray, very few rural people and very many soldiers were fed by the relief.
The humanitarian effort prolonged the war, and with it, human suffering” (de Waal 1997,
127).
The deployment of celebrity and popular culture in the campaign for famine
alleviation smoothed the edges around a complicated problem, and unfastened the
connection between the political and the economic. Because consumption was utilized as
a mechanism for attracting supporters, the deeply political situation in Ethiopia was
obfuscated by the cries of rock stars for donations. “The large confusing issues in the
political and economic realm and the antagonisms and controversies in the social realm—
all these are submerged in the experience of being at one with the lofty and great in the
sphere of consumption” (Lowenthal 1984, 228). “Mass idols,” as Leo Lowenthal terms
celebrities, do not clarify complex political issues, but contribute to the confusion of the
audience as to the full scope of the problem at hand. The practical consequences of this
differentiation are evidenced by the articulation of a grassroots constituency built on
faulty foundations of self-satisfying consumption that risk falling into cyclical traps of
current fashions and trends. Politics is ignored in favor of a simplistic narrative of
suffering and remedy. Yet, in the final episode of this period, a long-standing movement
expands its scope by leveraging consumer trends for overtly political purposes.
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Anti-Apartheid Struggle and the Role of Conscious Consumption
An Ideal-Type Global Human Rights Campaign
The worldwide movement to end Apartheid in South Africa had been in motion
for thirty years by time Live Aid was winding down. An ongoing, coordinated effort
consisting of local resistance and global civil society intervention was battling the white
minority government with a range of tools, from guerilla warfare to boycotts, sanctions,
and international legal challenges. While the global component originated in the United
Kingdom, by the mid-1980s an American movement was mobilizing. American
advocates called their elected officials and urged the passage of the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA), over the veto of President Reagan. The CAAA would
bring the US in line with international consensus that had been motivated by the
movement and institutionalized by the UN in its Special Committee against Apartheid,
begun in 1963 on the heels of the Sharpeville massacre.
The anti-Apartheid campaign is the strongest evidence from the period of the
potential for a true grassroots social movement to emerge from the human rights
community and challenge a systemic form of violation. Contrary to the piecemeal
casework of Amnesty International or the dauntingly unrealistic task undertaken by Band
Aid to end poverty in Africa, the anti-Apartheid movement exemplifies the capacity for a
well-executed campaign to attain its goals and affect structural change. The issue of
justice in South Africa was elevated into a mainstream cultural cause that resonated with
ordinary people throughout the world. But, unlike the campaign for famine alleviation, its
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mass appeal drew on the moral and political issue at hand, rather than on distractions like
celebrities and pop music. And it was its focus on a universal ethical position with
political remedies that demonstrates a consciousness on the part of those involved. The
existence of political consciousness in a mass movement coupled with a new set of
market-based tools provided the requisite foundation for the emergence of a committed
community of activists. The global movement utilized a variety of forms of pressure that
included domestic and international action and, more importantly, situated control in the
hands of the consumer, as will be shown below. In many ways, this campaign, for its
historical and global dimensions, captures certain specific characteristics that distinguish
it from the other cases as the ideal-type human rights campaign: a targeted set of
objectives, mass appeal, and a politically conscious constituency. The question remains
whether the success in South Africa is replicable and what lessons can be gleaned for
future campaigns.
A standout aspect of the anti-Apartheid movement was its specific agenda. The
campaign was direct, it was clear from the beginning about its objectives, and
unwavering in its commitment to see these objectives realized: Apartheid in South Africa
must be dismantled and equal democratic rights must govern the country. It was not
necessarily important to delve into historical details or intervene in ancient ethnic hatreds,
just as it will be in crises to follow, in order to understand that a majority of the
population was being subjected to a system of brutal racial discrimination. Similar to
Amnesty’s close focus and persistent approach to casework, the specificity contributed to
its marketability because of the way participants could concentrate their efforts on an
identifiable enemy. With a straightforward message, anti-Apartheid activists could
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mobilize supporters to challenge the government’s authority on the international stage
through an uncontroversial appeal to decency, fairness, and rights.
Its “uncontroversial” nature facilitated its penetration throughout society and the
world and the internationalization of the movement was a key element in its success.
While in Europe the anti-Apartheid movement had been active since the 1950s, its
diffusion to broader sections of the population, both in Europe and the US, occurred in
the 1980s. In the US, a clearly influential comparison was made between structural
racism in South Africa and that which had been overcome in the US a generation earlier.
While not the same in scope or depth, the memory of the US Civil Rights Movement
created a conceptual bridge for nightly news audiences that compelled participation
(Nesbitt 2004, 124). Drawing on such correlations generated mass appeal and fostered a
general cultural sentiment opposed to the continued abuse of black South Africans. While
Live Aid, for instance, inculcated mass appeal with a pageant of celebrities and by
exploiting imagery of suffering children, the anti-Apartheid movement issued a direct call
for political engagement in the defense of justice and dignity. As detailed below, there
was a popular culture component to this campaign but the form it took reflected the
movement and manifested itself in a more radical way than those before it.
Finally, the defining characteristic of this campaign and the element that is
perhaps most crucial is the awareness among activists of the political dimension of a
conflict and the political solutions that the conflict demanded. Evidenced by the methods
and strategies employed by activists, there was a conception advanced that Apartheid was
not a random series of infractions, but rather a system that must be attacked at its core (a
concept that will be missed in Bosnia, discussed in the next chapter). Being conscious of
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the dynamics of power operating to sustain the system—domestic government, foreign
governments, and business interests—meant designing a campaign that could infiltrate
complicated political and economic institutions and influence decision-making at high
levels. A constituency of advocates throughout the world was tasked with this
complicated job and, therefore, methods had to be implemented to empower these
citizens in such a way that would allow them to strike directly and forcefully at the
system. While traditional political tools were used, lobbying and protesting for instance,
new mechanisms were also introduced. Continuing the trend described in this chapter, the
market was used a channel through which ordinary, concerned audiences could gain
access to elite forms of power directly. By empowering a politically conscious movement
in this way, the campaign to end Apartheid was positioned to be successful.
Cultural Boycott and Political Consumption
For the campaign, market mechanisms were deployed skillfully and in a conscious and
empowering fashion. The Anti-Apartheid Movement was not a membership-based
organization and did not require formal dues to be paid; nor was it a donor-based
campaign that commanded a solely financial commitment from its supporters. Economic
tactics provided a means for advocates to leverage their consumption in such a way that
affected the politics in South Africa. Because the country was a hub of international
business activity—in ways that Ethiopia, for instance, was not—boycott and divestment
was able to be effective. Furthermore, the cultural segment of the boycott movement
forged a connection between the benefit concert events of the period, mass consumption,
and the political imperatives of the overthrow of Apartheid.
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The cultural boycott of South Africa was one component of what had become by
this point a global movement, spearheaded by the Anti-Apartheid Movement begun in
1959. Initially a group of South African exiles and their British supporters, the Boycott
Movement was from the start conscious of its potential: “When our local purchasing
power is combined with that of sympathetic organizations overseas we wield a
devastating weapon” (Quoted in Gurney 1999, 33). The 1976 Soweto uprising
accelerated such attempts as divestment campaigns sprung up in universities seeking to
punish companies with business interests allied with the white government. Specific
campaigns aimed at corporations such as Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Manufacturers
Hanover, Mobil, Shell, Ford, General Motors, and IBM opposed their support for
Apartheid and sought to stimulate capital flight out of South Africa (Knight 2004). Those
artists that violated the cultural boycott, such as Frank Sinatra, faced the scorn of their
peers and their fans. Those, like Roberta Flack, who turned down enormous contracts,
were celebrated as vanguards (Reddy 1984). Most importantly, the boycott situated
power in the hands of consumers and tied commercial exchange to moral principle if a
meaningful and lasting way.2
Following in the footsteps of the Secret Policeman’s Ball and Live Aid, there
were a range of cultural products that emerged to confront the white South African
government in over the policies of Apartheid and the continued detention of Nelson
Mandela. “Sun City” was the recording project of Little Steven Van Zandt (of E Street
Band fame) that brought together artists to support the cultural boycott of Apartheid

2

For detailed histories of the origins and effects of the boycott movement, see Nesbitt
2004 and Thörn 2006.
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South Africa and clearly had a more radical tone than did its contemporaries. Sun City is
a casino, resort, and music venue located in what was then a Bantustan, and the project
aimed to mobilize artists to refuse offers to perform in Sun City. Artists United Against
Apartheid, the umbrella organization, was “not just an issue of solidarity with a political
mass movement, but also a recognition that those involved are fighters, not simply
victims” (Ullestad 1992, 49). In addition to the initial song that spanned musical genres,
bringing together Public Enemy, George Clinton, Pat Benatar, Hall and Oates, and Joey
Ramone, Sun City was also a music video with MTV airplay and a book geared toward
educating the public on Apartheid (Ullestad 1987, 67). What differentiated this campaign
from its predecessors is that was more overtly political, with narrow aims and a specific
target.
Furthermore, on July 11, 1988 in London, a seventieth birthday celebration was
held for Nelson Mandela at Wembley Stadium and broadcast worldwide to 600 million
viewers. Again with a deliberately political tone, artists took the stage to demand the
release of the leader of the African National Congress (ANC) and for an end to Apartheid
generally. The song “Sun City” was featured, as was “Biko,” Peter Gabriel’s tribute to
the martyred ANC leader Steve Biko that had also been performed at AI’s 1986
Conspiracy of Hope tour. In the US, the concert received an abbreviated and censored
broadcast on arch-conservative Rupert Murdoch’s Fox Network, which was edited for
content and from which was removed anti-Apartheid ranting by the artists; incidentally,
the television version was also paid for with advertising by many companies still
conducting business in South Africa. The 72,000 fans in attendance at Wembley that day
were treated to a dizzying array of star power that measurably raised the profile of the
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global anti-Apartheid movement (Garofalo 1992b, 56-60). In 1990, once Mandela was
released from Robben Island, another mega-event was held in London to celebrate his
freedom. However, by this point, even MTV declined to air the concert because “they
had already committed to airing a Muscular Dystrophy benefit shortly after the Mandela
date” and could only manage one benefit broadcast in a short period of time (Garofalo
1992b, 63). This conclusive point evidences in many ways the perception of “charity
rock” by the end of the period—that despite its political efficacy, there was a limit to
what the public and the market would tolerate with respect to cause-driven cultural
events.
Tactical Integration and the Takedown of Apartheid
Glaringly unique about the anti-Apartheid movement was its skillful blend of
political and economic tools. In addition to political pressure, the use of boycotts and
sanctions created economic consequences for South Africa’s political decisions. These
measures were sweeping and aimed to punish business interests that operated in and with
the rogue state. Besides the obvious point that sanctions and boycotts hurt the bottom
line, their other primary effect was to endow ordinary consumers with extraordinary
power. This introduced a great degree of democracy into the marketplace where
conscious consumers could “vote” with their dollar. Effectively, through practices such
as divestment, citizens were able to shift the current against the white government by
increasing the costs on commercial enterprises. The balance of power tilted in favor of
civil society as an exodus of businesses continued through the end of the 1980s.
The multi-pronged attack initiated by movement activists was enormously
successful and presents a synthesis of human rights activism of this period. As described
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above, the cultural realm was influential in expanding a base of supporters and making
the boycott front-page news. Artists and musicians lent their names and their talents to
the cause, raising the profile of the campaign especially in the US where activity had
been lagging well behind that in Europe. The confluence of cultural, political, and
economic attacks on South Africa worked synergistically and constituted the greatest
global human rights movement since the abolition of slavery. This statement is not at all
to discount the local struggle that had been waged since the 1950s in South Africa; on the
contrary, the further convergence between local and global activists was central to the
ultimate downfall of the regime and the liberation of black South Africans.
However, while there are many lessons to take away from this campaign, it is a
dangerous proposition to attempt to replicate it and expect the same level of success. It is
true that the skillful blend of political, economic, and cultural methods was a central
component to the movement’s efficacy and the abstract lesson of integrated tactics is an
important one. Yet, the movement was also thirty years in the making. Global civil
society efforts were a supplementary force to the ANC’s bloody battle underway on the
ground. While the international presence lent credibility to the ANC, it would not have
been sufficient in the absence of a local struggle. In anticipation of the difficult cases of
mass atrocities that the human rights movement would confront in the 1990s,
organizations have neither the privilege of waging a lengthy battle, nor a local resistance
movement to counterbalance. Furthermore, there is considerably less moral ambiguity in
the South African case than there will be in future wars where violations are more
equitably distributed on both sides (ANC had a history in the 1960s and 1970s of terrorist
activity that was largely glossed over by the 1980s movement). For these reasons, the
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case of the anti-Apartheid movement as an ideal-type human rights campaign is a tenuous
claim to make and its instructive characteristics must be understood in their historical
context.
Conclusion: Solidarity or Self-Indulgence?
It is clear that new doors were opened for human rights during this period. The
deployment of the culture industry undeniably extended awareness of human rights to
enormous numbers of people. Funding of human rights initiatives exploded as campaigns
in the defense of human dignity gained mainstream popular appeal. Membership in
human rights organizations rose significantly, enabling the expansion of casework for
political prisoners and other issues. The market became a realm for political consumerism
that benefited human rights interests, while simultaneously satisfying individual desires.
As narrated above, the channels through which human rights emerged were
unique and groundbreaking. Average citizens were concerned with and invested in the
human welfare of other people, strangers unlike themselves whom they would never
meet. The contemporary human rights movement was constructed as a standing
constituency of defenders prepared at a moment’s notice to fire off a letter to a foreign
head of state and rally for the protection of human dignity. This point cannot be overemphasized: the attempt to establish a global grassroots movement permanently
assembled for the protection of human rights everywhere is a novel occurrence in human
history and was facilitated, in part, through patterns of mass consumption. However,
human rights activism during the 1980s is constituted by an awkward combination of
solidarity and self-indulgence. Celebrity endorsement and popular cultural events stir up
public fervor for mass movements, which is not to say that these ethical commitments are
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disingenuous, but rather that they are mired in a wash of self-satisfying behavior. This
contradiction—of self-serving and other-regarding behavior, of egoistic and empathic
behavior—embodies the tension of the period.
A generational effect also played a role in the emergence of this phenomenon. As
the baby boomer generation reaches middle age in the 1980s, benefits from the shifts in
personal finance, they are drawn to mass consumption, while retaining their 1960s
history. The same cross-section that invested in money market funds and stocks were also
engaged in grassroots struggles twenty years prior. The same generation that rebelled at
Woodstock, Stonewall, and Selma, maintained their political consciousness, while being
seduced by luxury consumption and materialism. For this reason, charity rock appeared
with such force as the perfect synthesis of radical political culture and consumerism.
Protest music and cause songs were familiar to this audience because of the impression
that Pete Seeger, John Lennon, and Bob Dylan had on their cultural memory. Charity
rock is the 1980s version of protest music, but on a grander stage and with explicit
emphasis on the consumption as a mechanism for social change. However, charity rock is
born of the era of the one-dimensional rock star—the ostentatious front man co-opted by
capital and transformed into a marketing tool, a logo, a brand unto himself. For instance,
critics lambasted the “We Are the World” song because of the way in which it echoes the
slogan of Pepsi, who happens to employ the song’s authors, Lionel Richie and Michael
Jackson, as spokespersons (both employ the language of “choice” in similar ways) (Greil
Marcus quoted in Garofalo 1992a, 29). The heroic image of popular musician as
politically conscious artist is a controversial suggestion because popular culture is no
longer a realm of rebellion.
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Despite the ever present pull of consumer capitalism and the way in which it
compels the kinds of behavior described here throughout, the South African case
illustrates how the reins of the market can be harnessed for human rights purposes. With
the initiation of boycotts, sanctions, and divestment as new activist tools, the impulses
toward individualistic consumption and the exercise of freedom in the market are directed
in the service of human rights. It seems as if it possible for one to pursue one’s own selfinterest while deliberately creating positive externalities. The final lesson learned from
South Africa is that the success was based in the solidarity of global citizens with specific
goals active in the economic and political realms. Contemporary campaigns that utilize
the market-based model, but fail to involve themselves in political struggles are limited in
their capacity and vulnerable to fall victim to the seduction of capitalism as a vehicle for
progress.
Following closely the critical theory approach of the Frankfurt School, one must
consistently be suspicious of coincidence like this because industrial capitalism is not
designed to advance human emancipation; instead, it perpetually co-opts and
commodifies those forces that demand change. Quoting Marcuse:
It solves this contradiction by closing all avenues of escape, protest,
refusal and dissociation, by absorbing or defeating all effective opposition,
by closing itself against qualitative social change, namely the emergence
of qualitatively new forms of human existence, and by suffocating the
need for social change. (Marcuse 2001, 88)
Ultimately, the risks posed by the deployment of popular culture are real, but are not
determinate. In the case of Live Aid, the commercial outweighed the humanitarian
impulses, eliminating politics in favor of shallow emotional sentimentality. However, in
the cases of Amnesty International and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, engineers of the
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movement, I believe, were careful to maintain a balanced blend of political action and
consumer behavior. They present glimmers of promise wherein market trends are infused
with ethical substance, in many ways predating 21st century commodity currents that
identify goods as “fair trade,” “green,” or “cruelty-free.” Solidarity with suffering people
can be expressed through shopping, but this equilibrium is easily upset, as selfindulgence lacking concern for others is a seductive feature of consumerism. It is difficult
to imagine a truly radical movement emerging from the commercial sphere, but one that
prioritizes political action and engagement is within the realm of possibility.

	
  

67

CHAPTER 3 – THE SPECTACLE OF SUFFERING AND HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA AND BOSNIA
“…television has become the privileged medium through which moral
relations between strangers are mediated in the modern world.”
– Michael Ignatieff (1985, 57)
“…television is at its most trivial and, therefore, most dangerous when its
aspirations are high…” – Neil Postman (1985, 16)
Introduction
If the 1980s human rights campaigns attracted audiences through celebrities and
pop music, the 1990s connected people through new visual media. Due to advances in
information and communications technology, a new wave of globalization was initiated
that brought the world closer together and viewers were afforded glimpses into the
world’s celebration and suffering. The penetration facilitated by satellites and cable
television ushered in an era in which the visual dimension assumed a primary role:
consumption of news, art and entertainment, personal interaction, market preferences,
and even political engagement were mediated through the broadcast of images. Neither
print nor radio disappeared and face-to-face communication did not cease, but they
became supplemented by venues that were increasingly convenient—quicker, easier, and
more accessible. Yet, this rapid shift toward visual media was disposed toward
excessiveness and gave way to an age of hyper-saturation aptly described as an age of
spectacle (Debord 1983; Kellner 2003).
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Through new media, images stream at the audience with omnipresent and
overwhelmingly spectacular displays, designed to entice, intrigue and attract, pummeling
our eyes and our minds with information and entertainment. The television set is the
primary site of the contemporary society of the spectacle with its capacity to visually
impact a critical mass of the Western audience. At once, this venue acts as amusement
and distraction from the miserable pain of daily life and provides a necessary, temporary
escape into the realm of fantasy. At the same time, television serves the public with
invaluable access to far off places that details stories of human struggle and sheds light
on matters of great international importance. However, if “the medium is the message”
(McLuhan 2003), or even if “the medium is the metaphor” (Postman 1985), what is the
effect on the audience when content of a serious nature is communicated through a
platform like television that is so thoroughly fraught with levity and commercialism?
This chapter details the impact of graphic imagery of suffering on the ability of
the human rights movement to mobilize behind humanitarian intervention, specifically in
the cases of Somalia and Bosnia. Following the expansion of the movement during the
1970s and 1980s, with its exposure to the mainstream through celebrity endorsement and
benefit concerts, the 1990s presented new opportunities for growth, specifically due to
developments in visual mass media. However, similar to the integration of human rights
with mass culture in the earlier era, these new platforms for activism also produced
stumbling blocks. While atrocity television demonstrates its ability to engage the
audience and motivate a civil society response, instances also reveal the audience to tune
out imagery of distant suffering, literally and figuratively. The interplay between the
media and the audience with respect to human rights encapsulates the dialectic of the
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global information age: at one moment, it is clear that this period presents an amazing
opportunity for social solidarity, democratization of foreign policy, and cosmopolitanism.
However, these same forces can be turned against themselves as firms shape new
networks as avenues for advertising, consumerism, and distraction from politics. A
critical look at the effect of technology and media on human rights activism evidences the
potential for progress even in the face of deep structural obstacles.
In the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union and supported by the tailwinds of
victory in South Africa, the human rights community was positioned to advance its norms
with greater proficiency. Furthermore, with the advent of cable television and satellite
transmission, the human rights movement was presented with, potentially, the answer to
many of its previous problems. Since the liberation of Nazi concentration camps, a
popular human rights mantra has maintained that information is the key to stopping
atrocities in progress and preventing those that lie immanent: “If only the public knew
what was going on behind those walls, something could have been done,” many
observers would opine. Despite the fallacy that nobody knew what was being carried out
in the Nazi camps, the imagery that emerged from Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald in
1945 was so startling that it shocked the conscience of the world. Therefore, were similar
imagery of suffering to surface thereafter, it would follow that civil society could
coalesce to protect the innocent victims portrayed in the photographs. However, recent
history tells a contrary tale that demonstrates how the opposite may well be true—the
claim that information deficit is at the root of inaction ignores the possibility that
information overload may be equally detrimental.
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Crises and conflicts of the past provide insight into the possible effects of imagery
from war zones has on its audience: the experience of observing the pain of others, even
at a distance, has the ability to touch the audience in a deep and personal way. Audience
members as a group are not affected evenly, but a connection may be forged through
witnessing the suffering of other humans—a psychological bond that hinges on a
sensibility of human sameness. Even if a television viewer has never been the parent of a
starving child or has never been tortured, she can empathize with the suffering other
because of her familiarity with hunger and pain of a less severe nature. An emotional
response is evoked with a myriad of subsequent effects that are reflected back on the
viewer and range from dismissal and disgust to outrage and protest. From a human rights
perspective, a question to be explored in this chapter is whether the audience’s experience
with imagery of suffering on television is likely to translate into political action for
intervention on behalf of the suffering, or is the emotional reaction merely a fleeting
feeling that quickly evaporates?
To begin, it is necessary to understand the context for the emergence of the
spectacle in the post-cold war era. I contend that the arrival of neoliberal globalization
and due to advances in information and communications technology (ICT), a new era of
spectacle dawned. The medium that exemplifies this period is the television because,
while the Internet was in a stage of maturation in the 1990s, the television reached an
overwhelming number of households and, with the expansion of global media
conglomerates, content on television was expanding as well. These developments provide
reason for hope, as well as cause for concern. Broader audiences became exposed to
global events and became more intimately connected to the suffering affecting so many,
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but this was only possible in an environment built on consumerism and entertainment.
Yet, perhaps the profit motive compels media companies to provide emotive stories for
the audience that speak to the common denominator in all of us; namely, human frailty.
This may put into motion a process whereby our moral communities, that group we
consider ourselves close to and close enough to act on behalf of, are expanded to include
suffering strangers. Or, perhaps the medium itself consolidates distance and alienates us
from the suffering other because of the nature of television and our associations with it as
a realm of diversion and fiction.
Ultimately, the question at hand helps clarify a crucial foundation for human
rights activism in the post-cold war. To the extent that engagement with human rights
issues by the audience is motivated solely by an emotional response to imagery of
suffering, it may signal the superficiality of the mass appeal of human rights. If this is the
case, then lacking is the crucial element that emerges from 1980s activism: political
consciousness. A cosmopolitan empathic stance in support of human rights may be
sufficient to motivate temporary uproar, but it is not the groundwork for a unified,
sustained, and effective campaign for humanitarian intervention. When the international
community is confronted with instances of mass atrocity, as it frequently was in the
1990s, the movement is exposed as fractured and fragmented, rather than a committed
constituency founded on solidarity with suffering people.
This chapter details the evolution of the spectacle of suffering in the post-cold war
world as it relates to and affects the audience’s mobilization in support of human rights
protection. With an investigation into the cases of Somalia and Bosnia, the role of
imagery proves to be a central and telling prism through which to explore the onset of
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this period. As each story unfolds, history and cultural memory are mediated through
contemporary imagery and impact the way in which the audience receives news of
atrocity and suffering. Actors—policymakers, activists, journalists, and spectators—are
confronted with coverage of human rights abuse in progress and are forced to wrestle
with the ethical and political questions that arise. The consequences of their actions
illuminate the relevance of the media in shaping decision-making and in the formation of
public opinions. What becomes clear is that the sensational coverage can be used to serve
the interests of the powerful, as well as those of the victimized. The battle over spectacle
is waged by geopolitical players, commercial media outlets, and human rights advocates,
with the former two often demonstrating greater mastery for spinning and manipulating
the substance of suffering on television.
In the initial phase, real time coverage of events in Somalia in 1991-1992
demonstrated the immediately central role occupied by media spectacle in this era.
Deeply reminiscent of the starvation of the Congolese in 1960, Biafrans in 1968, and
Ethiopians in 1984, graphic imagery from Somalia galvanized the public consciousness
as a cause in dire need of redress. The subsequent stream of video of US Marines landing
on the shore heroically, calling back to Normandy, perpetuated the mass support for
humanitarian intervention. However, as swept up as the public had become over
providing assistance to Somalia, the tide would turn just as swiftly with the debacle in
Mogadishu resulting in eighteen dead Americans and hundreds of dead Somalis,
dramatized as Black Hawk Down. This section chronicles the evolving public perceptions
of this event throughout its duration by focusing exclusively on the imagery generated by
coverage of the intervention in Somalia. This phase illustrates the possibility for spectacle
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to be a source of unity and solidarity, yet also exposes human rights advocates as a
constituency driven as much by emotion as by political consciousness or cosmopolitan
sensibility. Emotions are vulnerable to co-optation by the corporate media for their role in
driving viewership of an event, while geopolitical actors recognize ways in which
popular sentiments can be leveraged to advance their own agendas.
Overlapping with and then eclipsing Somalia, coverage from the Balkans of
human rights abuse produced a complex and troubling series of consequences that
transformed the human rights movement fundamentally. Cultural memory, both for the
US and for European nations, played a crucial role in fomenting groundswell for
intervention in the Bosnia: images of gaunt, light-skinned bodies behind barbed wire
fences, awaiting death on the European continent triggered a barrage of comparisons to
the Holocaust, which continues to set the standard against which all evil and all good is
compared. However, images of the Serbian camps did not result in intervention, dealing a
setback to the causal relationship between witnessing suffering and protecting human
rights. While military action would eventually halt the march of genocide, following the
revelations of the Marketplace Massacre and the fall of Srebrenica, this only occurred
after three years of conspicuous brutality by Bosnian Serb forces. This calls into question
the classic human rights concept that raising awareness is sufficient for commanding
political action. If bearing witness is no longer a powerful human rights tool, exactly
what kind of engagement is provoked by graphic imagery of suffering? Are audiences
entertained? Are audiences outraged? Are audiences ambivalent? Are audiences numb?
And, what types of actions are taken in response to these emotional states? Following the
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lessons of the 1980s, to be determined in this chapter is the effect that spectacle has on
the form and content of human rights activism.
The cases evidence a range of vacillating reactions of audiences to media
representation of human rights abuse. Overall, the story that unfolds is one of emotional
outpouring of sentimentality for suffering innocents on television in the context of
ascending norms surrounding the use of force for humanitarian goals. What results is a
splintered human rights movement held hostage by mediated spectacles. The spectacle of
suffering is sufficient to provoke a shallow, emotional response from the audience, but
fails to serve as the foundation for a solidarity effort. Audiences experience the suffering
of others without political consciousness and without regard for the dignity of the subject
due to the medium through which these images travel. Television, by its nature,
objectifies its content, fictionalizes reality, and alienates the audience from the real world
and from itself as a collective. Thus, the human rights movement proves itself to be
constituted as a pressure group of atomized individuals, rather than a cohesive, forceful
protest movement. In order to dissect and justify this reasoning, this chapter explains the
use of the term “spectacle,” provides context in social, economic, and technological
terms, and proceeds with the case studies of the Somali and Bosnian interventions.

What is the Spectacle?
The tendency in mass media to traffic heavily in images of suffering is often
described in the literature and in commentary as “pornography of war,” “pornography of
violence,” or “disaster pornography” (see Baudrillard 2008, Mamdani 2007, and Omaar
and de Waal 1993, respectively). The allusion to pornography in this context relates to at
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least two characteristics: the way imagery of brutality and violence appeals to our
prurient interests, and the exploitative nature of graphic imagery of suffering victims.
Drawing comparisons between atrocity photography and pornography suggests a certain
self-indulgence in observing others in vulnerable, intimate and sensitive positions, while
also injecting a power dynamic that connects the subject and object. My analysis focuses
on less conspicuous effects of the visual image on the audience, in a distinct way from
other deployments of the term “spectacle.” In cases where scholars and observers use the
language of spectacle, it is often to signify something spectacular and visually stunning,
without necessarily implying anything more (Boltanski 1999; Chouliaraki 2006). While
the spectacle in its usage herein will obviously apply to its visuality, I deploy this term in
a specific manner fixed to Guy Debord and the Situationist International.
For Debord, “the society of the spectacle” was a particular description of modern
times as obsessed and mystified by appearance. “The first stage of the economy’s
domination of social life brought about an evident degradation of being into having—
human fulfillment was no longer equated with what one was, but with what one
possessed. The present stage, in which social life has become completely dominated by
the accumulated productions of the economy, is bringing about a general shift from
having to appearing…” (Debord 1983, para. 17). If Marcuse, Adorno, and others
originated the critique of the society of mass consumption, Debord continues in this
tradition and identifies the spectacle as an extension of capitalism and “the image” to be a
new plane of commodification for the exercise of social control. For Debord, “the
spectacle is a permanent opium war designed to force people to equate goods with
commodities and to equate satisfaction with a survival that expands according to its own
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laws” (Debord 1983, para. 44). Debord sees advanced capitalism as a force that
suffocates radical politics and preserves the status quo at all costs. Therefore, by framing
the spectacle of suffering in a human rights context, I am attempting to coherently discuss
the impact of the spectacle on the political potential of human rights activism, going
beyond the mere description of spectacular imagery as a consequence of mass media.
The “spectacle” is a term I deploy to describe, on the one hand, a qualitative
aspect of the media environment of the post-cold war era, as well as the subject matter of
discrete media events. As will be detailed in the next section, developments in technology
and global capital facilitate the transmission of news and information in an accelerated
fashion and primary among the transmitted content is the image. Words and sounds were
the central mechanism of previous mass media platforms, print and radio. As the preeminently visual medium, in the 1990s television expands its range with heightened
intensity and deeper societal penetration. The priority of the image in modern
communication facilitates a shift in the meaningfulness of appearance itself because, in
an age of spectacle, “appearing to be” suffices for “being.” Projecting an image, real and
symbolic, replaces the need to embody the truth referent of that image; this is to say, for
instance, it may only be necessary to appear to be heroic in the face of danger, rather than
actually undertake an heroic act. This configuration says much about the actors, the
audience, and the medium. Spectacle is the permissive context that nurtures these
relations, as well as descriptive of the events themselves. Complicating this scenario
further is the role of commercialism in spectacle. Because mass media is the product of
and a venue for commercial profit seeking, the contradictions generated by the
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substitution of appearance for reality entail the blurring of hard news with entertainment
and advertising.
For this reason, the spectacle of suffering is a specific consequence of this media
environment with human rights implications. While previously news of human rights
violations traveled effectively across radio, print, and earlier phases of television, the
speed and saturation of images sets the post-cold war period apart. The spectacle of
suffering is responsible for the ubiquity of graphic coverage of brutality and humiliation
in ordinary settings: Viewing suffering on television, during the prime time dinner hour,
provides a complicated context in which to digest material of such a severe nature. Night
after night, and story after story, repetition of imagery of suffering becomes so familiar to
the audience so as to affect how this news and information is absorbed, processed, and
the reaction induced. Western audiences become attuned to coverage of children, women
and the elderly fleeing war zones and natural disasters, but the audience’s response is not
uniform. This chapter attempts to provide an explanation of how and why the response to
imagery of suffering has shifted over time. As the narrative below suggests, the spectacle
of suffering has roots in earlier forms of newsgathering during events such as the Biafran
War, the Vietnam War, and the Ethiopian famine. These events occurred in an antiquated
media environment, however, when news was not captured and transmitted in real time,
with an embedded sense of urgency. Spectacle entails the milieu in which serious content
is communicated through a commercial medium in a manner that is so overwhelming that
the audience is affected socially and psychologically.
However, the fact that nightly news coverage features human rights issues is not
inherently a bad thing; on the contrary, cable television is an essential medium through
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which the public stays connected to worldly events. However, the mediated environment
in which we live is in fact an advanced society of spectacle in Debord’s terms—an
environment defined by its saturation with streaming imagery and a persistent threat to
progressive politics. In the post-cold war era, there has been no shortage of spectacular
suffering beamed into the living rooms of Western viewers: refugees in flight, starving
African children in crossfire, burnt American Ranger corpses, mortal machete wounds,
mass graves, concentration camps, planes flying into skyscrapers, and degrading detainee
torture, to name several. The impact of spectacle on the recipient is complex—
provocative, yet paralyzing; fascinating, yet redundant. Constant visualization of one
conflict after the next injects a new, previously unheard-of ethnic minority into common
parlance: Kurds, Hutus, Tutsis, Bosniaks, Kosovar Albanians. At what point does the
repetition of ghastly, brutal imagery transform both the subject and object, and how? Is
the audience able to separate the difficult reality of events from the otherwise light
content on television? Is there a point at which human rights becomes mere human
interest? Can the audience distinguish between coverage of a humanitarian intervention
and that of the rescue of a cat stuck in a tree? In order to investigate these critical
questions, it is necessary to set the stage on which these dramatic transformations in
media communications, human rights, and politics took place.
The Socio-Political Economy of Spectacle
Globalization, the Information Age and the Network Society
The manifestation of spectacle in the post-cold war period is the product of a set
of parallel and interrelated developments associated with globalization: transition to a
knowledge-based economy and growth of a networked society. As a series of rapid
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transformations swept over the world in the early 1990s, observers attempted to frame
this new epoch and understand its impact on daily life. A sense of proximity and
connectedness was enveloping a broad range of social spaces, from the economic realms
of labor, production, and consumption, to cultural concepts and political organization.
However, the profound effects experienced as much by peripheral societies as by
international society itself, were not random, nor coincidental, but rather the result of a
long process of scientific investigation, social change and market expansion.
The central factor that enables globalization to take shape is technology.
Facilitating this shift was an infrastructure of fiber optic cables, satellites, online bulletin
boards, and corporate media outlets that formed an enmeshed global network. Through
these channels, activity traveled instantaneously across great distances, at low costs.
Finance became entirely mobile; supply chains were rerouted through new points of
origin; and migrant labor provided the workforce for the new economic environment.
With mass production shifting locales from North to South, a knowledge-based economy
materialized in the developed world. Labor increasingly operated outside the confines of
trade unions, and under the direction of consolidated multinational conglomerates. In
place of the Fordist assembly line, the post-industrial, post-Fordist economy is
globalized, disaggregated, and underscored by its provision of services and reliance on
information technology. Instead of factories, freelance, contracted workers began tenures
in cubicles, employed on a temporary, non-benefited basis. Markets emerged in places
previously beyond the pale and, especially in the West, capital penetrated more deeply
into areas that would have previously been considered private and out of reach.
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Not only did information technology provide the infrastructure for capital to
operate, it also provided new channels for the market to expand its access to consumers.
Information takes the form of breaking news headlines, but it also takes the form of
advertisement driving consumption. Television is a vehicle for creating and targeting
demographics of consumers and provides access for corporations to these consumers in
their homes, while they relax with their families. Global capitalism at the end of the
twentieth century is increasingly personalized and pre-packaged, while the individual is
ever more accustomed to constant confrontation with advertising and commercialism. It
has become part of daily life and slips easily into the backdrop of all environments; while
not necessarily overt, information as advertising takes on an inconspicuous presence,
constantly operating but rarely noticed. Whether these channels can be shaped to serve
the interests of the humiliated and downtrodden is one question that motivates the
argument in this chapter.
Essentially, this characteristic—the critical role played by information and
technology as the driving forces and platforms for economic transaction—is what is
meant when commentators discuss the “New Economy” and is definitive of neoliberal
globalization (Castells 2004; Hassan 2004). So hopeful were capitalists in these early
years that Microsoft founder Bill Gates called these manifestations evidence of a new
“friction-free capitalism”: an open market system with the least resistance, minimal
externalities, and maximal profit (quoted in Hassan 2004, 11). The Information Age, as
the post-cold war era is often described, is the consequence of the New Economy and
suggests the preeminent role played by information, in terms of the facilitation of the
economy, as well as the way in which it organizes non-economic arenas. The most
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glaring change in the way information was transmitted and received in this period
correlates to the speed, volume, and the depth of its diffusion into everyday life. As
“informationalism…subsumed industrialism as the dominant technological paradigm…”
(Castells 2004, 8), a social, cultural and structural shift was also underway.
Spectacle on TV
Television is the technological medium that ushers in globalization and
personifies the perception of commonality among the global audience in the early 1990s.
From a twenty-first century perspective, the Internet is the quintessential globalizer, but
after the cold war, it was television that captured the imagination of the masses with
instantaneous transmission of moving images across cable networks and satellite
constellations. Innovations in communications technology and corporate consolidation of
media ownership permitted uniformity in broadcast, as viewers internationally shared in
visual experiences together. While television itself was not a novel technology, having
made inroads through Western affluent classes in the 1950s, during the 1980s the
medium reached across classes in the West and began to diffuse more broadly.
Deregulation in the communications sector permitted corporate consolidation of
centralized sources of information, even as the illusion of more television channels
suggested the contrary. Driven by wider access, market impulse, and technological
capacity, media outlets accelerated information transmission by speed and volume. To
occupy the airwaves of twenty-four-hour networks, the sheer amount of on-air content
was valued for its own sake, and the traditional categories of news and entertainment
collapsed. A range of actors would soon confront the nature of the new media
environment, from political officials and revolutionaries, to athletes and celebrities.
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Spectacle on television is born of this climate, with the rise of the graphic image
as the essential platform for communication. However, visuality alone does not suffice to
explain the emergent spectacle; the nature of media coverage itself had taken a
spectacular turn and initiated a spiraling fusion of news and entertainment. Due to
competition on cable networks for viewership and advertising dollars, sensationalism
drove newsgathering in a way that departed from previous models. Newsworthiness
becomes that which attracts the largest audience, rather than being driven by relevance or
necessity. Therefore, the historic divide on television between hard news and
entertainment began to erode, creating space for the hybrid version we are left with
today—a context in which it is difficult for a viewer to decipher where the categories
begin and end.
Late-twentieth century media culture highlights the extreme, the perverse, and the
absurd. Events ranging from the OJ Simpson Trial and the Super Bowl, to the
impeachment of Bill Clinton and a Michael Jordan slam dunk typify the context for
spectacle (Kellner 2003). Even the tragic death of Princess Diana was transformed into
spectacle, with the paparazzi covering the car crash and subsequent controversy, as
closely as the royal funeral and the international grieving that followed. Mass event and
scandal reign, and significance is squeezed out. Saturation of the airwaves with
information of little consequence gives the impression that what is featured on the nightly
news is newsworthy—thus beginning a perpetual feedback of hype and aggrandizement.
In the spectacle, “tabloidized infotainment culture is increasingly popular,” which has a
reflexive effect on events and issues that actually demand attention (Kellner 2003, 1). As
media culture is increasingly shaped by spectacle, the irrelevant is elevated as relevant,
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while pressing issues become mired amidst a fog of the bizarre, the gratuitous, and the
intriguing. When violent conflict and natural disaster are transmitted through the same
channels and in the same manner as sex scandals and celebrity controversies, audience
receptivity is ripe for confusion, alienation, and apathy.
This is still not saying enough, though, because it is not only news or the
perception of news that is affected by spectacle, it is indeed the spectator herself. Media
spectacle “describes a media and consumer society organized around the production and
consumption of images, commodities, and staged events” (Kellner 2003, 2). The claim
here is that spectacle is the consequence of an advanced capitalist system that seeks new
realms of colonization through which to exert social control. In this context, audiences
are vulnerable to manipulation and likely to support a war that serves material or
geopolitical interests, but not their own. Jean Baudrillard, during the televised invasion of
Iraq in 1991, asked whether or not it was “really taking place” (Baudrillard 2008b). The
newly-inaugurated Cable News Network (CNN) broadcasted night-vision video of
missiles coasting through the air as if in a video game, but shockingly little footage of
actual people engaged in combat. Because the audience is unable to have a realistic
experience with war, it is impossible to critique its rationale and its conduct, thereby
acquiescing to state decision-making. If contemporary visual media fabricates a copy of
reality and, through mediation, transmits the copy, rather than the actual version of the
world, then critical deliberation can only take place in the fictional realm, dispossessing
the masses of sovereign authority over its politics.
This has the consequence of distancing the audience from the severe nature of
crises and catastrophes. Because the audience comes into contact with the world through
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a shadow of reality, public opinions become easily manipulated; a clear example being
televised, bloodless wars that more closely resemble a virtual reality than the human hell
of warfare. A sanitized rendition of the ugly affair of war has the effect of numbing the
audience to the terror of combat and its horrific effects. This is notably the case in the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which the public was not subjected to the realities of the
conduct of war and only recently were the news media permitted to cover the return
home of flag-draped caskets. Watching crises unfold on television places them alongside
romantic sitcoms, hospital dramas, and game shows, making for an opaque media
environment in which to form judgments.
With this experience of mediated events, the audience suffers from alienation on
two fronts: psychologically and socially. Internally, the viewer is pacified by a spectacle
that “stupefies social subjects and distracts them from the most urgent task of real life –
recovering the full range of their human powers through creative practice. The concept of
the spectacle is integrally connected to the concept of separation passivity, for in
submissively consuming spectacles one is estranged from actively producing one’s life”
(Kellner 2003, 2-3). The all-encompassing nature of visual distraction satiates individual
desire by first falsely producing needs fulfilled only by commodities. In a sense,
however, society of spectacle builds on the society of mass consumption by showing the
consumer commodities as consistently as possible; thus, the emphasis on advertising as a
product of spectacle (though Chapter 4 focuses specifically on advertising). Through the
individual’s perpetual quest for commodity accumulation, the alleviation of political
problems is obscured by the bombarding glare of spectacular imagery.
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Socially, this alienation is magnified and contributes directly to collective
political apathy. Quoting Debord, “spectators are linked solely by their one-way
relationship to the very center that keeps them isolated from each other. The spectacle
thus reunites the separated, but it reunites them only in their separateness” (Debord 1983,
sec. 29). Television, in this analysis, is the “center” that at once unifies, as well as
atomizes its viewership. It produces a common experience but, in doing so through a
commercial medium, the individual is compelled to seek out self-satisfaction, at her own
demise and at the demise of society’s collective goals. Discussion of “lonely crowds,” for
Debord, demonstrates a central contradiction of the spectacle; namely, the ability to be
among many people, yet still be utterly alone (Debord 1983, para. 28). Alienation
prevents the formation of social movements and the assembly of individuals for a range
of purposes but, most problematic from a human rights perspective, are those that aim to
motivate social and political change and advance freedom. In light of this critique, the
question of globalization as a cosmopolitan community-builder is a difficult one: “While
eliminating geographical distance, this society produces a new internal distance in the
form of spectacular separation” (Debord 1983, para. 167).
Yet, in the age of global media spectacle, there was a tangible shift in the way
audience members related to the world. Penetration of graphic imagery created
opportunity for proximity and participation in real time. To reiterate, while television was
not new, the immediacy with which its broadcast was transmitted and the depth and
breadth of its reach were unique to the early 1990s. Whether it was the invasion of allied
forces in Somalia or refugees in Serbian detention camps, television coverage of human
rights events provided the wherewithal for civil society to monitor action in progress. The
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cases below detail how this tension played out during the period, whose interests were
served, and how the human rights movement was affected. Departing from Debord’s
rigid structure, the thesis advanced in this chapter is that spectacle opens space for
empathic engagement and the expansion of moral community, but ultimately seals off
terrain for committed and conscious political activism. This chapter pivots on the
proposition that a connection is forged between the individual audience member and the
individual suffering on television through spectacle—but if, and how, this experience
benefits human rights protection remains to be seen. Despite the way in which this
phenomenon bloomed in the 1990s, even through pre-spectacle media, audiences have
demonstrated a curiosity of and attraction to atrocity photographs that provide historical
precursors for what will follow.
The Iconography of Famine
Precursors to Spectacle: Congo 1960 and Biafra 1968
The emergence of the spectacle of suffering in the 1990s, as I trace it, is the
product of an aggregate of factors: developments in ICT, corporate media consolidation,
geopolitical space created by the end of the cold war, and competition among NGOs for
air time and donor attention. However, it is also the consequence of an historical trend
that manifests itself again at this auspicious moment. Public response to media coverage
of previous humanitarian crises set the tone for future incidents. Specifically, events in
Congo in 1960 and Nigeria in 1968 provide antecedent cases through which to study the
effect of visual imagery of suffering on the audience’s mobilization in support of human
rights. Both demonstrate the crucial role photography can play in elevating a crisis to the
status of a cause célèbre.
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Reluctantly, in 1960, Belgium relinquished control on its long-held and
thoroughly terrorized territory of the Congo. While the history of King Leopold II’s
personal colony has been deftly explored (Hochschild 1999), the post-colonial Congo
also was fraught with dire suffering. In the chaos that ensued following the evacuation of
Belgian forces, the UN, under the direction of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold,
initiated its first peacekeeping intervention into the heart of darkness. But, on the fringes
of Leopoldville, hunger set in among rural inhabitants and refugees from the violence in
the capital. As this story made headlines in the UK, Oxfam experienced a rise in public
stature through its aid appeals for the famine in Congo. “On 18 December 1960, the
Observer carried a brief front-page story about mass starvation in a corner of the newly
independent Congo…Thousands were no more than walking skeletons and many were
swollen from hunger... People working for Oxfam at the time remember that story in the
Observer with the clarity normally reserved for the deaths of presidents and the outbreak
of war.” (Black 1992, 63). For Oxfam, and the greater British humanitarian aid
community, Congo was the event that catapulted care and concern for those suffering
from hunger into a mainstream position—all of which became possible due directly to the
visual imaging of those Congolese famine victims.
Thus was initiated the era of the starving African child in humanitarian
campaigns. “The tragedy in the Congo burnt the image of the starving African child onto
the collective British conscience,” a phenomenon that would spiral geographically
outward (Black 1992, 63). Two week later, “the story of the famine hit the popular press
in an unprecedented way, splashed across four pages of the Daily Mirror” (Black 1992,
65). Print media was the vehicle for the dissemination of these images and daily
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newspapers’ coverage of the story served to attract the readership to the story itself, as
well as to the aid efforts underway to alleviate the suffering. Oxfam, its contemporaries,
and the media outlets were all mutually benefiting from this coverage. From the spread in
the Mirror, Oxfam gained promotional material and “ordered 50,000 reprints of the news
spread and mailed them to all its supporter groups and donors. The coverage brought a
tidal wave of response” (Black 1992, 65).
For the rest of the month of January 1961, Oxfam witnessed a lockstep rise of
donations correlated exactly with media coverage of the famine; over £100,000 rushed in
directly to benefit the Congo Appeal (Black 1992, 80). As newspapers continued to carry
the story, and run it alongside graphic imagery, British citizens continued to give money
to the cause. If Oxfam itself had not initiated this strategy, it certainly recognized the
gushing well as such. To supplement the coverage, Oxfam took out paid advertising
appeals in dailies that replicated and reproduced the photographs (there were also a
deluge of appeals that the newspapers ran at no charge to the aid agencies) (Black 1992,
65). Oxfam pressed on in hopes of maintaining this momentum before it receded. With a
degree of self-awareness, these images were intended to make the audience
“uncomfortable” and even imply a “strong hint of accusation,” yet leave an indelible
impression nonetheless (Black 1992, 80). A decade prior, Oxfam accounts for £5
received for every £1 spent on advertising—this figure jumps by over six times following
the campaign for Congo (Black 1992, 80).
Out of this crisis emerged a relationship between the humanitarian community,
media outlets, and graphic coverage of suffering. The response from the public to the
atrocity photographs from Congo was a revelation and one that can be singularly traced
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to the image: “This massive outpouring of public generosity was something completely
new. It came purely from coverage in the newspapers – there were no television pictures;
and even the press coverage was modest and the pictures mild by the standards of later
African disasters” (Black 1992, 65). The spectacle of suffering that is detailed below is
dependent on television as a medium, despite having roots in the pre-TV era. Established
in 1960, though, is the audience’s experience of looking as a means through which to
connect to the suffering of others. In the case of Congo, and those of Biafra and Ethiopia,
looking compelled giving. Along with a check, one Oxfam donor sent a note that read:
“No child on earth should look like this” (Black 1992, 66). Without overanalyzing an
innocuous , anonymous remark such as this, it is worth recognizing that the donor’s
imperative does NOT read: “No child on earth should live like this.” This is as if to say,
the way the child appears to the audience is normatively prior to the way the child
actually lives, which in many ways is a telling precursor to the spectacle of the 1990s.
Toward the end of the 1960s, however, another African crisis will creep into the
consciences of the West and build upon the associations initiated in the Congo.
The civil war in Nigeria, also known as the Biafran War, was brought into
Western homes in the form of photographic evidence of the starvation of civilians among
the secessionist Igbo people. War photography by Gilles Caron of France, and Don
McCullin of the United Kingdom, has come to epitomize the ability for an image to
frame a conflict and communicate the desperate predicaments of the subjects of the photo
for an unsuspecting audience. Beginning in the Spring of 1968, news of the conflict
began to flow to Western news outlets through the reporting of Caron and McCullin. On
May 4, 1968, Caron’s photos were published in the Paris Match, and were thereafter
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syndicated in The New York Times Sunday Magazine (US), Manchete (Brazil), and Kwick
(Germany) (Cookman 2008, 227, 238). On June 12, similar photos were plastered on the
cover of Life magazine and in The Sun (Heerten 2009, 5-6). These photographs have
been, over time, elevated to the status of iconic because of their impact on the public and
the way in which they have laid the foundation for atrocity coverage to follow.
The images from the region of Biafra portray the debilitating effects of chronic
malnutrition on women and children. In a raw fashion they capture the physicality of
suffering by focusing the viewer’s attention on the extreme toll taken on the body:
In one, a child attempted in vain to suckle his mother’s withered breast. In
another, a group of naked boys stood intently watching some
action…Caron focused on a boy in the front rank, gently grasping a
slender stick; its thinness emphasizes the boy’s wasted limbs…The other
photograph shows a girl of indeterminate age, who seems little more than
a tissue of skin stretched tautly across ribs and shoulders. (Cookman 2008,
238)
Effectively, the photographs break down the experience of suffering into its most
visceral, human, base form in a way that translates well to an audience. Through the
process of mediation, the coverage strikes at the sentimental core of the audience: “Caron
humanized his subjects…gave his subjects dignity despite their suffering…” (Cookman
2008, 239). The relationship that photojournalists hope to establish is on the level of
emotions—that viewers will respond to the way the images make them feel. Because of
the nature of the still snapshot, there are many contextual assumptions that are required of
the viewer that cannot be made explicit through the medium.
For instance, there is a presumption of victim innocence in the Biafra coverage
that has continued across others cases. The use of women and children as subjects
communicates the notion that there are powerful, external forces acting on them, due to
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traditional narratives of female and child passivity. Starvation itself is illustrated in
simple terms, as a natural disaster, more akin to an earthquake than a calculated political
strategy. In the case of Biafra, as well as Ethiopia, this simplicity is in fact a distortion
because in both places food was being used as a weapon of war to punish civilian
populations. The combination of child-like victim innocence and subsistence rights
violation, beginning in 1968, casts a shadow on future incidents of visual media
representation of suffering.
However, these “innocent victims” were not merely passive subjects in the frame
of the photographs—they were in fact active participants in the global trafficking of their
own atrocity images. Under the leadership of Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the
secessionist Biafrans employed the services of Markpress, a Geneva-based public
relations firm to assist in their marketing and publicity. In addition to seven hundred
press releases sent to “British MPs, newspaper editors, radio and television
correspondents, businessmen and academics,” Markpress was more generally tasked with
casting “the Biafran case in the most heartrending light” (Harrison and Palmer 1986, 22;
Black 1992, 121). In the television coverage of 12 June on British outlet Independent
Television News (ITN), the figure of three thousand deaths per day was quoted, despite
having been drawn from “partisan” sources (Black 1992, 120-121). Ojukwu, aware of the
power of the image and of the press, leveraged the “starvation card” to sway British
public opinion and hopefully encourage a cessation of support for the Federal
government with which the Biafrans were at war (Black 1992, 121).
This proved to be an overwhelmingly successful strategy as the images of starving
Biafrans galvanized British civil society and awoke a remarkable, if short-lived,
	
  

92

movement. “The eventual breaking of the famine story provoked a massive popular
campaign which began in Britain and spread quickly throughout the west…The pictures
of Biafran children clearly touched a sensitive spot…Thousands of people in the west
marched, protested and demonstrated, went on hunger strike, collected money, took out
whole-page advertisements in newspapers and other opinion-formers” (Harrison and
Palmer 1986, 34). Local ‘Support Biafra’ groups surfaced in the UK, Belgium, France,
Holland, Ireland and the US, and advocacy editorials appeared in major publications
(Harrison and Palmer 1986, 34-35). Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere quipped “If I’d
been a Jew in Nazi Germany, I’d feel the same as an Ibo in Nigeria” (Quoted in Harrison
and Palmer 1986, 34). The British Daily Sketch called Biafra “today’s Belsen” (Harrison
and Palmer 1986, 31). While the relevance of Holocaust allusions will return below, it is
central to the Nigerian case that the images of famine, as influential as they were, cannot
be seen as neutrally filtered throughout the global mass media of the late-1960s. One
party to the conflict was able to manipulate the substance to serve their own interests—
although humanitarian agencies would also benefit.
Worldwide publication of Caron’s and McCullin’s photographs stirred the
conscience of the global public and had a range of cascading effects on the NGO
community. Aid agencies, such as Caritas Internationalis and Oxfam, used these images
in their print advertising, attempting to play off of empathetic sentiments in their
solicitation for donations. Caritas literally reprinted Caron’s photo of a starving baby in
their posters (Cookman 2008, 240); Oxfam, cleverly, took out ads in newspapers such as
The Guardian, that were reluctant to print the brutal photos in their coverage of the crisis
(Heerten 2009, 7). Famously, Biafra was the point of origin of Médecins Sans Frontières
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(Doctors without Borders, or MSF) when Bernard Kouchner, then a doctor on location
with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), refused to maintain his
silence in line with the ICRC dictum of neutrality in conflict zones. Kouchner declared
the starvation an act of “genocide,” imploring the world to act, and reprimanding all
actors for failing to take a stance against the guilty parties in this conflict (de Montclos
2009, 71-72).. The photographic evidence of the humanitarian emergency in Biafra had
the effect of spurring public outcry and generating financial contributions to agencies, but
also retaining simplistic storylines about the crisis, instead of delving into the political
mire.
Visual mediation of the conflict had brought tales of suffering to new sectors of
society and, therefore, “from a media point of view, Biafra was a success story, the first
major famine to be addressed through media images of starving Africans, before Ethiopia
in 1984 or Somalia in 1992” (de Montclos 2009, 72). Photography brought an element of
reality to viewers far removed from the crisis. Similar to coverage of the liberation of the
Nazi concentration camps, Biafra jostled a generation from its complacency. The
combination of photographs in daily papers and weekly newsmagazines, with the use of
stills in the nightly broadcast news, illustrated the depths of the ongoing peril in Biafra
for Western affluent classes. Biafra is important in cultural media history because of the
way in which African children specifically were featured as subjects of war photography.
While many photographs had famously captured historical cases of suffering—from
Hiroshima to My Lai—Congo and Biafra introduced the world to African famine using a
frame that would be replicated into ubiquity.
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Manifestation of the Spectacle: Ethiopia 1984
When similar images began to emerge in 1984 from the Horn of Africa, Biafra
was invoked as the clear predecessor. As discussed in Chapter 2, a BBC report filmed by
Mohammed Amin and narrated by correspondent Michael Buerk gripped the audience
and motivated a tidal wave of civil society activity culminating in the Live Aid benefit
concert. Once again the scene became familiar to audiences: children with swollen bellies
and desperately vacant glares, surrounded by swarming flies against a dusty backdrop.
Again absent from the narrative were the political dimensions of ethnic conflict and the
manipulation of aid delivery by Mengistu Haile Mariam, both key factors in the
consequential famine. Imagery was used to tell the story and to expect a certain set of
assumptions and responses from the audience; some of these assumptions rest on cultural
memory of Biafra, as well as on subtler and more harmful notions of African
hopelessness and dependence. Graphic coverage of suffering in Ethiopia assisted with the
cultivation of this narrative and the activism that responded to this narrative follows in
kind.
Famine alleviation campaigns waged in the mid-1980s, detailed in the previous
chapter, evidence the volume of public outcry over the suffering they were witnessing on
television. While a central component of these campaigns is the faulty combination of
mass consumption and human rights, the visual aspect is also compelling. As television
audiences expanded in the 1980s, Ethiopia captivated the attention of viewers with
moving images of suffering in progress. Mass media had changed. Previously, “television
[had brought] starvation in Biafra to the full attention of millions of viewers, but black	
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and-white photographs of starving children, published in newspapers and magazines,
were probably more important” (Benthall 1993, 102). While Biafra communicated the
still image, Ethiopia put starvation in motion, adding a dimension of immediacy that
photographs are unable to translate. Ethiopia became a worldwide cause célèbre because,
due to the cultural memory of past famines, viewers were already prepared to absorb
imagery of starving Africans and to accept certain claims about the issue (presumed
innocence, appropriate remedies, etc.). However, the repetitious nature of starving
African children on television created a context in which, while an audience could be
temporarily shocked especially due to the timeliness of the coverage, it could not be
surprised. As these images became commonplace in print advertisements and television
commercials for causes and organizations, their effect on the audience was
transformative.
For the audience member, just a flash of an image of an African child on
television conjures memories of Congo, Biafra, Ethiopia, famine, and charity. Observers
remark on the ascent of this image in the public psyche with overlapping language: “By
the mid-nineteen-sixties…the powerful image of the starving African child with haunting
eyes and skeletal limbs had become a universal icon of human suffering” (Cohen 2001,
178); “Starving children are the famine icon” (Moeller 1999, 98). But, what does it mean
for an image of suffering to become “iconic”? Does it mean that starving children
symbolize all suffering and give suffering children voice and visibility? Does it mean that
all people think the same way when the image appears before them? Does the image
provoke the same response in all contexts? Ultimately, from a human rights perspective,
the question is what is the effect of icon status on the dignity of the subject? Is the
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Congolese, Biafran, Ethiopian or Somali child merely a symbol of something to someone,
or a real human being who deserves treatment and care to protect her dignity? Or has she
been reduced to a symbol, whose worth is limited to her ability to generate public
attention and donations? The answers to these questions are wrapped up in the
contradictions inherent in the spectacle of suffering.
Suffering on television had become a normalized feature of nightly news with
questionable resonance in the minds of the audience. The spectacle of suffering is that
which traffics in the spectacular nature of its subject, while influencing the response of
the witness. The fact that a story or crisis becomes ordinary to the viewer does not entail
that it does not maintain relevance or weight—many things that are ordinary are still
essential, such as paying rent or filling the car with gas. To argue that repetition in the
media correlates directly to “compassion fatigue” (Moeller 1999) or some other
syndrome or deficit is to discount the response that is provoked by graphic imagery of
suffering; even in the saturated media environment of the post-cold war period, public
clamor for humanitarianism has been vociferous. The most crucial point of critique,
however, is the content and duration of the clamor: what is being called for, by whom,
and how persistent is the protest? “Starving children unequivocally attract notice, but the
repetition of their image suggests that all that is needed to resolve the crisis is food. Feed
the children and the famine will be over” (Moeller 1999, 99). If this cynical view is
accurate, then somehow the visual representation of suffering has a direct impact on the
content of the advocacy that is generated. If graphic imagery of suffering provokes a blip
on the radar of public opinion, similar to a hurricane or celebrity scandal, then Debordian
critique of spectacle is exonerated. This demonstration would give credence to the claim
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that the spectacle of suffering merely objectifies the other and paralyzes compassionate
observers from acting. But, if the spectacle motivates activism on behalf of human rights
protection, then the tale of the spectacle of suffering is more complicated, as presented by
the early instances of intervention in the post-cold war era.
From the Congo and Biafra to Ethiopia and Somalia, we witness an expanding
role of the image in prompting a civil society response and a growing intensity in the
response. It is my contention that this trajectory is attributed to changes in the
technological capacity for communication, as well as the cultural associations that are
nurtured over time through the repetition of atrocity. However, until the end of the cold
war, starvation was treated as remediable through donation and provision of aid. As we
will see in Somalia, coverage of child malnourishment on the Horn of Africa did not
produce a telethon or pledge drive; instead, military intervention was initiated that
expanded into a nation-building exercise. Distinguishing this episode from those that
preceded it is the heightened media context and the means used to alleviate suffering of
others. If Congo and Biafra were carried in print media, and Ethiopia by abbreviated
television reports, Somalia is the African famine that occurred live, in real time, and
unfolded before the public for all to experience simultaneously. The frenzied and frenetic
pace at which events occurred in this case is metaphor for the rapidly shifting public
opinion that shaped and was shaped by the media coverage.
Emergence of the Spectacle: Somalia 1991
Much has been written and said about the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in
the twenty years since it took place. The state remains essentially failed and plagued by
violent turf wars. Two decades of incapable governance has provided a safe haven for
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terrorists affiliated with al Qaeda, as well as the homegrown organization, al Shabab.
Piracy, the scourge of centuries past has returned in the Gulf of Aden as local
opportunists attempt to make a life for themselves amidst an otherwise stagnant
economy, yet at the expense of others. All the while, Somali civilians remain squeezed
between hardcore Islamist ideologies and geopolitical battles waged intermittently on its
shores. The country remains an incredibly dangerous place, a policymaker’s worst
nightmare, and the situation is as ripe today for chronic famine as it was before the fall of
the country’s last government in 1991.
“Operation: Restore Hope,” as the US intervention was termed, is a crucial
landmark in the checkered history of humanitarian intervention in the post-cold war era.
The debate surrounding Somalia generally consists of two central questions: what was the
media’s role in motivating the intervention, and what was the subsequent effect on the
West’s response to mass atrocity? With advancements in ICT and the innovation of the
twenty-four-hour cable news network, viewers witnessed these events in real-time, and
foreign policy appeared to shift in lock-step with media coverage and public opinion: As
images appeared of famine-stricken children, the public called for intervention; as these
images were replaced by those of dead American officers the following year, the tenor
swung to withdrawal. The blowback from Somalia negatively affected the ability of
human rights advocates to lobby governments for humanitarian intervention, for fear of
making a repeated spectacle out of the deaths of their own soldiers. The CNN Effect, as it
was termed, was an attempt by commentators to describe the role played by media
coverage of the event in driving foreign policy.
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However, when social science caught up with the commentators, the CNN Effect
was largely debunked (Robinson 2002; Western 2005). The most convincing evidence of
its inaccuracy is the simple sequencing of events. In late 1991, news of the famine in
Somalia came into view on Western television screens, mostly as part of a larger story
about famine on the Horn of Africa. Africa Watch reported “wanton and indiscriminate”
violence in the fallout from the government collapse (quoted in Western 2005, 139).
Major news coverage would not return until late summer 1992, even though international
organizations (IOs) and human rights groups would continue their alarm-sounding
advocacy. In July 1992, the International Committee for the Red Cross cited the figures
of 300,000 casualties from famine since 1989, and “reiterated its six-month old estimates
that 95 percent of the population of Somalia was malnourished” (Western 2005, 135).
The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) “estimated that as many as
4.5 million of the country’s 6 million civilians would be subject to death by starvation
without some form of immediate assistance” (Western 2005, 139). While reporting from
IOs does not often reach the average news consumer, inside the US administration, there
were officials such as Andrew Natsios, also advocating forcefully for intervention.
Natsios, then-assistant administrator of the US Agency for International Development
(UNAID), sought to make the crisis more public with a series of press conferences on the
topic of the “humanitarian catastrophe” (Western 2005, 135). Yet, with all this
discussion, there was very little graphic coverage of the famine in Somalia. Most news
outlets had pulled out due to insecurity and it was not until the Bush administration chose
to make the famine an issue that media sources began covering it.
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Still, the fact that there was an ongoing debate between IOs, state department
officials, the Pentagon, and the Executive is not a mass media matter. However, nearly
simultaneously, news emerged from the Balkans and reports of concentration camps in
Europe stole the headlines temporarily. The duration of the summer of 1992, the Bush
administration was mired in calls from all sides to intervene somewhere: either in
Somalia, or in Bosnia. Photographs of concentration camps in Bosnia had surfaced and
the human rights community demanded action. While the conflict in Bosnia and the role
of imagery in that intervention will be analyzed in detail below, its relationship to the
decision-making vis-à-vis Somalia is critical. As described in some detail by Nicholas
Wheeler (2000), Samantha Power (2007), and Jon Western (2005), the Bush
Administration, facing pressure from a range of external and internal sources, ultimately
executed the proverbial bait-and-switch. On August 14, President George H.W. Bush
authorized a military airlift of food aid, as well as of the Pakistani guards representing the
UN security force (Moeller 1999, 135). “The decision to launch the airlift to Somalia did
divert media and liberal attention away from critical coverage and commentary on Bosnia
and to sympathetic stories on Somalia…The airlift had given the administration a slight
reprieve from the pressure on Bosnia” (Western 2005, 163). This calculated move helped
“deflect attention away from…inaction over Bosnia” (Wheeler 2000, 181), which was
seen as a much more difficult conflict and a less favorable context for intervention, and
mobilized the press corps to cover Somalia in full stride. By initiating the airlift, “the
White House saw an opportunity to demonstrate it had a heart…and do it relatively
cheaply” (Samantha Power 2007, 286).
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From late-summer 1992 through the fall, Somalia was the humanitarian story
covered by all outlets. “Television and the print media were on the spot sending
wrenching stories back to the United States. Stories on and photographs of the famine’s
victims, heroes and villains became ubiquitous. The tales of woe—especially of child
victims—led the coverage on air and in print” (Moeller 1999, 137). Pleads for further and
more sustained action occupied the editorial pages, as calls escalated from aid delivery to
a more extended presence and a revised set of rules of engagement. Philip Johnston,
President of CARE-US, as well as other officers from that organization, continued his
vocal calls until the “drumbeat for intervention reached its crescendo” (de Waal 1997,
185). In September, US Marines were deployed to support the airlift mission, while
concurrently newsmagazine carried stories with graphic imagery of starving children.
Somali supermodel Iman and UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador Katherine Hepburn made
trips to the country (Moeller 1999, 140). Of all the grief and suffering on the Horn of
Africa (or elsewhere, for that matter), Somalia had clearly arrived.
Yet, contrary to popular opinion, upon close inspection, public attention and
media coverage followed official policy decision-making, not vice versa. The calculations
of the Bush administration, especially following his electoral defeat at the hands of Bill
Clinton, consisted of the expectation that the public supported and would continue to
support military activity in Somalia on behalf of humanitarianism. By effectively
mobilizing the media to cover stories of the famine, the Administration could maintain
the storyline: “…media coverage enabled humanitarian intervention by ensuring
domestic legitimacy…” (Wheeler 2000, 180). With US interests being affected by the
introduction of troops, and the emotional narrative of starving children, public support
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would help President Bush set himself up for a memorable legacy. Furthermore, Bush
bore responsibility for the plight of Kurds following Operation Desert Storm, so Somalia
helped to alleviate the pressure from the public on Iraq. Slowly, over the course of the
fall, the storyline shifted from the starving children and aid delivery to the more heroic,
patriotic vision of the role of US troops and the thuggish locals (Moeller 1999, 138).
However, despite the rousing support for the troops among the American public, “it was
not easy for the administration to control the subsequent coverage, which focused on the
fact that over 1,000 Somalis were dying daily” (Wheeler 2000, 179). The spectacle
enabled by the administration’s decision to intervene—and on which it depended—would
become the bane of the mission.
The night before Thanksgiving 1992 the shape of the mission changed when
outgoing-President Bush, with President-Elect Clinton’s approval, declared he would
send 15,000-30,000 troops to bolster the UN mission. At that announcement, civil society
awoke to the cause. Relief organizations saw a remarkable response in donations, and
media outlets began to position teams on the scene to cover the next stage of the
intervention. However, unlike late summer, the facts on the ground would not be allowed
to drive the story; there would be more coordination from the center. On December 8,
Marines landed on the shores of Mogadishu to be greeted by journalists and cameras
(estimates range anywhere from 75-300 news personnel on scene). The Pentagon had
arranged for these media representatives to be on site by issuing invitations, and even
positioned them appropriately (Moeller 1999, 143; Keenan 2004, 440). Reminiscent
within Western cultural memory of the landing on Normandy Beach in World War II, the
Somali expedition was designed to be a display of American power and intentionality in
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the post-cold war period, a controlled environment in which to make such a
pronouncement, and mediated to an extreme so as to message the event clearly to
enemies and allies alike. As dazed as the Marines were to be welcomed with conspicuous
television studio lighting, US forces would be faced with an equally jolting reality when
the same cameras would capture their exit months later.
Coverage of the landing boosted television news ratings to their highest since the
1991 Gulf War (Moeller 1999, 143). Public opinion of the intervention was extremely
favorable, with 81 percent supportive of the mission from a moral position and 70 percent
willing to sacrifice American blood and treasure for the cause (Moeller 1999, 145). The
spectacle of Somalia had been transformed from that of suffering to that of militaristic
heroism in a way that resonated with the audience and generated support for the
Administration’s goals: humanitarian, political, and geopolitical. Messaging through
visualization was being controlled in a masterful way. Media outlets were reaping profits
through an increase in television viewership and in print sales. All parties were content to
continue behind the mission in Somalia because all of their interests were being well
served. However, the unfolding of events will test the limits of spin and what results will
demonstrate the difficulty in managing image in an age of spectacle. As public opinion
turned against the mission, the US government learned the lesson of the fickle nature of
the audience for humanitarian expeditions.
By early 1993, with the end of drought and resumption of the rainy season, the
famine was effectively over, making it a “straightforward task to declare victory over
starvation” (Moeller 1999, 145; de Waal 1997, 185). While the original impetus for
intervention had been alleviated, the mission evolved rapidly to respond to facts on the
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ground. In the summer of 1993, aid delivery was no long the force’s raison d’être. Due to
an escalation in violence, prompted by attacks against the Pakistani peacekeepers, the
militarized humanitarian expedition took on a singularly military function. Infamously, in
the fall of that year, American forces faced significant opposition from troops under the
command of General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the President of Somalia. On September
25, a US helicopter was downed in Mogadishu and on October 3 two more helicopters
were shot down over the capital. The second attack resulted in eighteen US Army
Rangers killed, one taken captive, and one of the bodies of the deceased dragged through
the streets by children (Moeller 1999, 146). Fallout from the transmission of photographs
of the fierce battle and brutal treatment of American casualties was immediate and
dramatic. President Bill Clinton pledged a withdrawal of American troops from the UN
mission in direct response. Graphic imagery of suffering had provoked a change in
foreign policy, but the suffering subjects in this case were not African children—they
were American servicemen acting on humanitarian grounds. While thousands of Somalis
were dead or wounded when the dust settled in Mogadishu, their suffering had been cast
aside in favor of the American narrative. This narrative was driven by lingering
symptoms of the Vietnam Syndrome, in which the nation’s military gets bogged down in
a quagmire. Of course, the Vietnam Syndrome would give way to a “Somalia Syndrome”
that framed the West’s approach to Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo (Brooks 2006).
Humanitarian intervention in Somalia exposed the human rights commitments of
the audience as superficial, fleeting, and self-fulfilling. In the early stages, calls for
compassionate foreign policy on behalf of starving Africans were founded on the
emotional response to photographic documentation of suffering. With the history of
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caring and giving in the Biafran and Ethiopian contexts, but without the geopolitical
constraints of the cold war, Somalia became the example of what a force-forward human
rights foreign policy could look like. While few observers would claim American or UN
victory in Somalia, many detractors in hindsight will issue conclusions about how the
intervention would have worked if only it had been executed with a limited set of rules of
engagement; if the mission had not changed, then international forces could have exited
on their own terms, having restored the country to some semblance of normalcy and
halted the most chronic forms of suffering. Similar to the way in which “Operation:
Provide Comfort” in 1991 effectively set up safe zones for Kurdish refugees, without
attempting anything further, a modest strategy of civilian protection absent the aggressive
military adventure after Aidid may have been a recipe for success. However,
counterfactuals aside, human rights and humanitarianism were struck a severe setback in
the aftermath of Somalia. As Bosnia crept back into public debate, the reluctance for and
resistance to taking action was especially poignant.
The Bosnian Genocide in Prime Time
Concentration Camps Return to Europe
The military debacle in Somalia was, in important ways, a consequence of the
American government having to choose between two conflicting humanitarian crises, on
the Horn of Africa and in the Balkans. During the summer of 1992, while a debate was
bubbling about intervention in Somalia, news and then pictures emerged of grizzly
detention camps in southern Europe where Bosnian Muslims were being held at the
behest of Serbian forces. When Slobodan Milosevic, an ethnic Serb, assumed power over
the country of Yugoslavia through election and advanced a pro-Serb platform, the
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ethnically diverse sub-regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia,
became uneasy as hypernationalism laid the foundation for the Milosevic platform.
Following the secession of the latter three, the Yugoslav National Army, under
Milosevic, began attacks on the regions hoping to quell their rebelliousness. Unable to
corral Slovenia, but having routed Croatia, Bosnia became the next target. Nearly half of
Bosnia was Muslim, making it the most diverse of the Yugoslav republics. Despite the
fact that the US and European Community recognized the newly-independent Bosnia, the
arms embargo enacted on all of Yugoslavia at the outset of violence crippled Bosnia in its
war with Serb forces. On the offensive, Milosevic’s army laid siege to Sarajevo, the
capital of Bosnia, and began its ethnic cleansing campaign of captured territories in the
spring of 1992 (Moeller 1999, 263-4).
Two months later, an American journalist, Roy Gutman, began to pursue the facts
behind circulating rumors about detention camps in Bosnia. On July 19, Newsday
published a story on the existence of such a camp at Omarska, although without
photographs and without eyewitness testimony. Two days later, another article by
Gutman is entitled “Like Auschwitz” (Samantha Power 2007, 272). Two weeks after the
initial article, however, Gutman tracked down two former detainees from Omarska and
Brcko Luka who agreed to appear in photos. On July 29, The Guardian expands on
Gutman’s reporting in a story by Maggie O’Kane on camps at Omarska, Trnopolje, and
Bratunac. On August 2, Gutman’s follow-up story ran with the unmistakable headline
“Death Camps.” These accounts evidenced a strategy of systematic execution of
detainees at the camps that peaked the attention of the global public. Even before the
famous images are disseminated, journalist Christiane Amanpour frames the Bosnian
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camps for the first time in terms of the World War II genocide perpetrated by the Nazis in
Europe (Moeller 1999, 266-7).
When pre-image news broke, Bosnian Serb party leader Radovan Karadzic was
in London on a diplomatic mission. In order to counter these initial reports, Karadzic
caves and permits limited access to the ICRC and the media. Producers from the
Independent Television News enter Omarska under Serb supervision on August 5.
“Allowed into the canteen, the journalists saw wafer-thin men with shaven heads eating
water bean stew…But they were not allowed to visit the prisoners’ sleeping quarters or
the notorious ‘White House,’ which they had heard was a veritable human abattoir”
(Samantha Power 2007, 275). Without explicit photographs of what they had expected to
find, the team departs Omarska. It was clear these prisoners were not well fed, but, due to
the war in progress, it was possible that the detainees were criminals, dissidents, or
battlefield conquests (it was not initially obvious that ALL the detainees were innocent
Muslims, cleansed from their homes and villages). However, upon their exit, the caravan
passed by the camp at Trnopolje coincidentally as new prisoners were arriving, appearing
worn and haggard. The camera operators sprung from the car and began filming from the
outside of the camp, with the barbed wire as foreground. The night of August 6, ITN
broadcasts footage from Trnopolje that is simulcast on CNN and ABC, marking the
turning point for Bosnia qua news story. “Being the first visual evidence of the camps’
place in the Bosnian Serbs’ ethnic cleansing strategy, and the first accounts by outsiders
of the conditions in these camps, the ITN reports caused a considerable stir” (Campbell
2002a, 4).
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The morning of August 7, the front pages of newspapers throughout the West
were plastered with these now-iconic photographs. British press headlines rang clear;
Daily Mail declares “The Proof,” while Daily Mirror was even more provocative with the
unsubtle “Belsen 92” (Campbell 2002a, 2-3). Both of these dailies featured prominently a
prisoner by the name of Fikret Alic, situated in the center of the frame, with especially
stark physical attributes: waste drawn in, wrists skeletal, ribs protruding.3 Within two
weeks, Alic and his fellow detainees were subjects of global news broadcasts, and on
covers of Time and Newsweek magazines (Campbell 2002a, 1). It was these photographs
in the late-summer of 1992 that galvanized the public, and forced decision-makers to
confront the specter of genocide in Europe fifty years after the declarations of “Never
Again” were first made. “The images of wilting Muslims behind barbed wire
concentrated grassroots and elite attention and inflamed public outrage about the war like
no postwar genocide” (Samantha Power 2007, 276). As policy makers struggled to gain
traction in a conflict in which nobody wanted to be involved, civil society cries grew
louder.
The fervor over the images “…confronted Bush officials with the challenge not of
how to deal with the reemergence of concentration camps in Europe but rather how to

3

Professor David Campbell, in a two-part series for Journal of Human Rights (2002b;
2002a), details the legal battle between ITN and Living Marxism, a journal critical of
ITN’s coverage and alleging that these photos were inaccurate representations of reality.
Their claim was that it was the camera that was on the inside of the barbed wire and not
the prisoners because there was no fence around Trnopolje. The bizarre libel trial
involved testimony from former detainees, as well as members of the press, and resulted
in the judge siding with ITN against the allegations made in the pages of Living Marxism.
Much of the courtroom debate, as Campbell argues, had the effect of muting the public
perception of the terror perpetrated against inhabitants of Trnopolje that included mass
rape and torture in favor of the dispute over the photo.
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withstand the political pressures arising from the televised images of them. Concentration
camps a half-century after the Nazis would have been enough, but pictures of the
emaciated, tortured prisoners: this was the sort of thing that stirred the lethargic and
fickle American public” (Danner 1991, 2). President Bush was able to assuage public fear
by calling for—and achieving—access to the camps for the Red Cross. Following Red
Cross visits, many of the most severe detention facilities of the early phase of the war
were closed. While this can be seen as a human rights victory, more critically it can be
reasoned that this “victory” for the Bush administration sealed off further policy options
toward Bosnia going forward. No decision makers took seriously the claims that the
Serbs were genocidal and were able to ignore those calls having “solved” the problem of
the camps with their closure. Obscuring the larger strategy for the specific mechanisms of
camps, allegations of systematic torture and concentrated rape camps were dismissed as
unsubstantiated. The pressure that had mounted to act in Bosnia was allayed because
something had been done, namely the camps on television were closed.
On August 13, the UN Security Council, with US backing, authorized delivery of
humanitarian aid to Bosnia, but failed to address the question of camps (Samantha Power
2007, 281). There were people suffering under siege in Sarajevo and peacekeepers were
bolstered to protect civilians, but not to dismantle or intervene in the system of
concentration camps. Public pressure was applied in the form of official statements to
allow international agencies access to the camps and to the suffering people there, but
that was as far as any one would venture (Samantha Power 2007, 279). There were
resignations over US inaction within the State Department, and communications officers
attempted to create space for flexible policymaking without committing to any position;
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thus, the imperative not to declare Serbian aggression as an act of genocide—a position
taken by Helsinki Watch in the same month in a 359-page report on atrocities, edited by
Executive Director Aryeh Neier, the research for which began in March (Samantha
Power 2007, 257). David Rieff refers to this policy—of authorizing humanitarian aid
delivery, without forceful protection of civilians and repulsion of Serbian brutality—as
“substituting relief for rescue” (Rieff 2003, 149). In the same way Somalia would
become a massive distraction from the problems in Bosnia, this limited attempt to deflect
responsibility relied on the short-attention span of the television audience. As agitated as
civil society had become, and as vociferous as were its cries, the vast expanse between
the dramatic Holocaust comparisons and the weakness of political will signifies a
persistent contradiction produced by the spectacle: appearance can serve as a substitute
for action.

Shadow of the Holocaust in the Age of Intervention
The ITN footage immediately conjured memories of the Nazi genocide
perpetrated against Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, homosexuals, communists and other political
dissidents. This connection was at once clear to the average viewer, as well as facilitated
by the media’s framing of the subject matter. Coverage such as the piece in the Daily
Mirror that utilized the headline “Belsen 92” even placed a WWII photo next to that from
Bosnia, in order to make the linkage beyond skepticism. Two of the most obvious points
of comparison that resonated with the audience were the genocide’s geographic location
in Europe and the scenes of starving bodies behind barbed wire. The location introduced
geopolitical considerations, and the imagery had the dramatic effect of playing on
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emotional and cultural memory. While the spectacle of suffering that became manifest in
the case of Bosnia underwrote the viewer’s emotional response to the sight of human
suffering, the backdrop of the Holocaust presented an additional element. In much the
same way that Biafra and Ethiopia contributed to the reaction to Somalia, the cultural
memory of Nazi atrocities was a central motivating factor in the public’s outrage in 1992.
In a heightened fashion relative to the Somalia case, Bosnia demonstrates the force of
striking imagery combined with historical metaphor in framing contemporary crises and
shaping audience perception.
There is no association of greater magnitude than a comparison to the Holocaust:
it is the gold standard of good and evil, against which all things are measured. No
mission is of higher moral character than that undertaken by Allied Forces in dismantling
Hitler’s war machine. No political objective is as despised as the Final Solution. No act
more naïve or cowardly than that of appeasement. No analogy more damning or
demonizing than being termed Nazi, Fascist, or like Hitler; also, no analogy more
alarmist or overwrought. For such a dynamic event to become the model of hyperbole
speaks to its significance, as well as to the impression its legacy has made on the culture.
“The Holocaust has been appropriated as a cultural icon unequivocal in its meaning. To
apply the term to a situation is to make an imperative – and sensational – statement”
(Moeller 1999, 22). The Holocaust is treated with such gravity so as to occupy a space
beyond reach. It is the “ultimate metaphor,” the “archetypal case,” and the unambiguous
essence of (im)morality in contemporary political discourse (Moeller 1999, 273; Zelizer
1998, 210). But, this says nothing of the truth-value of such a comparison or its
usefulness in the making of public policy.
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Metaphor and imagery of Holocaust, however, did not initially coincide with
action. As some activists called for military intervention early on, elite decision makers
could be content to have enacted sanctions, closed several camps, and airlifted supplies
into Serb territory—treating a genocide as a humanitarian disaster, evidencing a
suspicious trend in modern politics. “Rony Brauman of MSF once remarked bitterly that
if Auschwitz were taking place today, he feared that both humanitarians and the mass
media would choose to describe it as a humanitarian crisis” (Rieff 2003, 75). Discussing
the plight of Kurdish refugees, two years prior to Omarska, Peter Galbraith echoes
Brauman, “I suppose your solution to Auschwitz would have been to ensure that some
Swedish girls in shorts would have been available to give the Jews food!” (Samantha
Power 2007, 240). The widening gap between rhetoric and action—and even the
transformation of the reality of aggression into deprivation—is a symptom of the
spectacle: “…the story of Bosnia is that of images which might have signified genocide
or aggression or calculated political struggle seemed for so long to signify only tragedy or
disaster or human suffering…and hence were available for inscription or montage in a
humanitarian rather than a political response” (Keenan 2002, 559). The space created by
spectacle is one in which disconnected realities can coexist without friction; and, the
spectacle itself, as it tends to fictionalize reality through mediation, cultivates the
nonsensical.
In applying the Holocaust moniker in the Bosnian context, a moral and legal
obligation is set upon observers and policymakers. The Holocaust references were kneejerk reactions to the imagery on television and not reasoned political positions. Driven by
emotions of empathy and fear, the comparisons were understandable reactions to
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alarming photography. Setting Bosnia apart, however, was the ability to apply the
metaphor in real-time. Unlike Belsen and Buchenwald, Omarska was a problem in
progress—not just an historical case to muse over and philosophize about in hindsight.
However, the immediacy of the conflict is only experienced by the public to the extent it
is represented through images. Yet, despite the panic in the media, the cries were loud,
but empty, and would soon vanish altogether. A central tension in this early phase of the
Bosnian genocide is the juxtaposition of the extreme nature of the metaphor deployed
against the narrow prescriptions that emerged. Another glaring consequence of the
spectacle of suffering is how quickly and to what degree images propel crisis onto the
global stage, as well as how quickly they recede—and in the interim, the issue can range
in importance from dire to irrelevant.
The spectacle envelops the audience in contradiction by at once galvanizing
public attention through ghastly images, while simultaneously commanding an incoherent
response. Holocaust analogy ceases to be rational when description fails to lead to
suitable follow through. When a circumstance is compared to the worst evil of the 20th
century, but results in the same outcome as does an earthquake, the lessons of genocide
have been forgotten and the logic of genocide response rendered impotent.
Humanitarianism was used, in the early phase of Bosnia, as a political tool and the
spectacle of suffering covered as a smoke screen. The US and UN policy toward the
camps were reliant on the public’s acquiescence to the policy’s limits. Had the audience
mobilized in support of a more direct challenge to Milosevic’s aggression, the delivery of
aid would not have registered as sufficient. However, the spectacle is by definition an
apolitical environment and therefore conditions apolitical mobilization. Graphic imagery
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of suffering drives emotional outpouring for action, but without guiding principles or
political consciousness.
For this reason, racially-motivated, forced removal and detention of peoples can
be equated with natural disaster. Politics and intentionality are removed. Yet, all suffering
people are not the same and all circumstances that lead to suffering are not equal. The
audience can feel like a participant in global affairs as it watches and compares Bosnia to
Nazi-occupied Europe, but the spectacle does not allow the comparison to persist beyond
that. The spectacle of suffering rests on the fact that the uniformity of subject matter
(suffering) transmitted through a uniform medium (television) will affect the audience in
a uniform way (empathy)—thus eliminating the opportunity for recipients to parse facts
and history, and reason through a crisis to generate a political response. In the absence of
a sustained and grounded reaction from the audience, human rights concerns (like war
crimes) are dealt with as humanitarian crises (like famine), despite their distinct causes
and remedies. Everything bleeds together into an amalgam of disaster and misery. In this
confusion, opportunities are missed and problems misdiagnosed. However, the story of
the genocide in Bosnia does not end with the news of the camps, and the public and its
decision makers will act to aid those under fire, but not before all other options, and hope
itself, fade away.

Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and the Hall of Mirrors
Three months prior to the exposure of concentration camps, the Breadline
Massacre of May 1992 struck at the consciences of Western audiences. Coverage of
“scenes of dismembered and maimed civilians” stirred the public and “led Bush to
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support imposing economic sanctions,” in the administration’s earliest response to the
war (Danner 2009, 173). As residents of Sarajevo stood waiting for rations, a Serb mortar
shell crashed down, killing seventeen and wounding many more. Newspapers and
observers at the time debated whether in fact it even was a Serb attack, as opposed to a
self-inflicted Muslim bombing aimed at garnering international sympathy for their cause.
This type of reasoning continued throughout the war. As the Siege of Sarajevo took form,
Serb propaganda and Western elites argued that Muslim hillside resisters were
responsible for the daily sniping at Sarajevan civilians. Bosniaks were not entirely
innocent victims in the conflict because their resistance forces were significant, fought
bravely, and at times acted with indiscriminate brutality rivaled only by their Serbian
enemies. Attacks on civilians were common as columns of Bosniak forces would descend
from the forest on unsuspecting villages, raze the buildings, and force civilians to flee for
their lives. For this reason, among others, Holocaust comparisons do not adequately
illustrate the complex nature of the war and its actors. However, to reason from these
scenarios that the Muslims would shell their own people simply to earn global sympathy
credit is unreasonable and out of line with the facts (Danner 2009, 180-183).
As Milosevic’s forces, under the command of the vicious Ratko Mladic, marched
across the countryside, villages were cleansed of Muslim inhabitants who were either
detained or killed, or sought refuge into an increasingly small number of towns in the
east. The refugees were unknowingly falling into the Serbian strategy of splitting off
remote sites and controlling access to and from places such as Sarajevo, Srebrenica,
Zepa, Gorazde, and Tuzla. As these villages swelled with refugees, conditions quickly
diminished. Resources cut off and vulnerable to constant attack, these areas were little
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more than decrepit refugee camps. However, as the towns degenerated as they did,
television crews were on the scene transmitting regular accounts of suffering and
torment. With the UN floundering to address the plight of the refugees, the remaining
Muslim enclaves were termed “safe areas” and declared under the auspices of “blue
helmet” peacekeeping forces. This distinction now in place, the populations found solace
in the international acknowledgement of their suffering. While the drama maintained a
steady simmer following the concentration camp flare up in 1992, a series of two
instances of acute harm and graphic disaster would once again jolt the Western audience
into paying attention: the Marketplace Massacre and the fall of Srebrenica.
By this point, the American administration turned over and Candidate Bill
Clinton, who had been so vocal about a force-forward policy toward Bosnia, was now
President Clinton, being held to account for his campaign promises. Clinton’s election
season posturing had been effective in scoring foreign policy points over President Bush,
who undeniably had more experience in this area than Clinton. As the images rained
down on American viewers, touting himself as savior of Bosnia created space between
Clinton and Bush who was reluctant to commit to any substantial policy. However,
besides the continuation of aid airlifts, American position vis-à-vis the Bosnian genocide
was unchanged. “Bill Clinton had managed to shape the perfect policy: a rhetorical
policy, one consisting solely of words. It brought moral credit; it carried no
risk…speaking out against inhumanity seemed a means to avoid standing up to it”
(Danner 2009, 195). Therefore, the President could remain popular among liberals,
human rights supporters, and those concerned with genocide without having to act on it.
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Once again, rhetoric and action, as far from one another as they were, co-existed
comfortably.
On February 5, 1994 in Sarajevo, “…a 120-millimeter mortar shell plunged
earthward in an impossibly perfect trajectory…its five pounds of high explosive spewing
out red-hot shrapnel and sending corrugated metal shards slicing through the crowd; in an
eye-blink a thick forest of chattering, gossiping, bartering people had been cut down”
(Danner 2009, 203). Of the daily terror lived by the inhabitants of this once-great city, the
magnitude of this attack hit the newswires with considerable force. Because the Siege
was being covered regularly, those journalists in the town readily captured this spike in
violence. “Now large glass lenses—more and more of them bobbing and glinting as ever
more cameramen pushed their way into the tiny square—would make those words flesh.
A few hundred miles away Germans and French would press a button on a remote control
and confront overwhelming gore…” (Danner 2009, 205). Blood spattered pavement,
scattered limbs, women shrieking: these were the scenes beamed into homes of secure
people in other countries. The single worst atrocity in the war thus far, in which sixtyeight Sarajevans perished, was captured in raw feed.
Immediately, in the wake of the attack, two concurrent debates unfolded: who was
to blame for the attack, and what had been the merit of the “safe haven” distinction? As
with the Breadline Massacre, the Serb propaganda machinery unleashed a torrent of
objections and claims that this one too was self-inflicted. Not only did UN authorities
begin investigating the trajectory of damage and analyze bloodstain patterns (one of their
reports actually concluded that it could have been carried out by Muslims), but TV Pale,
a Serb broadcast network, produced a “Phil Donohue style” television show with a host, a
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panel of experts, and visual aids to debunk the accusation that the Serbs had perpetrated
the marketplace bombing (Danner 2009, 217). Incomprehensibly, even the truth-value of
an event that was witnessed in real time was in play. Conspiratorial retellings of violence,
whose scars were still gaping, were treated as levelheaded possibilities. Imaging,
messaging, and spinning, in the age of spectacle, all took the place of truth and reality.
However, in some ways, regardless of who had actually lobbed the mortar, the
UN had previously declared Sarajevo “safe,” a label that, following the attack, was
seriously called into question. “Amid the human wreckage of this sun-filled square, what
could the phrase possibly mean?...Now, amid the stench of cordite in Sarajevo’s Markela
[marketplace]…‘safe area’ meant very little. It was a pretense—a policy of gesture, made
solely of words” (Danner 2009, 205). Between Clinton’s rhetoric and the UN’s “gesture,”
there is an apparent trend running through the treatment of the genocide as something
beyond apathy or reluctance. Critical inquiry suggests that the politics surrounding
Bosnia, while volatile, would tolerate a degree of buck-passing shrouded in benevolence.
So long as key actors successfully appeared as if they cared, and could convince the
audience of such with rhetoric and gesture, the projected image of themselves could float
by unscathed. While the Marketplace Massacre was a challenge to this position, the
gravest abuse was still to come and no Western actor would withstand “the gravest single
act of genocide in the Bosnian war” without bearing some responsibility—Srebrenica
tested the limits of the spectacle and the ability of the audience to maintain its distance
from the images on television (Samantha Power 2007, 393).
Due to the willful self-delusion of the West as to the gravity of the Serb
aggression, beginning in 1992 with Omarksa and continuing through 1994, Srebrenica
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crept up on the audience and the foreign policy community. Having learned a valuable
lesson from the exposure of the camps early on, Karadzic and Mladic slow-played the
final move to cleanse the remaining Muslim enclaves; moving swiftly was more likely to
provoke attention and reaction as it had in 1992. Into 1995, the Serb forces choked off all
relief convoys and even airlifts had proved ineffective. By July, Mladic had surrounded
Srebrenica on all sides and began to separate men from women and children, to “screen”
Muslim men for their involvement in war crimes—or so the Western media reported
(Samantha Power 2007, 404). On July 11, the day the Serbs assumed control over the
enclave, after meeting with the incompetent Dutch peacekeeping force tasked to protect
the safe area, Mladic strolled through town with his own cameras to document the
conquest. He toasted with Dutch Lieutenant Colonel Thom Karremans, commandant of
the UN presence in Srebrenica and was “clearly in a celebratory mood” (Flottau and
Mayr 2011). Mladic sauntered through the streets of Srebrenica handing out chocolate to
Muslim children, “‘No one will be harmed…’ the Bosnian Serb commander said on July
12, 1995, gently patting a young boy on the head. ‘You have nothing to fear. You will all
be evacuated’” (Rohde and Burns 2011). Smoking a cigar and flashing a bold smile,
Mladic mugged for his own cameras, as well as those he knew would transmit the event
to audiences far away. The brilliance of the Serbian leadership was its tactfulness in
perpetrating a genocide in front of live television cameras and, with a cigar and a smile,
tell the audience it was not happening.
Over the course of one week, Srebrenica would be emptied with unrelenting
brutality. What proceeded to occur, under the watchful eye of Western satellite imaging
and spy drones, was a mass murder of over seven thousand men and boys, and the mass
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rapes of the women—long an evil signature of the Serb military and paramilitary. While
American policymakers stammered to address what they certainly knew was happening,
the struggle was to comprehend the thoroughness of the operation. Despite the years of
Holocaust metaphor and alarmism surrounding the war, nothing approximated the reality
of the situation on the ground. If cultural memory through imagery had informed popular
opinion of Bosnia, it had done so at the peril of the victims. We could imagine how to
deal with someone like Hitler, because we dealt with Hitler once before. However, it
became impossible to imagine, or be creative, or dynamic, about possible futures. The
spectacle of suffering had circumscribed our understanding of the genocide in progress
with the historical and visual framing.
By late July 1995, news and images from refugee testimony and media coverage
flowed from the region. “Muslims described to the American media rapes and throatslitting carried out before their eyes. The major newspapers and television outlets
brimmed with graphic depictions of Serb butchery” (Samantha Power 2007, 413). In a
particularly telling instance, the Washington Post ran a cover photo of a young girl
hanging by her neck from a tree, having committed suicide after being raped (Samantha
Power 2007, 413). As images of mass graves surfaced, evidencing the extent of the act
that had occurred, observers and audiences endeavored to come to terms with the
suffering that had so quickly and so fatally been perpetrated. What was problematically
clear was that the case of Bosnia and the episode at Srebrenica could not be written off as
having happened unknowingly: the “story does not derive from a scandal about
information, about who knew what when. The massacre at Srebrenica…was a
culmination, marking with stark barbarities committed on the people of the UN	
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guaranteed ‘safe area’ the end of a long and terribly logical series of tawdry, cowardly
decisions by the nations of the West” (Danner 2009, 274). Being able to watch and
witness a genocide underway did not provide any assistance in the likelihood of stopping
it. The spectacle of suffering had transformed human rights abuse into theater, a “hall of
mirrors,” and facilitated disingenuous posturing by saviors and executioners alike
(Danner 2009, 221).
Conclusion
Witnessing as an Emotional Response to Distant Suffering
The spectacle of suffering that emerged in the 1990s is a latter day continuation of
trends in visual media receptivity, but in a heightened state. Technology made it possible
for distant suffering to be a regular feature of nightly news broadcasts and introduced
average viewers to extraordinary situations. Images of suffering civilians influenced
debate and framed the crisis in a certain way to the audience. For Western audiences, to
witness suffering at a distance is to be involved in a central human rights process
traditionally reserved for relief workers, medical personnel, and staff on the ground in
conflict zones. From a human rights perspective, witnessing is a political act because it
disables the abuser from operating in secrecy; accountability for gross violations can only
occur when the veil has been lifted: “…a fundamental axiom of the human rights
movement in an age of publicity: that the exposure of violence is feared by its
perpetrators, and hence that the act of witness is not simply an ethical gesture but an
active intervention” (Keenan 2002, 446). To reiterate Amnesty International’s founding
motto: “Better to light a candle than curse the darkness.” It is no coincidence that in 1992
the Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights began its Witness program that literally
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distributes video cameras throughout the world to capture human rights abuse for
documentary purposes (this program was initiated by rock star/activist/Amnesty
supporter Peter Gabriel) (Cohen 2001, 186). The spectacle is equivalent to the lighting of
a million candles, but transforming ordinary people into witnesses through television
does not simply transform them into human rights activists.
The episodes detailed above evidence the potential for the spectacle to be a force
for the expansion of moral community, but only on the basis of emotional appeal.
This issue arises at this time specifically due to the medium of television:
Confronting Western spectators with distant suffering is often regarded as
the very essence of the power of television. This is the power to make
spectators witnesses of human pain by bringing home disturbing images
and experiences from faraway places…The tension between a knowing
yet incapable witness at a distance is the most profound moral demand that
television makes on Western spectators today. (Chouliaraki 2006, 18)
Visually, television has a unique impact on its audience that radio and print never could
have. In terms of connecting with that which is covered, the ability to see the faces of the
affected cuts deeper than just reading or hearing about their plights and this experience
brings the viewer closer to the person on television in a morally relevant way. Witnessing
distant suffering is a symptom of globalization in the sense that ordinary audience
members can participate in global happenings through the process of watching.
Television provides a bridge across which irrelevant differences seemingly evaporate.
Because one party is sitting comfortably at home and one party is struggling to stay alive
does not make either party any less apart of the same moral category—and visual media
allows one to make this argument to a broader community.
To the extent that this is true, we should observe Western audiences making
universalistic claims on behalf of those suffering on television, as we do in throughout
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the cases. “This is a solidarity which is forged out of what amounts to empathy; out of the
imaginative recognition that despite appearances individuals are actually the same in all
morally important respects. I stop thinking about the other as ‘one of them’ and instead
start thinking about and treating them as ‘one of us’” (Tester 1995, 472). There is a causal
connection, therefore, between witnessing distant suffering on television, having an
emotional reaction, and expanding one’s definition of moral inclusion. Communities of
care and concern can be expanded through products of globalization, like global media,
which impact the demands that citizens make on their governments for human rights
policy. It is possible for Western audiences to have solidarity with suffering people in
another part of the world and feel a moral compulsion to restore and uphold human
dignity.
However, this moral claim—that a Somali, for instance, deserves assistance
because she is part of the same human community as I am—originates as an emotional
plea. Empathy motivates a series of cascading emotions that may range from sadness and
grief to anger, but generally all contribute to a comprehension of what it would be like to
be the victim of severe suffering. An understanding of sameness drives the desire to act
on behalf of others, and this sameness is communicated forcefully through visual media.
However, the emotional response expressed by audiences to distant suffering is a distinct
form of witnessing. Journalists, aid workers, and other conventional human rights
witnesses remark on the role of feelings in their work, but also are consciously hopeful of
the political effect of witnessing. Even for those reporters covering conflict zones who
are supposed to remain impartial in their coverage daily confess an acknowledgement of
the intervention they are making when reporting a story of suffering (this is central to the
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way in which the global public found out about Bosnia). Adapting this into a mass
perspective is rare in history, but the 1990s demonstrate the potential for this sensibility
to be mainstream, widespread, and normal. There are glimmers of the promise that the
spectacle suggests as to the power of the image in supporting collective action. This leads
some to be optimistic about the possibility for cultivating a mass human rights movement
that stands up against abuse and brutality, in defense of the oppressed and vulnerable.
Many advocates of the hopeful view point to the role of emotion in compelling average
people to become involved in activism and claim that the “human capacity for
compassion is the key to global solidarity” (Linklater 2007, 24).
Bearing Witness through the Lens of Spectacle
Yet, there is a qualitative difference between the new form of witnessing
underwritten by the spectacle of suffering and those customary in the field of human
rights. Witnessing from the vantage of one’s living room and witnessing from within a
refugee camp are not equivalent acts and have widely varying consequences. While they
may each evoke similar emotions, absent from the former is a concrete comprehension of
the reality of suffering. Mediation can transmit images and information, but only a
replication of reality. In replicating, the audience receives a version of the event. As
Stanley Cohen remarks:
The increased international awareness of atrocities and suffering, the
spread of new information technologies, and the globalization of the mass
media indeed mean that sovereign states (some of them) are being
‘watched’ as never before. But representing this information is more
difficult than ever. There is a profusion of similar images; lines are blurred
between fiction and fact (…); ‘reality’ is always in inverted commas…
(Cohen 2001, 187)
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If this is the case and the audience confronts imagery of human suffering at an alienated
distance from the reality of human suffering, then it becomes clear how the emergence of
the spectacle affects the audience from the outset. By presenting a mediated version of
reality, “…it makes us voyeurs of the suffering of others, tourists amidst their landscapes
of anguish” (Ignatieff 1985, 59). It is the illusion of unity that the spectacle creates and
when this euphoric feeling of solidarity through television attempts to be translated into
political action, it generates a fickle, shallow constellation of actors. An audience cannot
transform into a social movement through emotions alone. Emotions do not account for
politics and human rights abuse is inherently political. “What determines the possibility
of being affected morally by photographs is the existence of a relevant political
consciousness. Without a politics, photographs of the slaughter-bench of history will
likely be experienced as, simply, unreal…” (Sontag 1977, 19). Graphic news coverage of
atrocity may be a necessary condition for awareness, but it is absolutely insufficient in
growing and maintaining a political movement.
Instead of witnesses, in the traditional sense, the spectacle of suffering produces
spectators: those audiences that watch without engaging, willfully detached from reality.
Television proves it is no panacea. Human rights and humanitarian crises are treated as
newsworthy, and even given serious coverage over an extended period of time, but the
mediated version beamed into the homes of the viewers maintains moral and
geographical distance. There is an acknowledgement of the suffering of others and an
emotional response is provoked, but the emotional experience does not translate into
political participation. Contrary to the “lessons learned” from the Holocaust, knowing
about atrocity does not suffice for stopping it; in the words of a book title on the Bosnian
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genocide, “this time we knew” (Cushman and Meštrović 1996). While forces of
globalization demonstrate an ability to expand moral capacity across boundaries,
facilitating for new communities the recognition of others, that feeling tends to be limited
to empathy, devoid of full consciousness.
Absent political consciousness, an emotional mass outpouring is vulnerable to
manipulation, evidenced notably in Somalia and Bosnia. While human rights
organizations seek to capitalize on sensational reporting of human rights abuse, power
elites and media outlets also wrestle for propriety over the message—and these cases
suggest that these actors, not human rights NGOs, are more competent and savvy in this
area:
The stakes of this mediatic scenario are high; we cannot understand, nor
have a properly political relation to, invasions and war crimes, military
operation and paramilitary atrocities—both of maximal importance for
human rights campaigners—in the present and future if we do not attend
to the centrality of image production and management in them. We will be
at an even greater loss if we do not admit that the high-speed electronic
news media have created news opportunities not just for activism and
awareness, but also for performance, presentation, advertising,
propaganda, and for political work of all kinds. (Keenan 2004, 442-444)
Foreign policy makers attempt to secure domestic legitimacy for international operations
through the deployment of the spectacle. Corporate media conglomerates sought to
bolster ratings and advertising revenue also with the use of imagery of suffering. The
emotional appeal of a humanitarian narrative serves both sets of interests. And, while it
could also serve human rights interests, the spectacle consolidates the gaps between the
moral, the emotional, and the political, complicating the prospects for a sustained human
rights response. Since witnessing and other forms of human rights interventions are
necessarily political acts, the spectacle of suffering does not provide a willing platform
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for efforts of this kind. Instead, the spectacle spews content to which no actor has
propriety: neither the human rights movement, nor the government. As real time coverage
improves over the course of the decade, the spectacle holds both the movement and the
government hostage and challenges their veracity to act in the face of genocide.
From the perspective of the human rights movement, in its perpetual quest to
bolster its base, the risk inherent in the use of the graphic imagery to attract audience
members is providing an unintended substitute for activism: the spectacle effectively
replaces political action with the act of looking. Viewers feel empathy and compassion
for those suffering on television and participate through their voyeurism. “Since the end
of the Second World War, indeed, the non-governmental movement has looked forward
to the prospect of up-to-date information about crimes in progress, coupled with access to
the public opinion that might enable them to be interrupted…the ability to relay acts of
witness and evidence around the world in near-real-time, something like this transparent
world is increasingly real” (Keenan 2002, 546). However, driven by the imperative that
knowledge of atrocity fosters cessation of atrocity, steps in between were taken for
granted. The experience of the audience is limited to an emotional response to imagery
that curtails further commitment, either personal or political. Television circumscribes the
extent of political engagement by the very virtue of its nature and human rights
organizations do not demonstrate the aptitude to supplement the coverage with actionable
operations.
Furthermore, even as the spectacle diminishes the notion of witness and replaces
acting with looking, it has transformed another fulcrum on which the movement has
always depended. The “mobilization of shame,” since the founding of Amnesty
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International, has been a reliably useful tactic in defending human rights. Yet, most
notably in the Bosnian context, the offenders were not only comfortable abusing in plain
sight, but they also exhibited skillful mastery of imagery and messaging. To reiterate, a
society of spectacle is one in which reality is fictionalized through visuality and
contradictions can be suspended in balance—allowing Mladic to sincerely declare to the
camera his intentions benign, even when confronted with video feed capturing the
aftermath of this savagery. However, if villains can no longer be shamed by the exposure
of their crimes, the capacity for bearing shame has been transferred to Western onlookers.
Concerned audience members now can use their empathy to shame their own
governments into action on behalf of others. This new dynamic fundamentally turns
human rights activism on its head, offering possible ways forward, while also sealing off
traditional strategies. Amnesty’s model of “shaming and blaming” continues to be
successful in their specific approach to individual casework, but shaming of criminals has
been rendered impotent in more spectacular instances of violation. When sensational
abuse becomes subject of spectacle, human rights advocates have proven unable to
overcome the pull of the undertow. Movement actors are drawn into the spectacle without
the ability to control it.
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CHAPTER 4 – BUMPER STICKER ACTIVISM AND THE CORPORATE
BRANDING OF THE SAVE DARFUR MOVEMENT
“Advertising is about hawking product. Branding, in its truest and most
advanced incarnations, is about corporate transcendence”
– Naomi Klein (1999, 21)
“…we realized that the closer we could get to a bumper sticker, the better
we’d be as an organization” – David Rubenstein, founder of the Save
Darfur Coalition (Quoted in Hamilton and Hazlett 2007, 344).
Introduction
The movement to end atrocities in Darfur, Sudan was the culmination of those
campaigns and events that preceded it and was fundamentally shaped by the successes
and failures of the human rights movement of the late-twentieth century. From its use of
celebrities and mass cultural trends to the reliance on visual media, this broad campaign
demonstrated a capacity to learn from that which came before it and it its own right
profoundly expanded upon the model. Weighing heavily in the minds of the movement’s
architects was the breakthrough against South African Apartheid, filtered through the
memory of inaction in Rwanda; the synthesis of these events frames the approach of Save
Darfur. Yet, as a twenty-first century human rights movement, at its disposal were new
technologies and penetrating markets. To avoid pitfalls of the past, and the sense of
having to reinvent the wheel at the emergence of a new crisis, the Save Darfur Campaign
sought to institutionalize its brand of activism by integrating past models and injecting
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them with the force of Madison Avenue advertising strategies. The employment of
corporate marketing firms was primarily responsible for the unfortunate public relations
missteps and controversies wrought in the process of building the movement. Through its
efforts to maximize donor appeal, raise awareness, and leverage its popular support in
terms of political influence, Save Darfur was effective as a marketing push, but failed in
its mission. The movement suffered from a genuine disconnect between its means and its
ends: rather than politicizing its supporters in the service of its cause, advertising became
a self-perpetuating end in itself.
Yet, the diffusion of human rights activity around Darfur was in many respects
miraculous. In a few short years, Darfur was transformed from “a remote Sudanese
province little known even to Africanist scholars,” into the site of great suffering and the
object of tremendous outrage and compassion (De Waal 2008, 43). The movement to
“save Darfur” captivated the public imagination through a grassroots approach to
organizing that generated support from high school classrooms and college campuses to
the US Department of State and the International Criminal Court. The Save Darfur
Coalition (SDC), the umbrella organization founded in 2004, sits as the center node of
this network of divergent actors: a diverse group representing, among others, evangelical
Christians, Jews, Armenians, Muslims, and secular humanists. Citizen activism in
support of human rights rose to new heights and projected into the future what is
possible, while also consolidating progress through the formation of new institutions
solely tasked with responding to mass atrocities. However, since the fervor has subsided,
observers are beginning to take stock of the movement to save Darfur: exactly what was
it, what was done, and how was it done? Was this cause célèbre actually a landmark in
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the history of global human rights activism, or a game of smoke and mirrors—a mirage
of merchandising masked as political engagement?
The eruption of civil society activity around the issue of Darfur was a mass
phenomenon, often compared to the Anti-Apartheid movement in scope and scale
(Hamilton and Hazlett 2007, 338; Lanz 2009, 669). While there are indeed many
similarities, the most striking difference relates to the movements’ duration: the AntiApartheid movement began thirty years before it reached critical mass and nearly forty
years before its ends were realized. In Darfur, however, a movement was born, peaked,
and receded, all within five years, without having its primary objectives met. Yet, the
movement for Darfur made steady headlines, motivated key policymakers, and mobilized
a very significant constituency. Saving Darfur became the subject of bake sales, benefit
concerts, opinion pieces, and episodes of television drama, and was thrust into public
dialogue with a sense of great urgency. Essentially, it had all the characteristics of a
successful human rights campaign. However, inconsistencies plagued the movement and
remain its conflicted legacy. While it leaves in its wake permanent institutions for the
prevention of genocide, the movement also calls into question the authenticity and
credibility of human rights activists due to the dubious deployment of casualty figures,
aggressive advertising techniques, and force-forward demands. Embarrassing incidents
involving the refutation of body count totals used in public advertising, serious doubts as
to whether or not a “genocide” was in fact being perpetrated, and calls for the use of force
at odds with the wishes of aid agencies on the ground, created an non-governmental
organization (NGO) sphere fraught with tension and invalidated certain pillars of the
movement. Yet, Save Darfur put the issue of genocide on the front page and in the talking
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points of presidential candidates, cabinet members, and sitting heads of state—and this
development, however it was accomplished, should not be underappreciated.
But, the controversy persists: what explains the disconnect between rhetoric and
reality? As Save Darfur continued to call for an end to the genocide, it became
increasingly clear that genocide might not be in progress at all. Therefore, why did the
hub organization of this movement muddy itself in half-truths on billboards? In exploring
the underside of this acclaimed non-profit, the Save Darfur Coalition is cast as idealistic
and forward-thinking, as well as naïve and listless. The critique that follows is conscious
of the learning curve experienced by the leaders of SDC and the monumental task they
set for themselves—to affect the domestic policy of a sovereign state, largely through the
mobilization of average citizens of another country. However, an honest critique must
take seriously the unintended consequences of even genuine intentions and, if NGOs are
going to inject themselves into geopolitics in such a significant way, they must be held to
account. This chapter is an attempt to contextualize the actions of Save Darfur,
investigate its causes and effects, and inquire as to the forces that shaped the movement.
Testimonials and statements from key movement players, such as John
Prendergast, George Clooney, and others, suggest that a driving force in the founding of
Save Darfur drew on lessons from Rwanda above other prior events. Paramount among
those lessons was the necessity to motivate political will through the mobilization of
citizens with a clear and vociferous message: committing genocide is intolerable and
there will be political costs for a government’s failure to intervene on behalf of innocent
civilian lives. Repeatedly referencing Romeo Dallaire’s first-hand account (2004) and
Samantha Power’s (2007) journalistic retelling of the 1994 genocide, the architects of
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Save Darfur sought to generate sufficient public outcry that would go beyond mere
awareness raising, because the other events of the 1990s, mainly Somalia and Bosnia,
were instructive on this point: being aware of, and even visually witnessing, atrocities
was inadequate for fomenting a popular movement, let alone formulating useful public
policy. Instead, Darfur would propel human rights beyond this initial insight. To speak
out forcefully and collectively on abuse, as an expression of cosmopolitan solidarity with
those suffering, transcends the imperative to bear witness, which proves itself to be a
necessary but insufficient component. However, as we will see, the methods used to
initiate a solidarity movement and exert pressure on public officials matter. That masses
can shout in full volume and with resolute confidence on an issue says nothing of
substance. As loud as a cry may be, attention must be paid to questions of what is being
said, to whom, by whom, and how.
Indeed, this chapter pivots on the suggestion that the Save Darfur initiated a more
thorough blend of outreach as advertising than any other human rights campaign, but
somewhat to its detriment. The structure of the organization, as it was founded, relied
heavily on outside, independent contractors to complete many of its central functions,
such as fundraising, communication, coordination, advocacy, governmental relations, and
strategy. Adhering to a “grassroots” approach for Save Darfur took form as an incoherent
hybrid: students and civilians writing letters and attending rallies, notified by emails
messaged by corporate advertising agencies. The movement to end atrocities in Darfur at
once emerged as a popular surge of energy, while also being coaxed by very carefully
selected slogans and images. A seeming contradiction, Save Darfur advanced a model of
activism that relied as much on traditional grassroots methods, as on manufactured tactics
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teased from above. While progressive organizations frequently turn to an emergent
cottage industry of campaign coordinators and strategy managers, the degree to which the
Save Darfur movement was conducted by those same firms responsible for corporate
advertising is reflected in the message produced and the goals accomplished: the antigenocide platform was transformed into a brand, an identity that its supporters embraced,
but whose substance ceased to reflect facts on the ground.
The backdrop for this development is an ascendant corporate that is more
consolidated, more complete, and more penetrating than ever.

In an environment of

diminished competition marked by fewer and more profitable companies, monopoly
capitalism appears in a more palpable form. Corporations were changing not only in
shape, but in expression as well. As companies found themselves at or near the top of
their sector, the quest for preponderance compelled a more aggressive approach to
advertising and marketing. It became essential for companies to sell themselves as more
than simply the producer of goods, but instead as an essential component of a quality
lifestyle. From whom one purchases commodity goods and services becomes the mark of
value and status. This most recent turn in “branding” is the consequence of corporate
consolidation and demonstrates the deepening of corporate influence on social life. The
dramatic extent of this transformation is evident simply by a quick glance at the
landscape that surrounds us: the logos on the sides of buses and on the clothing we wear,
and the slogans that have become ubiquitous parts of our post-modern vernacular.
However, these are not mere images or phrases—they are competitive attempts to
objectify consumers as means for maximizing profit by nurturing walking, talking
commercials.
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Much can, and will, be said of the rise to prominence of corporate advertising at
the turn of the twenty-first century. This chapter revolves around the juxtaposition of the
initiation of a grandiose human rights campaign in the context of corporate branding, and
the thread weaving together these distinct areas is the use of branding strategies in the
movement to save Darfur. The attempt by movement architects to pre-package the
conflict in Darfur in quick, lucid sound bites was effective in motivating average people
to care about a crisis a world away but it did not correspond to the facts on the ground. I
suggest that truth and reality were two early casualties in the campaign, sacrificed
(inadvertently, yet not without pretext) for the sake of boiling down the cause in order to
fit it on a bumper sticker, a t-shirt, and a website banner. The label of genocide, the
inflated body counts, and the oversimplification of history and context ultimately
complicated and denigrated the movement’s ability to accomplish its goals and I contend
this is due to the role played by those actors seeking to brand human rights engagement
as a product to be consumed.
In order to demonstrate this cross-pollination, the chapter begins by detailing the
cultural and social impacts of branded advertising and the prevalence of this marketing
strategy in the 21st century. Furthermore, correlations will be drawn between corporate
culture and the campaign design that emerged from Save Darfur. To the extent the
movement’s outreach strategy was transformed into a branding agenda, the corporate
influence becomes clear. The critique rests on the hypothesis that these tactics are
misappropriated and ultimately harmed the movement’s chances of being successful. Yet,
the Save Darfur Coalition was founded with the utmost of intentions by talented,
experienced people. It generated impressive grassroots support for a dire conflict in
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which hundreds of thousands of civilians died and millions were driven to flight.
However, aside from some notable policy accomplishments, SDC continued to battle
against genocide after the violence was over, and dismayed elites and other supporters
with disingenuous outreach techniques. Squaring these complicated circumstances will
require dissecting the organization’s origins and strategies, and critiquing SDC’s balance
sheets and other expressions of its priorities. This chapter will conclude with some
takeaway lessons from the movement to “save Darfur,” in light of its successes and
shortcomings.
The Socio-Political Economy of Advertising
Advertising is a pervasive feature of contemporary society. Slogans are the new
lingua franca, and logos the smirk smattered across the landscape. There are fewer
surreal experiences than stepping off a bus in a rural town in a foreign country to be
greeted by words and images that signify soft drinks, cigarettes, or ice cream familiar
from home; at once comforting, as well as unsettling. Colors and symbols carry
equivalent meaning for diverse communities of people. Yet, these messages are not on
their faces ideological, or partisan, or pointed; it is not a political perspective, a call to
arms, or a rallying cry. Advertising communicates a sales pitch for a product to be
purchased by consumers in the market. Billboards and commercial air space serve as
venues for marketing campaigns that seek to reach a maximum volume of potential
customers and clients. Through advances in communications technology, the deepening
penetration of advertising reaches a growing swath of the public and expands the
consumer commodity market. Corporate marketing is a driver and a symptom of
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globalization and, in its accelerated form, marks a distinct turn in post-industrial
capitalism.
A central tension of the contemporary marketplace is the consumer’s experience
of being inundated by advertising—a seemingly endless barrage of logos and catch
phrases—yet as the volume becomes more overwhelming, the commodities themselves
represent fewer and fewer corporations. The oligopolistic structure of the market bears
down on the consumer in the form of ad campaigns on multimedia platforms: from
billboard to commercial radio, and from product placement to pop-up window. Still, it is
insufficient for marketing to expand into multiple venues; for to wrangle a competitive
advantage, corporations strive for a deepening of the association with its commodities
among consumers. In order to accomplish this lofty objective, traditional forms of
advertising have been eclipsed by a far more totalizing strategy known as branding.
Historically, however, companies sold products. A consequence of the industrial
revolution, in the late-nineteenth century products and companies were mutually
associative because there was commonly one dominant company that produced any given
commodity: “Oil was Standard Oil, steel was Carnegie, film was Kodak, soup was
Campbell’s” (Barber 2007, 175). As the market opened up, companies were compelled to
distinguish themselves from their competitors, as well as protect themselves legally from
infringement. The concept of the trademark was developed to serve these purposes, and
laws and practices rose in parallel to the emergence of the modern corporation: “between
1850 and 1890 the number of patents granted each year in the major Western nations
increased by a factor of ten” (Chevalier and Mazzalovo 2004, 16). Predictable market
interactions and competition among fledgling firms spawned the move toward
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trademarking products and is very much a legacy of the period. “Brands were born as
stepchildren of the entrepreneurial competition that followed the age of cartels and trusts”
(Barber 2007, 178). When the largest corporations are broken down by anti-monopoly
regulation, the market spreads out and becomes fairer and more competitive. This was
true even in the market for basic commodity goods: “Not surprisingly, Proctor & Gamble
with its monopoly on household products being challenged by new competitors was the
first to codify a ‘brand management system’ back in 1931” (Barber 2007, 178).
In this context, companies were forced to advertise more deliberately to
emphasize the relative quality difference between competitors. It was no longer enough
to provide information on the product; advertising would now have to attract consumers
in a more clever and “manipulative” fashion (Barber 2007, 176). However, as firms were
adapting to increase competitiveness and respond to checks from regulators, consumers
were changing as well. What was called “consumptionism” in 1925 by observer Samuel
Strauss described a new trend among the American public to, in Strauss’ words, pursue
“luxury and security” above other traditionally fulfilling values (Leach 1993, 268). Retail
and industrial sectors, responding to the shock of World War I, restructured their
operations, and organized labor suffered setback after setback in the face of economic
crisis (Leach 1993, 265). Contemporaneously, scholars of the Frankfurt School began
their similar, but more rigorous, critique of consumerism and affluence to be fully
realized in the post-WWII era. The advances made in the world of marketing and the
rising taste for non-essential commodity goods among broader sections of the population
is, of course, not a sheer coincidence. Instead, it is fair to identify a symbiotic and
mutually reinforcing relationship between the two realms that has the effect of
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intensifying the association consumers have with brands and fortifying corporations with
social purpose.
During the wave of mergers and acquisitions of the 1980s and ‘90s, the brand
took on a status above that of the company, and that of the product. The 1988 purchase of
Kraft by Philip Morris for $12.6 billion signaled a “defining moment” in the history of
corporate branding because the food company was acquired for six times its actual worth
on paper, assigning a value to the brand itself (Klein 1999, 8). For brand managers this
development justified a further boom in spending, recognizing the potential profit
windfall from effective branding and turning ad money into “an investment in cold hard
equity” (Klein 1999, 8). However, five years later, in the midst of recession, branding
faced a setback when Marlboro cigarettes lowered its prices by 20 percent to compete
with bargain products. Of all companies to take this measure, Marlboro is an acclaimed
franchise for its memorable “Marlboro Man” mascot and this move shocked investors
(Klein 1999, 12). In the wake of this event and the stagnant economic trends of the early
1990s, “two tiers of consumerism” fell into place: one tier responded to competition from
below and the “big box” retailers, WalMart for example, were born to inexpensively
supply basic goods to consumers. The high end of retail, however, such as MercedesBenz, transcended the early branding of Marlboro by messaging corporate commodities
as components of one’s identity (Klein 1999, 16). If brands could rise above the ebbs and
flows of markets and situate themselves as indispensible ingredients to the modern
lifestyle, corporations could proceed to “monopolize ever-expanding stretches of cultural
space” with willful acquiescence from the consumer (Klein 1999, 16).
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After all, maybe sophisticated brands of this nature are exactly what consumers
want. In an environment saturated with advertising, brand recognition provides certainty:
“…the brand becomes a symbol of confidence for the consumer, and a commitment to
quality and compliance with certain rules for the producer…[a] contractual dimension of
the brand” (Chevalier and Mazzalovo 2004, 10). Branding insists on thorough, high
quality uniformity through all the producer’s commodities, which in turn attracts and
demands loyalty from the consumer base. By amassing “capital of confidence,” through a
history of reliability coupled with coherent messaging, corporations project themselves as
self-identifiable (Chevalier and Mazzalovo 2004, 10); that is, a brand that consumers
want to be a part of and take part in. Confidence is bred culturally—by developing a
reputation and an association often tied to status: Gucci and Louis Vuitton exude luxury,
Disney is fun and family-oriented, Nike stands for athletic prowess, and Chanel embodies
glamour and grace. However, lack of confidence is also bred culturally. From the Ford
Pinto to the Exxon Valdez and BP oil spill, negatively branded products and events are
emblazoned with corporate names and remind consumers of harm to personal safety or
ecological recklessness, for instance. When disparaging associations become attached to
a brand, it is re-branded—re-cast as that which it wants to be, rather than that which it is.
Image is the paramount goal of branding, not truth.
The name, the logo, and the slogan are each essential components of
contemporary brands. “At the beginning of the history of industrial brands, this was often
the name of a person, intended to lend a familiar, folksy quality to a standardized product,
but also to emphasize the existence of human know-how upstream of the chain of
production” (Chevalier and Mazzalovo 2004, 13). In the twenty-first century, brand
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names are short words with one or two syllables that place the corporation in the future
having forgotten its human origins or merged past. A logo is the graphic representation of
the corporation designed to communicate meaning and transmit familiarity. With crisp
contours and vivid color schemes, the logo is often more recognizable than the brand
name, as it is likely to be plastered on sponsored items without the name present at all.
For its prominence, the logo is “the heraldic shield of modern times,” or the family crest
of the firm (Chevalier and Mazzalovo 2004, 32). Finally, a slogan is the fullest
articulation of the brand, synthesizing the message behind the name and logo. The
projected identity is formalized with a mantra: “just do it”; “the real thing”; “think
different”; “do it your way”; “reach out and touch someone”; “you’ve come a long way,
baby!” Exemplifying assertiveness, authenticity, nonconformity, individuality,
connectedness, and empowerment, each of these slogans are (ostensibly) attractive
qualities that consumers desire to possess. The insinuation, when fastened to a
commodity, is that the consumer will experience these euphoric sensations upon
purchasing said goods, be they soft drinks, fast food, or cigarettes. Commodities become
not what we own, but who we are. In place of ethics or values or other subcutaneous
components that make us who we are, consumers are constituted by their possessions.
This chapter addresses an instance in which political principles themselves become
branded and commodified.
But, at the same time, this implication is neither directly stated nor actually
intended. Even ad executives know that simple commodity items do not ensure
happiness, high self-esteem, or true emancipation. A broader, savvier picture is being
painted. Such items, and more so in higher tier goods such as clothing, automobiles, and
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jewelry, are the key elements to a robust, actualized lifestyle: “brands are gradually
dissociated from the specific content of the products and services they label and
reaffiliated with styles, sentiments, and emotions at best remotely linked to those
products and services” (Barber 2007, 174). Consumer capitalism evolved to package its
products as components of an ethereal commodity existence. “The old paradigm had it
that all marketing was selling a product. In the new model, however, the product always
takes a back seat to the real product, the brand, and the selling of the brand acquired an
extra component that can only be described as spiritual” (Klein 1999, 21). In order to sell
a product as if it were a lifestyle or an experience, the branding must be complete. The
interplay of the logo and slogan and the deployment of an advertising campaign are the
tangible components to a fundamentally cultural appeal. As Starbucks founder Howard
Schultz readily admits, “the real goal is ‘to establish emotional ties’” (Quoted in Barber
2007, 179). To forge connections between the psychological and the material is to craft
an image of the product that rises above its instrumental value or even its status
attribution. Branding “increasingly seeks to take these associations out of the
representational realm and make them a lived reality” (Klein 1999, 29). After the product
has been replaced by a projection of the branded lifestyle that the product brings into
existence, the final sleight, then, is to have consumers transform into advertisements
themselves. This is the force of branding: when this spectacular illusion has been created,
the participants perpetuate its momentum by trafficking in the logos and slogans through
the clothing they wear, the places they shop, the cars the drive, and the devices they
use—walking, talking viral marketing.
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The question remains, however, how this translates to the political arena. If
branding is an effective means of communication, then the tactic might carry over into
other realms that have a need for the transmission of messages. One could reasonably
anticipate the desire to embed meaning and identity within a political movement, so as to
conjure commitment and solidarity among its supporters. With this affiliation, a
movement could assert itself and continue to broaden its constituency. However, there is
a significant element of façade, of untruth, and of duplicity in advertising that one might
not welcome in a political movement’s outreach campaign. Coke is not actually “the real
thing” by any measure of reality; AT&T provides the ability to only figuratively “reach
out and touch someone”; and by co-opting feminism, Virginia Slims is actually
demonstrating how far women have not come, baby. While a degree of tongue-and-cheek
word play can be tolerated in the advertising world, it is an approach with a tenuous
relationship with politics. Certainly in election campaigns candidates present themselves
as that which they wish they were, or that as which they wish to be seen, branding
themselves as a reformer, a maverick, or a stalwart defender of the way things were. Yet,
in social movements or broad popular campaigns, a correlation between the demands of
the participants and the truth is paramount to the achievement of legitimacy. When this
imperative is sacrificed or lost unintentionally, the claim to moral authority may vanish in
the process. The movement to save Darfur provides a fresh case with which to evaluate
the use of corporate branding in a human rights campaign.
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Branding an Anti-Genocide Campaign
The Movement to End Atrocities in Darfur, Sudan
Ten years after the Rwandan genocide galvanized the global public with horrific
tales of raw, violence, another African conflict would bring those memories flooding
back and awaken “…arguably the largest international social movement since antiapartheid…” (Lanz 2009, 669). Initiated in the United States, the movement to end
atrocities in Darfur, Sudan reached from elementary school classrooms to Hollywood to
the halls of Congress. While the movement emerged spontaneously, its growth was
orchestrated by a cadre of foreign policy veterans and well connected members of the
non-profit world through a series of new organizations formed to respond to the crisis:
the Save Darfur Coalition (SDC), the Genocide Intervention Network, and STAND
(Students Taking Action Now: Darfur!). Of the many consequences of this grassroots
surge, debates on a range of current issues in global affairs were shaped, from
humanitarian intervention and Responsibility to Protect, to the war on terror and the
prosecution of war criminals. The Save Darfur Movement (SDM)4 personifies a twentyfirst century human rights movement by virtue of the way it was assembled from the
lessons learned of previous moments, but is not without its controversy. Despite the
amazing outpouring of energy, this chapter calls into question both the ends and the
means of SDM, and raises skepticism about future manifestations of this model.

4

This chapter will employ the acronym “SDC” to refer to the specific organization
named the Save Darfur Coalition and the acronym “SDM” refers to the larger movement
to end atrocities in Darfur, which implies the centrality of SDC in this effort as a hub and
a driver of grassroots activism.
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As early as February 2003, Amnesty International issued a press release warning
of a deteriorating situation in the western region of Darfur and describing attacks on
civilians by “armed horsemen” and retaliation against government target, apparently by
“bandits” (Amnesty International 2003a). The report described ugly scenes of abduction
and random violence against villagers, bodies shot and discarded into fires set by looters
who had razed crops and homes (Amnesty International 2003a). While the press release
expressed concern about an escalating cycle of violence, as well as grievances by those
local bandit groups, it did not demonstrate awareness of the organization of rebels in the
area as well as the origins of these horsemen. A month later, UN Human Rights
Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila was quoted as saying that Darfur was the site of
“the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis” and “the only difference between Rwanda and
Darfur is now the numbers involved” (Prunier 2007, 127). Despite this ending Kapila’s
tenure in Sudan, having been transferred by the UN out of country, the comparison to
Rwanda—and therefore to genocide—now circulated among observers freely (Crilly
2010, 168). By April, Amnesty called for Darfur to be folded into the monitoring
directives of the peace process governing the North-South Sudanese civil war that had
raged since the 1980s, despite being unrelated to the civil war (Amnesty International
2003b). In June, the International Crisis Group (ICG) issued its first report on this splinter
conflict and similarly recommended the inclusion of Darfur into to the peacekeeping
infrastructure already in place (International Crisis Group 2003). The alarms were
sounding of rising rates of violence and human rights abuse against innocents, but,
besides Kapila, there were no broader arguments made about the violence. It was not
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until vocal journalists and commentators became involved that accusations were levied as
to the intentional, systematic, and coordinated nature of the attacks.
NGO reporting continued to follow the events unfolding in Darfur throughout
2003. However, much of this news flew under the radar as the public became consumed
with the US-UK invasion of Iraq. Eric Reeves, an American English professor and
follower of Sudanese affairs who became a vocal defender of Darfuri rights online and in
public debates, first blogged about Darfur on October 8, 2003. The government had
begun an aerial assault on the region, in violation of a cease-fire agreement, sending
75,000 refugees fleeing over the border into Chad (Reeves 2003). As these attacks
continued, often combining ground forces supported by aerial bombardment, the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs issued updates through its IRIN
news agency of refugee figures and details of the campaign against villages. It would not
be until March 24 of the following year that the conflict reached the desk of Nicholas D.
Kristof, columnist at the New York Times (Kristof 2004).
Kristof was preoccupied for much of 2003 urging against the invasion of Iraq and
criticizing the Bush Administration’s march to war and post-invasion programming,
among other pet issues such as human trafficking, Third World disease, and women’s
rights. In the initial column, the term “ethnic cleansing” was invoked to describe the
violence, due to Kristof’s framing of the attacks as against “black Africans” and by
“lighter-skinned Arab raiders, the Janjaweed” (Kristof 2004). Over the years of the
conflict there were accounts of racial epithets used by the Janjaweed as they maraud
through villages; and there are real distinctions to be made between the Islamic elements
in northern Sudan that differ from the tribal ethnicities of the people in Darfur that largely
	
  

147

affiliate as Masseleit, Fur, and Zaghawa (inter alia Reeves 2003). This description of the
conflict was seized upon by observers and activists, including the Save Darfur Coalition,
and became a conceptual framework for explaining the context for violence in movement
literature and talking points. However, the racial dimension also eschewed another,
seemingly more accurate description of the conflict as one between the government and a
rebel faction, in which the government used overwhelmingly brutal tactics against the
rebels’ civilian base of support. For critics, the racial argument was evidence of deeper
ties between the activist organizations and the US government to the extent that the
vilifying of Arab violence could be included in the grander narrative of the Bush
Administration’s war on terror (Mamdani 2007).5
But, Sudan was not a new issue produced for the benefit of geopolitics. Since the
civil war raged, a civil society constituency had been engaged in the East African state,
largely to defend the Christian populations in the South from the Muslim regime in the
North. Christian Solidarity International (CSI) is one such group: a self-described human
rights organization devoted to the defense of those facing religious persecution, at-risk
children, and humanitarian relief (Christian Solidarity International 2011). CSI has been
at the forefront of combating modern slavery in Africa by using the controversial method
of buying back slaves from slave-traders. In June 2004, CSI helped form the Sudan
Campaign, along with members of the US Congressional Black Caucus, who “held daily
protests in front of the Sudanese embassy [in Washington, DC], allowing themselves to
be arrested for obstructing the embassy entrance as an act of civil disobedience”

5

Controversial and racy, this debate is the subject of other critiques of the Save Darfur
Movement, but will not be featured, except for this mention, in this chapter.
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(Hamilton and Hazlett 2007, 341). The movement to Save Darfur is marked by the
collaboration of strange bedfellows; beginning with Evangelical Christians and American
black politicians, soon joined by an influential Jewish group associated with genocide
prevention efforts.
The Committee of Conscience at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum
(USHMM) was established in 1995, two years after the opening of the Museum itself,
and in 2000 issued its first genocide warning for Southern Sudan. Ethnic groups in the
south, such as the Dinka and Nuer, were claimed to be under threat from Khartoum,
whose actions “are primarily responsible for the deaths of around two million people”
and “another four to five million people have been driven from their homes” (Committee
of Conscience 2000). On April 7, 2004, the Committee “strongly reiterated” its previous
warning, though this time the ethnic groups were different and potential deaths as a
consequence of displacement was named as the cause for alarm—highly unconventional
evidence of the commission of genocide (Committee of Conscience 2004). Over the
subsequent months, the Committee stepped up its calls for attention, received exposure in
mainstream media, and pressured elected officials to take stances, as well. By early
summer, an umbrella group formed in New York to address the massive violence in
Darfur.
An Emergency Summit was convened on July 14, 2004 at the City University of
New York at the direction of Jerry Fowler, Staff Director of the Committee of
Conscience at the USHMM, and Ruth Messinger of the American Jewish World Service.
Representatives from CSI were invited, as were civil rights groups, Muslim charities,
human rights organizations, and other relevant civil society actors (Crilly 2010, 170). Elie
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Wiesel, renowned Holocaust survivor, Nobel laureate, and anti-genocide activist,
provided keynote remarks and John Prendergast, “who would soon become one of the
most ubiquitous Darfur experts” was also on the program (Hamilton and Hazlett 2007,
344). Prendergast served on the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton,
has held a range of prominent positions at organizations such as Human Rights Watch
and the International Crisis Group, and is a generally well-respected expert on human
rights in Africa with significant time spent on the ground. The proceedings produced a
Unity Statement declaring violence being perpetrated against civilians in Darfur to be
unconscionable and called upon world leaders and international organizations to act. This
statement served as the cornerstone of the coalition and larger movement and is an appeal
for protest: “We stand together and unite our voices to raise public awareness and
mobilize a massive response to the atrocities in Sudan's western region of Darfur” (Save
Darfur Coalition 2004). Nearly a week later, the US Congress unanimously passed a
resolution declaring the situation in Darfur to be genocide. That same day, July 22, 2004,
Secretary of State Colin Powell met with Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Sudan, both
recognized the gravity of what was happening and what could happen, but neither were
willing to use the genocide moniker (Corey 2004). Public pressure rose steadily and
resolutely over the subsequent period due entirely to the activism of those associated with
the Save Darfur Coalition.
Over 180 diverse organizations that may vehemently disagree on a range of other
issues signed on to be apart of SDC and champion the cause, and principal within this
broad coalition is the student contingent. On September 14, 2004, ninety Georgetown
undergraduate students attended a panel discussion on the crisis in Darfur at USHMM
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organized by an intern, Lisa Rogoff, from which would emerge STAND – Students Take
Action Now: Darfur. STAND’s founders, Ben Bixby, Martha Heinemann and Nate
Wright, set out to end the conflict over the course of fall semester (Hamilton and Hazlett
2007, 345). STAND became the fulcrum of a movement on college campuses around the
issue of Darfur that emerged spontaneously but found centralization useful. National days
of action could be issued throughout the network that reached from universities to
elementary and high schools. Specifically, divestment efforts began on college campuses
by STAND chapters first targeted their own universities’ funds for re-appropriation.
A month later, three students at Swarthmore College, Sam Bell, Mark Hanis and
Andrew Sniderman, founded the Genocide Intervention Fund (a name that would be
changed to Genocide Intervention Network, or GI-Net) with the hopes of raising enough
money to fund peacekeeping operations in Sudan to protect civilians (Zengerle 2006). To
accomplish this bold objective, GI-Net initiated a web-based fundraising drive and as the
money began pouring in, the fledgling organization needed to find a recipient for an
initial sum of $250,000. In due time, they had run through a range of possible options
including giving directly to the African Union (AU) or funneling the cash into Rwanda as
proxy and then to the AU. These entrepreneurs then began to contact private security
firms, with the hope that GI-Net could take out a contract to send private soldiers into
Sudan. After dozens of positive responses, even one unnamed company that agreed to
intervene even without consent from the Sudanese government, GI-Net conceded that
“going with mercenaries was a bad idea” (Zengerle 2006). Eventually the money was
given to an African NGO partnered with the European Union to “train a contingent of
female escorts to protect Darfurian women when they leave their refugee camps to search
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for firewood” (Zengerle 2006). Genocide Intervention Network has raised over $1.6
million and has become a formative part of the Save Darfur Movement, transitioning
from dorm room scheme to Beltway mainstay (Preston 2006).
Despite the initial burst of naïveté—STAND’s notion that they could end the
crisis in three months time, or GI-Net’s attempt to hire private military contractors—the
student contribution to the Save Darfur Movement was crucial; perhaps it was the
idealism of the students that undergirded the momentum of the movement. The ascent of
Darfur as an issue occurred rapidly and continued over the course of the year. “There was
a growing appetite to hear about Darfur. It seemed as if genocide was the cause of 2004”
(Crilly 2010, 169). Civil society activity motivated institutional and official personnel to
stake out positions. In September, US Secretary of State Colin Powell finally described
the crisis in Darfur as “genocide” in his testimony to the Senate, seen as a concession to
the movement (Flint and De Waal 2008, 182). Two weeks later, the UN Security Council
dispatched a panel to determine the scale and scope of violence in Darfur, and ultimately
to identify whether or not what was going on could be called “genocide.” Calls from the
public for intervention (of some variety) were vociferous and an official determination
was essential. While “moral indignation and its attendant media coverage” maintained
Darfur as “the humanitarian crisis and horror story of the year,” in order to sustain the
campaign, the movement understood that it must transcend the media cycle (Prunier
2007, 125).
Mainstream media culture both helped and hurt this possibility. Also in
September, the film Hotel Rwanda was released to wide acclaim and direct ties were
made between Rwanda and Darfur among the audience. Don Cheadle, who portrayed the
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hero Paul Rusesabagina, was drawn into the movement and proved to be an instrumental
figure. In reality, Rwanda and Darfur did not share many similarities, except that they are
both violent conflicts in East Africa. However, the reminder of the 1994 genocide
perpetuated the 2004 movement and generated “the biggest boost to American popular
interest” (Flint and De Waal 2008, 184). Even in light of this popularity, the audience has
a short attention span and the December 26 Asian Tsunami quickly eclipsed Darfur as the
cause of the moment. Donations streamed in and news coverage swept up the audience.
The tsunami was treated as wholly apolitical and rested on the emotional affect of the
devastation (Prunier 2007, 128). Coverage of the tsunami dealt a minor media setback to
SDM, but one it would overcome. Contemporaneously, the UN contemplated its stance
on the violence in Darfur, complicating matters for the movement.
In January 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, created by
the Security Council three months prior, returned with its findings and determined that
crimes against humanity, but not genocide, were being committed (Mamdani 2009a, 4243). Both government actors and rebel groups were culpable in war crimes, but neither
could be identified as genocidaires, due to the lack of intention to destroy a singular
group in whole or in part, as the Convention mandates. The Commission saw the conflict
as between a regime and a rebel faction, and while attacks against civilians were illegal
and reprehensible, the central systematic force of genocide was conspicuously absent
(Flint and De Waal 2008, 183). While a ruling such as this one might setback a
movement like SDM, in fact it did not. Movement literature and talking points continued
to use the language of genocide as they had from the beginning. Moving forward, there
was an awkward disconnect between the position of the movement and others’
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conceptions of the nature of the conflict. Despite facts on the ground, the movement was
not deterred in its mission to grow its constituency and raise the profile of the cause. In
the ensuing years, the movement went into overdrive, deploying a wide range of popular
culture mechanisms to further entrench the issue of Darfur in the public consciousness.
The Save Darfur Movement produced a merchandising boom: music, television,
video games, clothing, and accessories. “No opportunity for raising funds or attention had
been ignored” (Crilly 2010, 165). Lisa Rogoff, an initiator of STAND while working at
USHMM, suggested a green, rubber wristband for Darfur, after Lance Armstrong’s
Livestrong cancer support foundation whose yellow band “had acquired that intangible
quality of ‘cool’ due to the parade of Hollywood stars seen wearing them” (Hamilton and
Hazlett 2007, 347). Amnesty International (AI) issued a compilation album called
“Instant Karma,” on which pop stars recorded cover songs written by John Lennon,
proceeds from which went to AI’s Campaign to Save Darfur. The television medical
drama “ER” filmed an episode in South Africa where they staged the scene of a Darfuri
refugee camp. “T-shirts, mugs and even underpants emblazoned with messages such as
‘Think, Act, Save Darfur’ or ‘Empower Darfur’ could be bought for a few dollars on the
internet. The discerning pet could eat dinner from a bowl proclaiming, ‘If we don’t speak
up we become accomplices’” (Crilly 2010, 165). Students at the University of Southern
California even devised a video game. Called “Darfur is Dying,” the game allows the
player to occupy the role of refugee seeking water and evading Janjaweed pursuit
(Vargas 2006). Timberland, the footwear and apparel company, partnered with actor and
activist Don Cheadle to design a work boot with a message in its tread, “Stomp Out
Genocide,” and an accompanying t-shirt. Only one hundred pairs of the boots were
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manufactured and “delivered to humanitarian activists, policy makers, journalists, and
entertainment professionals who raised awareness of and championed change in Darfur”
(Cheadle and Prendergast 2007, 148-149). Profits from these ventures benefited the
budgets of activist organizations and provided much needed revenue for operating
expenses.
Cheadle, who was among the most visible celebrities on Darfur, teamed up with
John Prendergast for multiple trips to the region, interviews, op-eds, and two books, but
he was not alone. Cheadle and Prendergast founded the Not On Our Watch foundation,
along with a letterhead that veritably mirrored the closing credits of the heist films
Oceans Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen—George Clooney, Brad Pitt, Matt Damon, and
Jerry Weintraub. Around the same time, in 2006, Pitt and Angelina Jolie publically
announced a $1 million private gift to several Sudanese NGOs (Mamdani 2009a, 53).
Clooney raised the profile of Save Darfur as he raised his profile within the movement.
Taking repeated trips to Sudan and twice contracting malaria, the actor once brought
along the film crew for Oprah Winfrey’s show to visit (Hamilton and Hazlett 2007, 360).
More so than others, Clooney also testified in front of US Congress and for UN
committees on Darfur offering impassioned pleas for intervention and civilian protection.
Besides the prominent Oceans crowd, Mia Farrow stood out as one who “has
dirtied herself in the dust of Darfur” (Crilly 2010, 172). As the 2008 Beijing Olympics
approached, Farrow ramped up public attention on the relationship between China and
the regime in Khartoum, terming the global event as the Genocide Olympics. Based on
China’s increasing demand for oil, the nation was investing heavily both in Sudan itself
and in its relations with Sudan. Farrow went on hunger strikes and famously dissuaded
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film icon Steven Spielberg from directing the opening ceremonies of the Olympics,
despite his contract to do so. Leveraging the China issue allowed for spin-offs to
materialize, including US speed skater Joey Cheek’s Team Darfur—a coalition of
athletes dedicated to the cause of Darfur. Farrow provided the divestment wing of the
movement with the greatest exposure and contributed to its many successes including
against Fidelity Investments, “one of the largest mutual fund companies in the United
States, has sold more than ninety percent of its holdings in PetroChina, an oil sector
company with close ties to the Sudanese government” (Thomas-Jensen and Spiegel 2008,
212). Oddly, however, Farrow also “approached the private security company Blackwater
[now Xe Services] to see if they were ready to go to Darfur” at a lunch with CEO Erik
Prince (De Waal 2008, 44).
This outpouring of energy and wide-ranging efforts culminated in various popular
expressions. On April 30, 2006, the Save Darfur Coalition held its biggest national event
to date, with a rally in Washington, DC on the National Mall. Headlining the event were
figures such as George Clooney, Elie Wiesel, Samantha Power, Paul Rusesabagina, Joey
Cheek, and then-Senator Barack Obama. With the White House as backdrop, this event
decidedly focused on the American response to the atrocities, and the capacity of the
public to motivate an official response of some sort. The event represented the
culmination of two years of progress on the issue, marked largely by the attendance and
the media attention it garnered. In the crowd were cross-sections of the population from
Jewish and Armenian groups bused in from throughout the country, to repatriated African
refugees. There was some criticism about the lack of diversity of speakers (EichlerLevine and Hicks 2007), but the audience personified the broad base of support that SDM
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had cultivated (in the United States). Leading up to the rally, which also consisted of a
west coast satellite event in San Francisco, SDC “Save Darfur launched a ‘Million Voices
for Darfur’ campaign, aiming to get one million Americans to send postcards to President
Bush…With a parallel postcard campaign running online, the number of Americans
signed up to receive email updates from Save Darfur increased from 50,000 in January
2006 to over 400,000 by April” (Hamilton and Hazlett 2007, 357). While receipt of
emails signals some nominal semblance of commitment, at the very least this figure
indicates that people were aware of the issue. In the fall, another rally was held in Central
Park, New York City, as well as at sites throughout the world—a sign that SDM was
beginning to be aware of its limitations as an American movement and the imperative of
internationalization (Save Darfur Coalition 2011).
Simultaneously, George Clooney gave testimony to the UN Security Council to
supplement the AU force in Darfur which was set to expire at the end of the month: “So
after September 30th, you won’t need the UN. You will simply need men with shovels
and bleached white linen and headstones” (Quoted in Mamdani 2009a, 54). Clooney, in
essence had declared the 2007 campaign theme which shifted from attaining critical mass
to a sense of impending doom and urgency, the hourglass serving as a de facto mascot.
The next year witnessed a wider barrage of mass events. In the spring, a “Global Day for
Darfur” was held in forty-seven states and thirty-five countries (Thomas-Jensen and
Spiegel 2008, 210-211). “More than 3000 campaigners gathered in London outside
Downing Street where a giant hourglass was filled with red liquid to represent the blood
spilled so far in the conflict” (Crilly 2010, 163). Film stars Matt Damon and Hugh Grant
were photographed for posters in which they aggressively smash similar, blood-filled
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hourglasses (BBC 2007). Mia Farrow hosted a rally in Washington, and activists in
Boston participated in a “die-in,” in solidarity with those civilians under fire. “All around
the world protestors turned hourglasses upside down to demonstrate how time for a
solution to be found was running out” (Crilly 2010, 163).
However, despite Clooney’s guilt-laden supplication, in the most meaningful
sense, the sand in the glass had already expired. By most accounts 2006-2007 were
relatively quiet years for violence in Darfur. Casualty rates had drastically declined and
the assault experienced in Darfur during 2003-2004—of the murders, village razing,
aerial bombardment, and rape—did not reflect the reality of the moment three years later.
While far too many people were still dying, these casualties were largely from byproducts
of the war, such as unsanitary water in refugee camps and the spread of disease.
Regrettable and preventable, these problems are not legal indications of genocide.
Furthermore, many of the most heavily trafficked death toll figures did not reflect the
truth, as independent auditors would demonstrate. Either inflated, manufactured, or
mistaken, the numbers of over 400,000 dead flooded advertisements, billboards, and
news coverage of the crisis for years, yet, as will be detailed below, they were desperately
inaccurate. What accounts for these dramatic inconsistencies? What effect did they have
on the movement’s ability to be a credible source of information? What effect did they
have on the movement’s capacity to organize and mobilize? Was there a genocide going
on, or a large-scale civil conflict? If the latter is a more acute depiction than the former,
why the deployment of the genocide language, and to what effect? What would compel
legitimate players to deploy factually incorrect information in the service of human
rights?
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In what follows, an image of the Save Darfur Movement emerges that makes a
sympathetic observer uncomfortable. The argument below suggests that movement
architects made a concerted effort to project an image of the anti-genocide movement as
influential, relevant, and thoroughly “cool.” This was the sought-after brand of the Save
Darfur Movement and was not accidental. In fact, it is a deliberate consequence of the
employment of corporate marketing firms and branded advertising strategies that sought
to drive the message of the movement into public consciousness. The very fact that
“Darfur,” an obscure African region in a remote African country, became something that
average people could at least associate with a problem, be it genocide or humanitarian
crisis, is a testament to the efficacy of the marketing campaign. However, the desire to
boil down a complex political crisis into a slogan or a logo for presentation on a bumper
sticker lends itself to exactly the kinds of controversies experienced by the movement, in
which its legitimacy suffered even as the cause remained cool.
Controversies and Complications
The dramatic tension of the Save Darfur Movement revolves around several
fundamental questions that should confront an anti-genocide campaign: Is a genocide
occurring? How do we know this? What is the scale and nature of the violence? Due to
the legal implications in utilizing the language of genocide and the gravity it sustains, this
determination is historically not something taken lightly. Infamously, leaders have
avoided the language of genocide because of the political challenges it presents. Given
the way in which Rwanda looms large over the conflict in Darfur, and the reluctance to
use the term “genocide” so as to skirt moral obligations to intervene, an alarm sounded
when the “G-word” became readily in play.
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Journalists and observers initiated the trend as early as March 2004, when Nick
Kristof began making the argument (Straus 2005, 128). As noted above, the USHMM’s
Committee on Conscience issued a genocide alert in July, the same month the US
Congress passed a resolution declaring the conflict in Darfur to be genocide. Save
Darfur’s Unity Statement describes Janjaweed violence: “They wiped out entire villages,
destroyed food and water supplies, stole livestock and systematically murdered, tortured
and raped civilians” (Save Darfur Coalition 2004). Categorizing these paramilitary
actions under a centralized directive, SDC connects the dots to formulate an argument:
“The Sudanese government's genocidal, scorched earth campaign has claimed hundreds
of thousands of lives through direct violence, disease and starvation, and continues to
destabilize the region” (Save Darfur Coalition 2004). Excluding the claim about regional
instability (which is pertinent due to the flow of refugees, but not related to the argument
for genocide), there are many answers given in this statement, presumably answers to
questions that were proposed and resolved.
In the Fall of 2004, the US government interviewed over one thousand Darfuri
refugees in Chad to determine its stance on the issue of genocide. On September 9,
President Bush issued a statement and Secretary of State Powell spoke before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, both of whom declared that genocide was underway, under
the direction of the regime in Khartoum (Straus 2005, 130). “For the burgeoning Darfur
movement, getting the US government to use the ‘G-word,’ as activists referred to it, was
an unimaginable coup” (Hamilton and Hazlett 2007, 343). After all, these were “the first
times such senior US government officials had ever conclusively applied the term to a
current crisis and invoked the convention [on the Prevention and Punishment of the
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Crime of Genocide]” (Straus 2005, 123). If this move was an attempt to appease activists,
“the strategy had the opposite effect…The legitimacy the term gave to Darfur advocacy
emboldened a fresh and growing pool of activists, convinced that the ‘worst crimes
imaginable’ demanded an uncompromising response” (Hamilton and Hazlett 2007, 343).
From an activist’s perspective, this, of course, would be followed by official
action, of some form and perhaps coercive in nature. However, in retrospect, we can see
now that despite having energized civil society, the Bush Administration was co-opting
the movement and the language of human rights without any intention of intervening in
any meaningful way. Yet, other public officials, either more skeptical or less savvy than
Bush, were reluctant to describe the conflict as genocide. Western authorities “avoided
the term, as did UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who was pilloried in the media for
limiting his description of Darfur to ‘massive violations of human rights’” (Straus 2005,
130). Even Samantha Power, the muse of the student movement, preferred the term
“ethnic cleansing” for its generality and the uncertainty that the whole group was the
target of the violence, rather than the space itself (Straus 2005, 130). Language and the
obligations attendant to the use of certain language played a significant role in the debates
about Darfur in 2004, as the movement was taking shape. Yet, on a different plane, nondiscursive debates were also underway about the empirical facts on the ground: How
many people were dead and how did they die? Because this was a case in progress, it was
impossible to send human rights monitors to count bodies on a battlefield, or to uncover
mass graves in the aftermath of conflict. Therefore, a range of methods was used by a
range of people to statistically determine what was going on and at what pace. As
politicized as Darfur was becoming, the casualty count would stoke the flames of
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controversy and add a dimension of doubt to an already unsettled situation.
Since late 2004, figures as high as 500,000 and as low as 35,000 have been
trafficked through official reports and media outlets as accurate portrayals of the level of
suffering in Darfur. Casualty counts, however, must be disaggregated in a complex
humanitarian emergency such as this. Some proportion of the dead will have died directly
from violent attacks and others are accounted for as “excess deaths,” those that die from
indirect consequences of war: the danger inherent in refugee flight, malnutrition and
starvation, unsanitary conditions, disease, and lack of access to medical care, for instance.
While these are by no means inconsequential effects of war, when determining if
genocide is being committed, excess deaths provide shaky ground on which to make a
legal argument.
By Spring 2005, several organizations had conducted their own mortality studies
that produced divergent results: World Health Organization (WHO) tallies 45,000 to
80,000 total deaths, with between 35,000-70,000 excess deaths; Center for Research on
the Epidemiology of Disasters (CERD), affiliated with WHO, “calculated the number of
excess deaths…at 118,412”; US State Department’s numbers range from 63,000 to
146,000; Coalition for International Justice (CIJ), a now-defunct NGO partnership
financed by the State Department to supplement its own internal investigation, claimed
396,563 total casualties; Eric Reeves maintained a running count on his website that
reached 400,000 by the end of 2004, and fluctuated from as low as 300,000 up to 500,000
over the course of the next two years (Mamdani 2009a, 26-28); and in April 2005, Save
Darfur Coalition began using the 400,000 figure, “a claim based on its previous research
and an analysis of other data” (Foley 2008, 9).
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The National Academy of Sciences and the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), a respected nonpartisan body attached to the US government tasked with auditing
many aspects of public life, undertook an expansive study to make sense of this muddle
of statistics. Its 2006 report culminated in a thorough analysis of methods and findings of
six sources and issued a broad condemnation: “The experts we consulted did not
consistently rate any of the death estimates as having a high level of accuracy” (United
States Government Accountability Office 2006, 8). The report is sophisticated, consisting
of quantitative and qualitative assessment of the numbers. Cross-referencing of the
studies is difficult because of the difference in time frame, as well as the means of
extrapolation used by each. GAO’s critique, in some respects, rested on an inability,
necessarily, to compare different states within western Sudan or to properly account for
death rates over time. As well, limits in existing population figures, lack of access to the
affected areas, and the challenging conditions of collecting data in a conflict zone
contributed to a host of problems. Some of the studies, including that of Reeves, were
challenged for lack of objectivity, because they “were more characteristic of advocacy or
journalistic material than of objective analysis” (United States Government
Accountability Office 2006, 32). “Overall, the experts rated CRED’s estimates most
highly in terms of data, methods, objectivity, and reporting of limitations” (United States
Government Accountability Office 2006, 21). This would place the number of fatalities at
170,237 in the period September 2003 – January 2005, which includes baseline mortality
(those that would have died anyway), refugee populations, and 141,800 excess deaths,
yielding approximately 35,000 “violence-related deaths” (United States Government
Accountability Office 2006, 20; Guha-Sapir and Degomme 2005, 35). It is important to
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keep in mind, however, that the CRED report concludes that excess deaths “may be
attributed directly as a consequence of the war” (Guha-Sapir and Degomme 2005, 35).
This conclusion is satisfying and unsatisfying. It presents, on the one hand, a
reasonable approximation of deaths in Darfur during the peak period of violence
(although since the rebel uprising begin in February 2003, it would make sense to assume
that CRED’s figures could be revised slightly higher). As well, the GAO report allows for
a juxtaposition of the various numbers that had been bandied about in the media and in
movement advertising. Yet, it does not solve the dilemma of whether or not genocide was
either in progress or had occurred—nor was this its task. The report does not address the
question of culpability, nor does it provide specific remarks on intentionality: excess
deaths may (or may not) be a direct consequence of the war, but does this then compel
the conclusion that they were part of a campaign “with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” as the Convention demands?
By any metric, Darfur is, at least, unlike other genocides we have seen. It has
been described as “a slow-motion genocide” and “genocide by attrition” (Cheadle and
Prendergast 2007, 3; Quoting Mia Farrow in Crilly 2010, 180). But, does this match our
impression of genocide? Clearly it is not Rwanda, where in 800,000 members of one
ethnic group were executed by members of a rival faction in under one hundred days, at
the command of a central authority. Neither is it the Nazi Holocaust or the Serbian
campaign against Bosnians, both of which shook the world with its mechanization and
systematic efficiency. Yet, even the discredited low estimates still represent tens of
thousands of human being killed at the behest of the state; tragic under any heading. If
the regime is culpable in the excess deaths of over 140,000 individuals, is that sufficient
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evidence for the accusation of genocide? These are enormously difficult questions for
policymakers and activists to wrap their heads around, and to then operationalize in
policy or in campaigns.
None of the most respected human rights NGOs—Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF), Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch—labeled the crisis in Darfur
genocide (Crilly 2010, 181; Fake and Funk 2009, 16). In the view of one journalist:
“Genocides do not wind down after a couple of years, as the slaughter had in Darfur.
They end with the victory of one side or the other, when all the victims are dead or the
perpetrators are defeated. There is no such thing as half a genocide” (Emphasis added;
Crilly 2010, 182-183). This sentiment is a reflection based on the facts on the ground, as
well as based on a certain conception, legal and historical, of what genocide looks like.
Deviations from this image of genocide either compels a reshaping of the original, or it
leads one to deny that the violence is in fact genocidal. Furthermore, in light of the UN
Commission’s 2005 rejection of the claim of genocide and internal dissent within the
broader human rights movement, the controversy created space for supporters of
Khartoum to maneuver. “It would be more difficult for the Sudanese government to
sidestep accusations of murder. Accusations of genocide allowed it all sorts of ways to
get off the hook” (Crilly 2010, 182-183).
In 2007, the Save Darfur Coalition received a flood of donor money, well in
excess of budget projections. Executive Director David Rubinstein “mounted a media
blitz,” in the US and UK, with SDC’s British partner, Aegis Trust (Mamdani 2009a, 49).
Plastering subway cars and billboards with images of an anonymous dark-skinned child,
with wide, hopeful eyes, in the arms of a woman draped in a vivid orange cloth, Darfur
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was forced into the fore. Print ads and television commercials provided a prominent
media presence for the grassroots movement. However, despite the GAO’s findings, the
figure of 400,000 dead was ubiquitous (Mamdani 2009a, 48). This startling number was
ruled to be inaccurate, yet continued as the official total. While inconsistencies may
regularly go unnoticed in advertising, a pro-Khartoum constituency was ready and
willing to exploit the inflated statistic.
The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council (ESPAC), “an organization
funded by Khartoum to defend its interests abroad,” filed a claim in the UK against Aegis
Trust and SDC with the British Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) (Crilly 2010,
175). ESPAC challenged the merit of the figure and disputed the presentation of this
number as fact. David Hoile, the Director of ESPAC, had self-published several
monographs discrediting the anti-genocide movement and shifting attention to the role of
the rebel groups in Darfur.6 ASA evaluated the challenge, based on the GAO report and
on letters submitted from researcher Dr. John Hagan, the Northwestern University
sociologist responsible for the figure of 400,000 as reported originally by the Coalition
for International Justice. Conclusively, the ASA decided that SDC’s claims were in
violation of standards of advertising and must, theretofore, qualify their figures as
opinion, rather than as matters of fact. While not registering in the American media and

6

Titles include The Media and Darfur: Sensationalism and Irresponsibility; The
Extremist Roots of the Darfur Rebellion; and Darfur, Human Rights and Hypocrisy and
all are available free of charge via download from ESPAC’s website. Hoile is a notorious
figure in British conservative politics with a history of support for authoritarian Cold War
regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua (Rose 1986). As a leader of the
Federation of Conservative Students in the mis-1980s, Hoile was condemned by
members of the Tory party for his extremism and infamously wore a “Hang Mandela”
sticker, while Mandela was imprisoned on Robben Island (Borger 2007).
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carrying no legal implications, pressure from this embarrassment complicated matters for
Save Darfur (Foley 2008, 9).
This advertising push placed SDC at odds with their allies, as well as their
enemies. By this time, the humanitarian relief effort in Darfur was the largest aid
operation on the planet, due in large part to the advocacy of the Save Darfur Movement.
The attention heaped on Darfur over these years contributed, not only to a heightened
sense of political clamoring, but also to a boost in charitable donations. However, in
2007, as this media blitz reached critical mass, a backlash within the community caused
tensions to rise. Vocal representatives from prominent aid agencies took issue with SDM
on at least two fronts: first, the issue of the death tolls and the cause of death; second, the
force-forward message in the advertising. Not only were the misleading figures
embarrassing to those working on the ground, including to the extent it provided comfort
to the Bashir government, but the campaign projected an image of a conflict fraught with
violence. Instead, as relief workers witnessed, the leading killer in 2005-2007 was
“diarrhoeal diseases and malaria,” not guns or machetes (Flint and De Waal 2008, 186).
Which is why SDC’s call for a no-fly zone over Darfur was so illogical from the
perspective of humanitarianism: the same measures that would prevent military planes
from flying, would also prevent aid drops from continuing, threatening the viability of the
operations underway. Furthermore, relief organizations worried that increasing the
military presence in Darfur, as SDC proposed through its calls for a multilateral
peacekeeping force, could also have unintended consequences for peace and stability.
This tension was exposed in public in 2007 in a series of letters and press
statements. Sam Worthington, of InterAction, wrote to SDC in strong terms: “I am deeply
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concerned by the inability of Save Darfur to be informed by the realities on the ground
and to understand the consequences of your proposed actions” (Mamdani 2009a, 50). Not
only did InterAction take issue with the content of the advocacy, but also the way in
which SDC purports to speak for the greater human rights and humanitarian community.
“[It] was clear that a rift had opened up between the organizations working in the region
and those lobbying for it from the outside” (Foley 2008, 11). Regarding the use of force,
supporters were generally at odds over the proper response to the conflict. Aid providers
rested on the possibility of a negotiated peace settlement, while more hawkish wings of
the Save Darfur movement urged, from the outset, for an intervention of some sort—
either by a multilateral, UN-sanctioned force, or even through unilateral action if
necessary. “The tension between aid and advocacy is not unique to the Darfur conflict,
though it is almost always papered over by the code of silence that governs relations
among nonprofit groups” (Strom and Polgreen 2007). The public nature of this tussle is a
testament to the high profile of the cause and of the actors.
Despite the hostility, however, “the relationship is also symbiotic” (Strom and
Polgreen 2007). Aid groups benefit a great deal from the work of advocacy groups in
making an issue out of what would otherwise be an overlooked crisis. Without the
advertising and the celebrities, Darfur would be just another African disaster. However,
between the GAO report, condemnation by the British advertising board, and deepening
tensions among allies, stakeholders began to question whether this advertising campaign
had served the interests of the organizations involved and the cause at the center of it all.
David Rubenstein was forced to resign his post at the Save Darfur Coalition in June,
replaced eventually by founding member Jerry Fowler (Strom and Polgreen 2007). The
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2007 media drive marked the height of a broader strategy that utilized high-powered
marketing firms to craft a brand for an organization, and place the cause on the
international agenda. While outreach is a constant component of human rights
campaigns, Save Darfur bore the mark of the corporate advertising firms it contracted,
and whose effectiveness as a tool for human rights is brought into question in the wake of
these controversies.
Advertising as Outreach
The considerable influx of cash in Fiscal Year 2007 (October 1, 2006 –
September 30, 2007) presented an incredible opportunity for Save Darfur, allowing the
organization to spend six times what it had the previous year.7 A retrospective look at the
strategies the movement executed in its four years of existence reveals a glaring reliance
on advertising tactics rather than a range of other possible outlets for spending on
advocacy, such as lobbying efforts, organizing and coalition building, campaign strategy,
media relations, support of other organizations, or sponsorship of local initiatives.8 In
hindsight, it becomes possible to identify a central motivation, or logic, to the strategies
employed by Save Darfur and their emphasis on advertising as a method. There was a
decisive push toward a mass approach to make support for Darfur a mainstream view
among the public. While an equally reasonable approach might have compelled
7

The analysis of the financial standing and expenses of the Save Darfur Coalition in this
section is based on calculations by the author of the publically available Forms 990
submitted to the US Internal Revenue Service, 2004-2009.
8
Amidst the tension between SDC and humanitarian organizations, a critique was widely
circulated that SDC could be spending its troves of funding on relief work, that is
feeding, clothing, and healing suffering people. That seems to be a frustrated expression
voiced by humanitarian workers that blurs the division of labor between advocacy and
aid. However, too common is the reciprocal call from the advocacy community that
blames aid workers for not being more vocal and more politically engaged.
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organizers to target niche constituencies or specific decision makers, the desire to bring a
human rights message to the broadest demographic is based on the memory of past
genocides and draws its inspiration from a particular origin.
What is striking in interviews and testimonies from movement architects,
spiraling from John Prendergast outward, is the centrality of a mantra taken from a
singular source: Samantha Power’s Pulitzer Prize-winning book, A Problem from Hell:
America and the Age of Genocide (2007). Power, through her deft chronicle of twentiethcentury genocides from the perspective of American policymakers, argues that mass
atrocity was permitted to take place over and over again due to a lack of political will
within the governments of the great power. Therefore, she concludes, should civil society
exact costs from elected officials for their inaction, the necessary will could be generated
to halt crimes against humanity in progress or even prevent them from beginning.
Throughout the book, members of Congress and State Department desk officers attest to
this with remarks that suggest a degree of democracy in foreign policy that runs contrary
to common conception. US Senator Paul Simon stated this clearly when the Rwandan
genocide was at a precipice: “If every member of the House and Senate had received 100
letters from people back home…when the crisis was first developing, then I think the
response would have been different” (Samantha Power 2007, 377). Anthony Lake,
National Security Advisor, echoed these sentiments: “If you want to make this move [to
send troops and stop massacres], you will have to change public opinion…You must
make more noise” (Samantha Power 2007, 377).
A significant strength of Power’s work is its ability to get behind the façade of
“we didn’t know about it,” when in fact there has been high-level cognizance of the
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major genocides she covers. As a result, her reporting has left a legacy among readers
with regards to the second step in the equation: once we know about atrocities, we must
”make noise” until we are heard, loud and clear. There is a final corollary to this advice,
which is that if civil society makes enough noise, democratically elected officials will
alter their stances and elevate human rights as a foreign policy priority. This is a forceful
sentiment. It empowers citizens to become engaged in human rights activism, in the
defense of the dignity and security of innocents. It effectively knocks elites down off
their pedestals, and places popular decision making within reach. It diminishes the status
of geopolitical relationships and grants individuals access to the problems of the world,
yet from a distance. With this driving impetus, the architects of the Save Darfur
Movement made every attempt to mobilize compassionate citizens and amplify their
collective calls for the protection of civilians in Darfur. Should they succeed in gathering
a critical mass of supporters behind the cause, Power’s prophecy would be realized and
the people of Darfur would in fact be saved. Toward this end, the movement deployed the
tools of the twenty-first century marketing industry in the service of human rights.
Public relations, campaign management, and grassroots mobilization were
outsourced through the contracting of independent firms for whom Save Darfur became a
client. The organization itself operated with a skeletal, stripped-down staff while much of
the work was facilitated through these networked companies. M+R Strategic Services
were on board as early as August 2005 and responsible for “providing communications,
online advocacy, fundraising and advertising, and event planning services” (M+R
Strategic Services 2011a). With an emphasis on the public interest, M+R’s clients are
non-profit organizations, labor unions, and philanthropic foundations, including Oxfam
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America, Human Rights Campaign, American Diabetes Association, Service Employees
International Union, and the John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The firm
projects itself as a synthesis of traditional grassroots activism and cutting edge social
media techniques. Boasting its success in capturing media attention and raising the
profile of the Save Darfur Movement, M+R quantifies awareness raised in terms of
listserv figures, attendance at mass rallies, online postcards sent, and dollars raised. Also
associated with New York lobbying firm Malkin and Ross, M+R Strategic Services is a
player in the area of issue-based communication in the US (this information found
throughout the firm’s website, www.mrss.com). The president of M+R, Bill Wasserman,
occupied the role of interim executive director of Save Darfur in between the tenures of
Rubenstein and Fowler, leading critics to “raise questions about conflict of interest
involved in the board hiring a consultant as the manager of its organization” (Mamdani
2009a, 23).
As the campaign ramped up, another significant contract was extended to Weber
Shandwick, a global public relations firm. While this contract constituted a lower-tiered
expense relative to M+R and GMMB (below), Weber Shandwick is an award-winning
agency recognized for its prominence and influence in the field. Its client list includes an
impressively wide range of corporations from Pepsi, American Airlines and ExxonMobil,
to Microsoft, KFC and Johnson & Johnson (Bush 2010). Weber’s brand communication
emphasizes new attempts to humanize corporations in the eyes of consumers through
efforts in social responsibility, corporate citizenship, and environmental consciousness.
With offices in seventy-seven countries, Weber Shandwick is actually a subsidiary
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company of the Interpublic Group and, as of July 2010, was registering quarterly
earnings of over $1.6 billion (Morrison 2010).
However, over the course of the period under evaluation, the highest amount of
total money, as well as the greatest proportion of the budget, was spent at GMMB, a
“political consulting and advocacy advertising firm.” The agency runs campaigns for
organizations on malaria prevention, youth tobacco use, methamphetamine abuse, and
cancer awareness. In the electoral arena, GMMB’s clients include prominent Democratic
members of Congress, such as Senators Barbara Boxer and Harry Reid, President Bill
Clinton, and South African President Nelson Mandela. But, the most recent victory for
GMMB was the campaign for president of Barack Obama. Personnel have moved fluidly
from the campaign team and the Administration, into GMMB since 2008 (post-dating its
involvement with SDC). A full service agency, GMMB oversees all processes of its
campaigns, from grassroots organizing and strategy development, to digital marketing
and video production. GMMB is owned by its parent company Omnicom Group, and its
stock is held by Fleishman-Hillard, a global behemoth of advertising, second only to
Weber Shandwick (Holmes Report 2010).
In 2007, Save Darfur Coalition spent $32,982,042 on its contract with GMMB, or
over 64 percent of its total expenses for that year. In the following year, the amount spent
on advertising was below 7 percent, and by 2009 the media blitz was effectively over.
Along with sizeable investments in strategic consulting and other areas of public
relations, Save Darfur was in business with high profile firms from the corporate world
and major movers in the domestic political arena. These are companies with proven track
records of successful brand management and execution of advertising campaigns. The
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question remains, however, whether success in these other fields translates to an effective
resolution of a human rights crisis, which in turn pivots on the goals of the movement. If
the goals are to brand an organization, promote its name and its mission, and generally
raise the profile of the cause, then we can deem this campaign victorious.
If, on the other hand, SDC’s objectives are met by
•
•
•
•
•

ending the violence against civilians;
facilitating adequate and unhindered humanitarian aid;
establishing conditions for the safe and voluntary return of
displaced people to their homes;
promoting the long-term sustainable development of Darfur; and
holding the perpetrators accountable,

as declared in the Unity Statement (Save Darfur Coalition 2004), then a) advertising
agencies are not particularly well suited to these tasks, and b) Save Darfur did not
accomplish its goals. There is an implicit line drawn from the public branding of an
organization to its efficacy, and, it would seem, this is a false correlation in the human
rights world. In the corporate world, one can make such correlations with confidence.
Consumers’ decisions are closely tied to product recognition, familiarity, and reputation.
However, consumers and activists do not have equivalent motivations, nor act the same
way, and politics is not a marketplace. The confusion expressed by Save Darfur in
conflating the two is a symptom of the social and cultural milieu of the 2000s.
To be sure, this conclusion is not drawn spuriously or disingenuously. Writing of
several conversations with a central movement architect, Don Cheadle exposes this logic:
In my many discussions with John [Prendergast] about outreach, ways to
widen the circle of influence where Darfur was concerned, we had often
broached the idea of ‘branding’ activism, tying in the spirit of social
justice with an easily recognizable and perhaps even popular outward
symbol of such. At first blush, it may sound counterintuitive to combine
the crisis of genocide in Darfur with the concept of being cool, but
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imagine the possibilities if such a marriage did exist…Activism and
fashion needn’t be mutually exclusive…why not take this opportunity to
create a righteous blend?” (Cheadle and Prendergast 2007, 148)
This is a strategy that was sought after and realized through the medium of advertising.
By plastering public space with slogans, and logos, SDC leadership believed that they
could raise awareness and awaken consciousness to the suffering in Darfur. By placing
this responsibility in the hands of professional image makers, such as contractors M+R
Strategic Services, Weber Shandwick, and GMMB, Save Darfur gambled on the idea that
successful communication of some messages translate regardless of the substance of the
message.
M+R claims responsibility for the repeal of the US military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” policy that prohibited gay and lesbian service members from serving openly,
because the firm was contracted with Human Rights Campaign in the year leading up to
repeal. Weber Shandwick is the firm that directed the rebranding of Kentucky Fried
Chicken to bring the fast food store up to speed with current health trends. Now known as
KFC, the store began to offer grilled chicken, in addition to its traditional fried chicken
(Bush 2010). KFC can market itself as a nutritious option in a market that has, in light of
an epidemic of obesity and heart disease, begun to consider less fattening possibilities for
dinner. As well, GMMB would go on to engineer the most dynamic candidacy in recent
US election history when Barack Obama was transformed from a one term senator with a
Muslim-sounding name born to a Kenyan father and white mother, into the nation’s first
black president. These three cases are simple examples of uphill battles waged in the
arena of messaging and advertising by associates of SDC. However, they are also
instances in which a distorted vision of the truth is sold to the public.
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While M+R served a function, for a consulting firm to champion its role in the
repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is to neglect the sacrifice of those officers and activists
who risked their personal security and professional lives to see this policy undone—the
fact that M+R produced viral videos or enlisted online supporters supplemented the
grassroots campaign that was waged over the course of the previous fifteen years (M+R
Strategic Services 2011b). KFC, regardless of its packaging, is not a health-conscious
dinner option in no uncertain terms. While President Obama advances many policies
faithful to his campaign, it should come as no surprise to the left-wing of the Democratic
party that his adherence to principles of “hope” and “change” extends only as far as the
mire of politics allows. This critique is to underscore the fact that branding is a projection
of reality; it is not reality itself. Advertising is conducted to sway public opinion behind a
product. Crafting an image or a brand is an attempt to change the persona of the subject in
the eyes of the audience. When advertising becomes a substitute for traditional forms of
outreach, the substance of the message is transformed. In the case of Save Darfur,
advertising affected the communication of the truth, costing the movement credibility and
casting its supporters not as activists, but as consumers.
In a fleeting comment about the 2006 rallies, Rebecca Hamilton and Chad
Hazlett write about the campaign to send President Bush one million postcards
advocating for action in Darfur: “Beyond the numerical signaling, the campaign was a
much-needed organizing tool: it gave activists something to do” (Hamilton and Hazlett
2007, 357). Without making too much of the semantics, this observation is either an
oxymoron or gets to the heart of the problem. If activists are not doing anything, they are
just cheerleaders or wallflowers. In the cultivation of an activist base for the Save Darfur
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Movement, the architects sought after a brand for their organization, media attention, and
throngs of supporters. However, the movement they designed and executed demanded
little of these supporters, besides their presence. The advertising campaign effectively
mobilized people to become involved by attending rallies and, in some cases, contacting
elected officials on the matter. However, somewhere along the way, the advertising
became an end in itself rather a means to a greater end.
The Corporate Makeover of Human Rights
Bumper Sticker Activism
The campaign developed and executed by the Save Darfur Movement owes its
form both to the cultural memory of past genocides, as well as to the involvement of
corporate advertising agencies. As energy focused on building a constituency for this
crisis, branding techniques were utilized to convey a clear and attractive message to the
audience: there is a genocide in progress in Africa, innocent people are dying by state
violence, and you can help these people. In light of the current investigation, it seems that
none of these statements are obviously true. The label of genocide is a controversial one
that major authorities (UN, AI, HRW, MSF) deliberately chose not to deploy; violence
was not the worst killer, nor was the state the only guilty party; and it remains unclear
what could have been done to tourniquet the suffering. Military intervention is the least
desirable option, yet constituted the loudest issue heard from Save Darfur activists.
Without doubt, the Save Darfur Movement is a landmark phenomenon in recent human
rights history, however its legacy should give observers great pause.
A fear in hindsight is that the overwhelming compulsion to attract supporters
caused the message to degenerate into a simplistic catchphrase that could fit neatly onto a
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bumper sticker. This bumper sticker, in turn, could be affixed to an activist’s car, by
which she can be identified publically as part of the movement. As she drives through
town and even across state lines, the movement to save Darfur is popularized as other
drivers see the logo and read the slogan and, maybe, search out ways to get involved too.
Certainly this is the way that corporations see advertising—as a viral force to familiarize
a broad range of people with their product. Furthermore, when a status or value is
attached to the brand, its desirability is perpetuated and reproduced. In the context of
Darfur, this was achieved: the crisis became the cause célèbre of the moment and
possessed a prestige that drew people in. The ability for a driver in another car to see the
bumper sticker, connect the slogan or name to a celebrity, and then finally to the issue—
or at least some version of the issue—mimics the branding strategy of a corporation.
To reiterate, the claim is that this did not happen by coincidence; branding of the
anti-genocide movement was a deliberate strategy. By 2007, pride in the brand was
expressed in the letter distributed as part of the search for a new executive director: “In
three years, the name, ‘Save Darfur,’ has become the brand for the Darfur anti-genocide
movement” (Mamdani 2009a, 23). In creating the student organization, STAND
“produced something of lasting value—a brand name” (Hamilton and Hazlett 2007,
3345). Throughout much of the literature and journalistic coverage of the movement, this
kind of language is repeated sometimes as a strength and sometimes as a weakness. Its
strength would be the brand’s capacity to breed familiarity and legitimacy. Its weakness
would be the way in which this same legitimacy was sacrificed in order to attract
supporters and bolster its numbers.
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Critics are baffled by the inversely proportionate relationship between advertising
and truth: “For the Save Darfur Coalition, advocacy had turned into a series of
advertisements…The more advocacy turned into a sales-pitch, the less the ads
corresponded to reality on the ground. Yet the mobilization continued with increasing
success.” (Mamdani 2009a, 51). The chasm between the actual facts and the advertised
facts (casualty figures, causes of death) is confusing and cannot reasonably be determined
to have been simply a giant mistake. Branding the movement created a context in which
numbers could be stretched, which must also indicate that the actual facts were seen to be
insufficient to motivate citizens to action. Deaths from diarrhea and malaria are not as
sexy or glamorous as deaths from armed conflict. While 200,000 dead people, by any
means, sounds like a catastrophe, unrevised tallies of 400,000 remained on all posters
long after they had been refuted. In these cynical times, when consumers have come to
expect a certain level of duplicity from companies trying to sell products and increase
market share, even the most jaded among us does not expect exaggeration from a
presumably reputable human rights organization. We assume accuracy and credibility
from those groups working to address moral causes, not to be taken advantage of by
actors fighting the good fight.
This being the case, what is the relationship between the central organization of
the movement and the supporters? Critics of the marketing strategy claim “Save Darfur
relates to its constituency…as would an ambitious advertiser” and that their
preoccupation with “merchandizing, and establishing their claim as the default
organization” affected their judgment in making policy prescriptions (Mamdani 2009b;
Eric Reeves quoted in Hamilton and Hazlett 2007, 344). In conjuring a constituency of
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activists through the deployment of bumper sticker slogans, there is recognition of the
short attention span of the consumption-oriented audience member. There is a low
threshold of expectation placed on the “activist,” which is then reinforced by the bumper
sticker approach. Mark Hanis, co-founder of GI-Net says explicitly: “If you can’t get
someone to do something in five minutes, you’ve failed in a key way of organizing”
(Preston 2006, 32). This would seem to fly in the face of any mass movement from
history, be it the anti-Vietnam war movement in the US, the 1968 student movements in
Europe, or pro-democracy uprisings in China, Iran, or Egypt. But, it also is a genuine
expression of the way organizers approached the crisis in Darfur by crafting a movement
to suit the twenty-first century consumer.

Save Darfur: The Brand
If, then, these uncomfortable elements that emerged from the Save Darfur
Movement are products of the branding process, what are the brand’s qualities? I suggest
the brand rests on three pillars: the pronouncement of genocide, an emotional appeal for
the suffering, and advocacy from a position of strength. These elements, as mentioned
above, were central to the communication that materialized during the height of the
advertising push in 2007, but also guided the messaging in the movement’s early years.
Glaringly, these three characteristics were among the most distorted points to be
expressed through the movement’s various channels, and evidence a correlation between
branding and misinformation.
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The declaration that there was a genocide in Darfur was an invaluable component
of the campaign. There is a certitude that accompanies the term genocide, a gravitas that
dwarfs other forms of conflict and crisis. It is what separates Darfur from the Congo,
Uganda, or even Afghanistan—pre-packaging the conflict into a category the public
could absorb and understand without complication. Describing Darfur as a
counterinsurgency campaign waged by the regime removes it from the ethnic/racial realm
and risks confusing it with other similar wars, like the one raging contemporaneously in
Iraq that rivaled Darfur in war-related deaths (Mamdani 2007). The label, when applied
to Darfur, at once distinguished it from one sub-category, while transferring it to another,
more infamous category: “This was not just another African war…This was a genocide”
(Crilly 2010, 168). Darfur therefore belonged in the same unambiguous category as
Rwanda and Nazi-occupied Europe, not Somalia or Angola. Journalists, as powerful
conjurers of public opinion, latched onto “genocide” for use as a headline. Broadcasters
could repeat the label in a quick bite. “Stop Genocide” looks better on a t-shirt than “Stop
this Confusing Conflict between Groups Whose Interests We Do Not Fully Understand,
in which Thousands of People Are Dying of Diarrhea.” Mamdani argues repeatedly that
the activism around Darfur refused to appreciate context, when in fact, I would argue, it
had a keen appreciation for contextualization—however, it selected the wrong context.
New York Times columnist Nick Kristof, who was a prominent figure in the
communication of the Darfur brand, complained that individuals were more likely to feel
sympathy for a “a suffering puppy with big eyes and floppy ears” than for human victims
of violence (Kristof 2007). However, in certain terms, the label of genocide was the
“Darfur puppy” (Crilly 2010, 167). It prefigured the way the audience would feel about
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the conflict and presumed a certain response. In actuality, as early as 2004, Kristof was
sounding the alarm that “ethnic cleansing” was underway because of the way the term
rang loudly in the ears of those who recalled Bosnia and Rwanda (plus, it is a simpler
distinction to make than genocide) (Crilly 2010, 168). Genocide is unmatched in its
reputation as the crime of all crimes and invoking that reputation, for the Save Darfur
Movement, was central to its branding strategy.
Directly related to the label of genocide is the emotional weight it carries. The
emotional reaction to the crisis was based on the ability to humanize the victims and
personalize the brutality. Such was the case, for instance, in a 60 Minutes story that
originally aired in 2006, in which John Prendergast and correspondent Scott Pelley
tracked down a child named Jacob, whose notebook had been found amidst the ash and
rubble at a razed village in Darfur. While the story is a touching one, and focuses on the
human side of the crisis, even when it was updated and re-aired in 2008 did it frame the
story as part of the continuing genocide (Efran 2008). The category of genocide, coupled
with personal stories and images of horror, motivated the psychological current that
urged audience members to take part. This was the role of the ghastly statistics as well.
“Their object is to wake up, even to alarm, those used to being assailed by advertising
and news media—constantly breaking news—on a daily basis” (Mamdani 2009a, 20).
“Shock and awe” are powerful motivators and allow the public, at least temporarily, to
make sense of a diverse set of world problems based on an emotional attachment to its
victims (Crilly 2010, 174).
However, there is a tension between the moral imperative to assist those suffering
and political impediments that naturally lie in the path of righteousness. Some argue, like
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other humanitarian catastrophes before it, “the moral outrage which was felt tended to
overshadow, if not hide completely, the political nature of the problem” (Prunier 2007,
128). It is one thing to feel a certain way about a problem, and will it to be otherwise; it is
quite another for a moral sentiment to transcend power and politics. The greatest fear
would be for morality to impair judgment as an actor, or a movement, engages in problem
solving, and critics believe that is exactly what happened for SDM. Supporters were
asked to react to a moral awareness, a common humanity, divorced from the troubles of
politics. “Save Darfur’s great political victory has been to thoroughly depoliticize Darfur
as an issue” (Mamdani 2009a, 60).
This analysis helps, therefore, explain the third pillar of the branding strategy: the
pursuit of a policy based on coercion. Economic sanctions, military intervention, and
criminal charges all topped the agenda of the Save Darfur Movement at different
moments. From a communication perspective, these ends personified an image of
strength, of authority, and of command. These were not idealistic hippy activists,
unfamiliar with geopolitics, daunted by the harsh words of a dictator. Advocates for
Darfur projected a persona of forcefulness and relevance, and refused to be relegated to
the margins of foreign policy. Yet, strategic calculations did not lead the movement to
appeal for mediated negotiations between Khartoum and the rebels, which, in hindsight,
seems like a reasonable approach that reflects the roots cause of the suffering. Instead,
Save Darfur sought to cripple Omar al-Bashir by all means and to assert the prominence
of the citizen movement. The use of force was the initial imperative of the Genocide
Intervention Network, with its desire to fund troops and even send unmanned drone
planes—a tool with dubious legal standing and highly questionable moral consequences,
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especially from a human rights stance (Zengerle 2006). Through multiple expressions of
the movement, Save Darfur often appeared like a “war mobilization,” with the slogan
“Boots on the Ground!” regularly heard at rallies and mass events (Mamdani 2009b). The
indictment of al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court was also an attempt by the
movement to flex its muscle and fan its plumage, even if it came at the expense of
humanitarian aid provision—another move that angered relief agencies and performed a
disservice to the key objective of minimizing suffering (Charbonneau 2009).
The insistence on the use of coercive tactics demonstrates, not a depoliticized
approach, but an overpoliticized approach to conflict resolution. In a sense, the reliance
on force-forward measures produces a “site where the language of genocide has been
turned into an instrument. It is where genocide has become ideological” (Mamdani 2009a,
8). A vacillation between the apolitical and the overly political occurred frequently
throughout the branding of the movement. At once, the appeal to emotion generated
compassionate and charitable responses—the kind that drives donations during a natural
disaster recovery effort. However, SDC cultivated an emotional response from the
audience and converted it into a rallying cry for military action. Posturing of this sort is
usually associated with states, such as the march to war in Iraq to the extent it was billed
as a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. That a human rights
organization or movement parroted the tactics of the Bush administration in its messaging
and advertising is symptomatic of a deep disconnect between means and ends, between
the message and political action. The brand was never transcended in favor of the ends for
which it was designed: to politicize civil society and exact political costs from elected
officials for inaction.
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Conclusion: Professionalization or Perversion?
In late 2010, the Genocide Intervention Network, which had already absorbed
STAND, merged with the Save Darfur Coalition. The desire to establish a permanent
constituency to combat genocide and mass atrocity will be realized. “The merger creates
the largest anti-genocide organization that combined, boasts a membership base of over
800,000 committed activists globally, an unparalleled nationwide student movement, and
a network of institutional investors with over $700 billion in assets under management”
(Brown 2010). Along with the ENOUGH Project, founded in 2007 by John Prendergast
and Gayle Smith, powerful institutional support for human rights has emerged in the
wake of the movement to save Darfur (Cheadle and Prendergast 2007, 194-195). These
efforts have turned to address a range of issues including the upcoming South Sudanese
secession, mass rapes in the Congo, and the role of conflict minerals in financing warfare
in East Africa. While “the ‘Save Darfur’ movement has stalled” (Kristof 2009), its
progeny continues to evolve and confront human rights abuse in new ways.
The intention of those like Hanis of GI-Net was to mimic other successful interest
groups in US politics in creating these new organizations, like the Sierra Club, the
American Association for Retired People and the National Rifle Association (Hamilton
and Hazlett 2007, 354; Preston 2006, 32). While Hanis is new to this scene, veterans like
Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen have for time understood the necessity to develop
a permanent constituency to maintain pressure:
After the Holocaust, Rwanda, and Srebrenica, small waves of advocacy
efforts came and went, but each time, activists had to reinvent the wheel.
The current movement, which is far stronger and broader than any of its
predecessors, has the opportunity to make this a permanent effort to not
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only respond to Darfur and other similarly egregious crises, but to build
institutional capacity and will to prevent future outbreaks of mass
atrocities. (Thomas-Jensen and Spiegel 2008, 214)
To facilitate the transition from crisis to crisis, these new types of organizations have
developed relationships with policy makers and activists that they hope will continue over
time. A cottage industry of companies has blossomed to serve the needs of NGOs in the
areas of campaign design, advertising, and grassroots mobilizations, such as those
described above.
Some observers have recognized this transformation and refer to it as “the
professionalization of human rights” (Kennedy 2005, 27; Land 2009, 206).
Professionalization entails the involvement of experts, scientists, lawyers, and others that
are essentially outside of the caricatured frame of grassroots activist. The total picture that
emerges is of a dynamic force, employing the services of trained people to provide
credibility to the movement; but not credibility in image alone. Professionals, ostensibly,
are able to gather information and file challenges in ways that laypeople cannot, which
strengthens the claims of human rights movements. However, there is a concern that the
professionalization of human rights is “distancing the human rights discourse from
ordinary individuals and thereby robbing the movement of its ability to capture the
imagination of the public and to ensure accountability to important constituencies” (Land
2009, 207). Save Darfur seems to have avoided falling into this particular trap, yet its own
version of professionalization has set up other obstacles.
In addition to scientists and lawyers, “most British and American aid agencies
now have sizeable media and advocacy departments whose work is based on, and
essentially funded by, their operational programs. Press offices and lobbyists are
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employed to highlight particular crises and make the public care about them” (Foley
2008, 14-15). Save Darfur introduced, to the fullest extent to date, the employment of
professional communications experts and advertising executives into the human rights
universe. Unleashing corporate branding on human rights had decidedly Janus-faced
results: hundreds of thousands of citizens were drawn to a movement that sought to
ameliorate the suffering of vulnerable people in a far away country, while operating with
faulty data, suspicious categories, and questionable objectives. The marketing campaign
became an end in itself, rather than a means to other ends. “Their generalizations have
helped raise awareness of the slaughter, but polarized the search for answers” (Crilly
2010, xv). Advertising may be a necessary, but insufficient, condition for a twenty-first
century human rights movement.
This tension complicates the legacy of the movement, but explains its
shortcomings. A high profile advertising blitz is not a substitute for political follow
through that appreciates historical context and facts on the ground. The throngs of
supporters attracted by the logo and the slogan were never committed to engagement on
behalf of Darfur, but were satisfied to be identified with its brand. While elites within the
movement had access to policymakers and frequently lobbied for their attention, the
grassroots were not mobilized to do anything other than attend an annual rally or wear a tshirt. Supporters were attracted by the cultural currency of “Save Darfur,” but were not
effectively leveraged as a force for compelling political will. Instead, they were
conditioned to be gleeful when Bush or Powell used the term “genocide,” despite never
having any intention of intervening in any manner. The movement was able to be
manipulated because it was never constituted with the political fortitude to challenge and
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overcome the rhetoric. As recipients of the branding campaign, advocates were not
politicized in a meaningful way, but were merely associated as if through a commercial
relationship.
Moving forward, observers reflect on Save Darfur as “a move beyond the old
apolitical style of humanitarianism and also beyond the class approach of human rights
organizations, which don’t explicitly deal with questions of political power” (De Waal
2009). Even Mahmood Mamdani, a vociferous and harsh critic of the movement, is able
to recognize SDC’s contribution:
The Save Darfur Coalition represents a New Age organization that joins
the voluntary effort of foot soldiers characteristic of lass cause-driven
movements (such as the Vietnam-era antiwar movement) with
advertising skills honed by highly paid professional advertising firms, all
under the tight supervisions of a select and small, politically driven and
charged, executive committee. Save Darfur is undoubtedly the most
successful organized popular movement in the United States since the
movement against the Vietnam War. (Mamdani 2009a, 70)
The fervor around Darfur, from the elite levels of SDC’s decision making to the local
high school chapters, is a promising testament to what is possible. Despite the eruption of
civil society activity, however, the consequences of Save Darfur activism did not halt
violence, at times accentuated human suffering, and entrenched the power of a brutal
dictator. The concern remains if the model developed by Save Darfur does not rely too
heavily on the corporate world for its techniques and its standards of achievement. Even
in the aftermath of the movement’s peak, the organizations that had grown throughout the
2000s chose to follow the corporate example by consolidating operations, outsourcing
essential jobs, and depending on their brand to transcend the reality of their weak
product.
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CHAPTER 5 – RECLAIMING POLITICS:
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISM
“To sympathize in the way that the television images invite us all to do is not difficult. It
is with the question of how that sympathy can be translated into action that the problems
arise” – David Rieff (2003, 34)
Introduction
The dissertation set out to explore the reasons why the global human rights
movement is unable to politicize its supporters, through an investigation into the role
played by popular culture in the incubation, design, and execution of human rights
campaigns. From its outset, this project hypothesized that the strategies human rights
organizations use in recruitment, fundraising, and advocacy are responsible for
establishing a connection with the public that frames the way average people engage with
the human rights movement. What emerged from the research was a series of episodes
detailing the development of a generalized consciousness largely tied to pop culture
processes, rather than the political content of human rights. However, while human rights
was certainly packaged with mass appeal, the cases did not give credence to the
unfiltered viewpoint that mass activity facilitated through patterns of consumerism
necessarily produced hollow, diluted expressions of commitment to human rights. As
critical theory suggests, market-based social initiatives should suffer from weak ties and
limited impact because of the collapsing effect on alternative perspectives in the onedimensional society. Progressive causes, like human rights, should be done a disservice
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through their interaction with late-/post-industrial capitalism, to the extent it is a system
that relegates and co-opts challenges to the status quo. Yet, the chapters evidence a less
straight-forward relationship between human rights and consumer venues that requires a
subtle and nuanced unpacking, in order to distill lessons learned.
A central conclusion drawn from the cases indicates that popular culture can serve
as a useful method for awakening concern for human rights in the audience, but
translating awareness into politicized engagement is neither natural nor simple through
commercial media. More so, at times the reactions provoked among the public proved to
have net negative effects due to their susceptibility to manipulation by elites and the
fleeting and fickle nature of these emotional attitudes. Therefore, the most optimistic
takeaway from this broad narrative is to say that the potential exists for transforming this
superficial form of human rights engagement into political activism. Through these
stories it is clear that a latent sensibility exists in ordinary people that lends itself to
feelings of cosmopolitanism and solidarity with suffering strangers. Celebrity
endorsement, graphic imagery, and corporate advertising can rouse this dormant
potential, but improving upon the bonds created by these platforms and channeling this
energy into political action may demonstrate to be a task too great for the medium to
bear.
A goal in this chapter is to determine what the global human rights movement is
and what it is not. In order to do so, the structure of this chapter rests on framing concepts
introduced in Chapter One and explored in each episode in detail. A central set of
variables explored in this research includes the motivation, expression and commitment of
those individuals that participate in human rights campaigns. The cases present multiple
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and overlapping explanations for the appearance of these variables. We find that people
are motivated by combinations of emotional sentimentality, moral outrage, and political
protest, each of which appeal to distinct underlying values. Expressions of human rights
activism often swing pendulously on the spectrum from charity to solidarity, yielding
insights about the relationship between human rights and humanitarianism. Individuals’
commitment to human rights causes, however, is the weakest and most elusive element in
this series. Brief discussions of recent events bring the question of commitment up to date
and illustrate ways in which the human rights movement has faltered, in part due to the
strategies it has employed in the past.
The final objective of this chapter is to go beyond those strategies that were
employed in the past and speculate about strategies not employed. Now that we have a
sense of the constitution of the human rights movement it is important to determine how
it could be otherwise, which will provide a hypothetical scenario in which to analyze
alternative approaches to mass human rights activism. As an entry point into this
possible-world analysis, I will reintroduce the dichotomy of self-determining and otherregarding human rights movements. Judging the relative differences of these two forms,
from the perspective of the individual advocate, will explain the obstacles to creating an
other-regarding movement with the politicization a self-determining movement; but,
while overcoming these obstacles is not impossible, our expectations should be tempered
from the beginning. In order to rise above its inherent limitations, the global human rights
movement must transcend the dialectics laid out in this dissertation, reclaim politics, and
reinvigorate the human rights community with a set of progressive guiding principles
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based around cosmopolitan engagement in the world and solidarity with vulnerable
populations.
Motivations
The approach in the subsequent three mini-sections is to isolate the qualities that
characterize the relationship between individuals and the human rights movement, as
shaped by popular culture. With respect to motivations, three categories that appear and
re-appear suggest something about the reasons why ordinary citizens participate in
humanitarian action. There is sufficient evidence to indicate a hierarchy, or at least an
ordering, of motivations that while neither static nor ever-present, occurs often enough to
be analytically useful. This explanation is not beholden to an essentially causal
relationship linking these categories, as if one flows from the previous one into the
successive. However, the cases demonstrate how certain campaigns operate across all
three stages, while some remain limited, to their detriment. Because other-regarding
movements are already degrees separated from the first-hand realities of violence and
suffering, understanding the motivations of actors is central to illuminating the extent of
this relationship.
Emotional sentimentality, or the appeal to how one feels, is central in this
instance, ranges from sadness to anger, and includes the psychological effects of the
campaign itself on the audience. One aspect of this motivation is the experience a viewer
has when a news story or image of human suffering comes into focus. In many respects,
this response signifies the common humanity and universal dignity that each of us shares
and, when confronted with the denial of such humanity, a natural reaction is to feel badly
about it. Empathy is a component as well in as much as it fuels intersubjective
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conceptions of suffering across traditional boundaries. Sentiment is not necessarily
couched in rationality to the extent it is, in a sense, an involuntary response to stimuli,
rather than a reasoned reply to argumentation. This is a more descriptive point than it is
judgmental, but it does follow that the emotional motivation is accompanied by severe
constraints. While the knee-jerk empathic response to graphic imagery of suffering, for
instance, is a broadly common experience that speaks to a base human instinct, it is not
inherently connected to action. Therefore, when an audience collectively witnesses the
brutality of the Siege of Sarajevo in 1994, it is compelled by the coverage to feel grief or
sadness, but those emotions do not entail any particular policy prescription. On the
contrary, a reaction that is purely emotional stifles debate in favor of any fix that is quick
and removes from vision images of devastation. Emotive impulses can be nurtured,
cajoled, and translated into behavior that extends beyond one’s own sensations, and,
because they are so widespread, lend themselves to mass involvement. Yet, without
deliberate direction, emotional sentimentality is a remarkably superficial and fleeting
reaction to bad news and very likely to turn over when replaced by newer or worse news.
Emotions may correspond with a certain set of moral values, but are not necessarily
anchored by principle, which results in a drifting tendency that is most vulnerable to cooptation and involuntary shifts in popular trends.
Ethics feature heavily in human rights campaigns, as abuse is messaged and
interpreted as infringement of standards of justice, fairness, and decency. Beyond
empathy, moral outrage appeals to higher principles that govern human behavior. Such
principles are encoded in domestic legal frameworks, or, in the absence of national laws,
international laws stand in as authoritative. Human rights are only coherent within legal
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frameworks and understanding law as the manifestation of morality falls in line with
common parlance. Outside of the strictly legal context, breaches of moral conventions are
seen as deviant and offensive, demanding retribution. In plainspoken language, when
innocent people are subjected to indiscriminate violence or inhuman conditions, it is not
just sad or unfortunate, but immoral. There is a deeper understanding of culpability that
emotional pleas do not capture. However, moral critique does not necessarily contain a
political dimension and, when it does not, outrage is generally directed as if at the
heavens. That something immoral is happening is to curse the universe for not being
otherwise. Appealing to justice, the advocate extends the situation beyond herself and her
own sentiments and contextualizes suffering in broader terms. This position operates with
the assumption that human welfare represents a vision of justice, and human suffering
stands opposed to popular notions of justice. Grappling on new levels of abstraction
permits insight into big picture questions about the exercise of power, but does not
necessarily make the leap into the political realm where it will become possible to
confront power and defend the vulnerable. Public outcry during the Ethiopian famine is
most representative of the moral motivation because of the narrative’s framing of victims
as “innocent.” While presumably the women and children pictured on television were
largely uninvolved with the conflict in East Africa, the appeal to morality compelled the
audience to donate to the cause and participate in its events. During Live Aid,
concertgoers and fans acknowledged the correlation between moral injustice and the
remedy being proposed. The conveners of Live Aid trafficked in moral outrage, but never
in more overtly political ideas. In the world, in order to right what is wrong, it is
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insufficient to simply assert that an act or a circumstance is immoral; it is essential to
engage immoral behavior in the political domain.
Encompassing the emotional and moral drivers of human rights participation,
political protest is the manifestation of the politicization of those participants. Through
contact with human rights campaigns, some individuals undergo a fundamental
transformation in the way they confront human rights abuse in the future. Going beyond
the shallow emotional response and going deeper than the abstract appeal to injustice,
when supporters become politicized, they develop from spectators and consumers into
activists. For the politicized activist, the human rights experience is not situated in one’s
psychological self, neither is it a product of the cold, unjust, blameless world.
Recognizing that suffering does not just happen, and is not a natural human state, means
identifying those responsible and holding them to account. Instead, a higher order process
gains traction in which power is called into question and challenged. Political protest is a
category that describes the individual as well as her interaction with the suffering of
others. Political engagement represents the unity of means and ends in human rights
activism: if abuse is the product of political mechanisms, then only political confrontation
will end abuse. The Anti-Apartheid Movement is the clearest example of politicized
activism throughout the dissertation. Its messaging and its methods empowered global
activists to directly challenge the exercise of power at its core. Sob stories and moralizing
were relegated to the fringe, while an urgent call was issued. Average people were
politicized by the movement because of the substance of the campaign and the principles
it championed. This linking of principle and action served the movement well and
continues to provide the most promising example of politicized, grassroots, global human
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rights activism. Advocates moved by high-minded abstract principles that fail to commit
to principles in their action are not politicized, despite being engaged under other terms.
The motivations of politicized actors carry with them force, weight, and a robustness that
have proven to generate the expressions that are most effective in human rights struggles.
Expressions
The instantiations of these motivations are expressed in various ways and
generate profound lessons about the dynamic that emerges from one’s experience of
emotional sentimentality, moral outrage, or political protest. Throughout the dissertation,
a spectrum of expression has set the parameters for human rights engagement, ranging
from charity on one end to solidarity on the other. These categories link motivation and
expression and describe the crucial bond between the advocate and the suffering stranger.
These terms are in desperate need of analytical exploration and will help expose critical
elements about the role of politics in activism.
Certainly, the chapters present evidence of human rights advocacy expressed as
an act of charity—an altruistic gesture by Party A on behalf of Party B, who is suffering.
Ostensibly, Party A is at least safe and secure, if not also well-to-do, while Party B is
vulnerable. Notions of charity are inextricably linked to the history of humanitarianism
initiated by Christian missionaries thought to be conducting God’s work, bringing the
Word to foreign people who were in need of support and assistance. Religious
communities were at the core of historical predecessors to contemporary century human
rights campaigns, such as the campaigns against slavery and the slave trade and for
reform in the Congo. This is also the case for the contemporary movement, but the
language of aiding the subaltern has evaporated in favor of a discourse of universality and
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equality. From a public relations perspective, this is a useful development to the degree it
creates distance between dignity-supportive campaigns and their paternalistic and
patronizing roots. Charitable exercises of the nineteenth century were constituted by
uncomfortable relations and too often cast in terms of enlightenment versus barbarism, a
legacy that taints modern attempts at human rights activism. Transitioning away from a
charity posture is a deliberate step to broaden the umbrella of human rights.
However, humanitarianism persists beyond its initial association with charity.
Humanitarian relief consists of a range of aid work, from emergency provision to longterm development projects. Humanitarian assistance occurs in war zone, or after an
earthquake or a drought. Emergencies do not have politics, humanitarians argue, insisting
that neutrality guide their operations. Failure to be neutral may compromise their access
to suffering people. Therefore, humanitarianism is often considered an apolitical
approach to the protection of dignity and well-being. Without muddying itself in politics,
humanitarian agencies can do their work and positively affect the situation as efficiently
as possible. This approach has problems, one of the most glaring of which is to provide
assistance to all people regardless of their identities or affiliations. In post-genocide
Rwanda, this meant feeding and caring for perpetrators of unspeakable atrocities who had
fled and were living in refugee camps in Chad. Yet, despite hiccups and mild
inconsistencies, humanitarianism is the self-applied label of organizations seeking mass
appeal specifically because of their common desire to evade political mire. During the
Cold War, for instance, organizations described themselves as humanitarian to avoid the
polarizing and partisan associations of “human rights.”
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Since the end of the Cold War, human rights has supplemented humanitarianism
as a component language of the NGO sector. Shedding the reputation—for better or for
worse—of a disruptive, anti-establishment force, human rights is now a key component
of the mission statements of a wide array of organizations, from traditional human rights
organizations like Amnesty International, to historically humanitarian agencies like
Oxfam. If aid relief groups have emphasized poverty alleviation in the past, they do so
today with a rights-based approach, which provides unique currency and gravity to their
mission. This is not true across the board, as many organizations like World Vision, Save
the Children, and Catholic Relief Services continue to rely on their religious foundations
for their identity, eschewing the more political implications attached to human rights. A
new variation on this worn debate is the introduction of what has been called “Political
Humanitarianism” (Foley 2008, 15), identified closely with Médecins sans Frontiéres
(MSF, or Doctors without Borders). Unsatisfied with providing aid on neutral grounds,
MSF incorporates the imperative of witnessing in its work and asserts itself in ways other
organizations refuse. This synthesis suggests the potential for a future organizational
hybrid that combines advocacy and aid provision in a creative, pragmatic, and forwardthinking way.
Yet, due to the historical association with movements for self-determination,
solidarity is also a familiar expression of human rights engagement. Solidarity is the
assembly of a unified front for a political purpose and, in the context of human rights, this
purpose revolves around the defense of dignity and welfare. Solidarity also entails a
bridging of boundaries or gaps in a social sense. “Solidarity with” suggests that, similar to
the depiction of charity above, Party A is not directly affected by the circumstances, but
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has sensitivity, sympathy, or empathy for Party B. Furthermore, these bonds compel
Party A to do something to alleviate the suffering of Party B, beyond a charitable gesture.
To act in solidarity with someone is to stake an investment in the success of their
struggle, issue, or campaign. Solidarity is a connection between people and groups and a
demonstration of affinity and mutual reliability. That investment takes various forms:
marching in solidarity, voicing solidarity in a letter or a phone call, and generally
supporting the self-determination and security of an other. Solidarity is an expression of
direct action, and charity is an indirect expression of action through proxy. This is not a
normative judgment of one or the other, but a qualified distinction of expressions of
human rights engagement; whether one type of expression is more effective than the
other is an empirical matter to be adjudicated case-by-case.
However, acts of solidarity provide the building blocks for a viable political
movement, while charity serves only as a short-term fix. This conclusion analytically reestablishes the relationship linking charity and humanitarianism, and solidarity and
human rights, respectively. As well, we are able to place examples from the chapters in
context as popular expressions of citizen activism fall at points along this charitysolidarity spectrum. The trends that emerged during Live Aid and continued in the
campaign to Save Darfur that relied on merchandising and simple donation can be
characterized as useful contributions, but based on weak ties. More overtly political
action, such as that in the Anti-Apartheid Movement, in the case of Bosnia around 1995,
and in rallies for Darfur, are examples of solidarist efforts between Western civilians and
those suffering from abuse in other countries. From the perspective of the average
audience member, charity is an easier extension of one’s self, while solidarity in its pure
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form demands a deeper commitment because of the risk involved (be it social or political
risk). Put bluntly, acts of solidarity are courageous expressions that necessarily entail
sacrifice, while charity is often a singular act with minimal impact on one’s own welfare
and the welfare of the recipient. While acts of charity are better than not acting at all, it is
a mistake to suggest that charity alone can have a positive effect on systemic human
rights abuse or structural suffering of any kind. It is one thing to be able to provide rice in
a complex emergency and quite another matter to empower individuals to motivate their
own governments to provide for the populace. Humanitarianism rests of the former and
human rights on the latter. The final explanatory category is the dependent variable of
“commitment,” which will be explored through brief snapshots of recent human rights
events and phenomena and the responses from civil society.
Commitments
The strategies and methods initiated throughout the episodes in the chapters are
very alive today and, in important ways, persist in shaping ordinary citizens’ associations
with ethical political behavior. Throughout Chapters Two, Three and Four, modes of
popular culture were introduced as platforms for human rights activism; each chapter
illustrating how a unique feature of pop culture manifested itself as an activist tool.
Trends in each episode demonstrate the potential for these new instruments to serve a
useful purpose, while also highlighting tendencies toward the manifold commercial facets
of popular culture. It is this tension that propels the argument forward, teasing at what is
possible, wary of unintended consequences. Concern over commitment is at once central,
as well as peripheral, depending on strategic prioritization. From the stance of the
campaign, it may be sufficient to register a one-time commitment from a supporter that
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advances the campaign along. From the perspective of the movement, commitment is
something conjured and relied upon over time. As human rights abuse continues to arise,
the long-term advocate may be the key to success—or perhaps the periodic involvement
of the one-timer is a more predictable approach. To evaluate the role of popular culture in
the constitution of the human rights movement, this section looks at the three modes that
emerge in the chapters in the context of their materialization in recent events:
consumerism, in the case of the RED campaign; voyeurism, in the incident at Abu Ghraib
prison; and brand identity, through the intervention in Libya. The last decade has
presented the human rights movement with many challenges that, sadly, it has not dealt
with gracefully, suggesting the deep limitations of the popular culture approach. These
are three exemplary instances in which this is true.
Consumption: Product (RED)
The argument in Chapter 2 addresses the integration of patterns of consumerism
into a model for recruitment, fundraising, and advocacy. From the modest Amnesty
International benefit shows to the extravagance of Live Aid and the militancy of the AntiApartheid movement, campaign engineers institutionalized commercial aspects into
activism as a means of expanding and empowering a grassroots base. I suggest that the
range of market-based initiatives in this period presented opportunities for new
demographics to become aware of and involved in human rights and humanitarian
campaigns, yet in an alienated and uncertain way. Wide-ranging and diverse programs
created a hive of activity that linked popular cultural products and consumerism to human
rights. The underlying assumption in this approach is as follows: ordinary people can
participate in ethical, globally-oriented action through channels with which they are
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already familiar, with minimal discomfort and even some self-indulgent satisfaction.
There is an incongruity in this arrangement that assumes significant sacrifice is
unnecessary in political struggle, reflecting a disjointed relationship between principle
and action. In the case of Anti-Apartheid this is slightly different in that participants in
the cultural boycott did shift their purchasing habits, keeping in mind the businesses they
were patronizing. If a business had ties to the white government, they were shunned,
forcing the consumer to adjust her spending. One lesson drawn from this period is that,
the most overtly political commitment in this trajectory only required a mild deviation
from daily life—and was the most successful. Therefore, should movement organizers
design campaigns along the lines of these dictates, a solidarity effort with staying power
can emerge. However, in terms of consumption-based efforts aimed at the alleviation of
suffering, the tendency has been towards limited engagement framed as charity.
This is especially evident in the Product (RED) Campaign. An aggregation of
celebrities, consumer capitalism, and humanitarian impulses, (RED) is the brainchild of
Bono, the U2 front man and Live Aid alum, that emerged along with a flurry of other
similar activity, including Jubilee 2000 and ONE: The Campaign to Make Poverty
History. Along with Bobby Shriver, the initiative launched in 2006 in conjunction with
the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland to bring attention to the ills of global
capitalism, as well as the opportunities. These campaigns and organizations focused
primarily on economic justice issues, such as Third World debt relief and the Millennium
Development Goals, and global health concerns like Malaria, Tuberculosis, and the
HIV/AIDS pandemic. Product (RED) is essentially a marketing campaign in which a
percentage of sales of certain products from certain corporations benefit the Global Fund,
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which distributes anti-retroviral (ARVs) drugs in Africa to those who have contracted
HIV. Participating corporations include Nike, Gap, Apple, American Express, Dell,
Converse, Armani and Starbucks. Each sells specific commodities to proceed (RED) in
what can be described as a mutually beneficial relationship: It “is not a charity. It is
simply a business model” (Quoted in Shoumatoff 2007), and coincides with trends in the
corporate sector towards social responsibility, good citizenship, and philanthropy (Ponte,
Richey, and Baab 2009). Involvement in ethical campaigns such as this one projects an
image of the corporation as concerned with human well-being, despite frequently being
the target of human rights activism. However, and skillfully, Bono describes this as a
“judo strategy” in which you use “the strength of your opponent to overthrow him"
(Shoumatoff 2007).
Similar to the cases of Chapter 2, (RED) channels trends in consumer behavior in
the service of an ethical cause, in this case treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS in
Africa. Consumers may seek out products with the (RED) logo with the knowledge that
through their act of self-indulgence (the purchase of a non-essential luxury good:
designer running shoes, hip portable music player, or flashy watch), a stranger suffering
from an incurable virus will receive a lifeline. This element is not simply a selling point:
the consequence of the Global Fund’s efforts has been described as the Lazarus Effect,
referring to a tale from the Gospel in which “Jesus raises a man named Lazarus from the
dead, and in essence that's what these drugs are doing for people with aids [sic]”
(Shoumatoff 2007). “Since its launch in 2006, (RED) has generated over $170 million for
the Global Fund and over 7.5 million people have been impacted” (Product (RED) 2011).
While the perspective of this research project has been critical, certain facts are
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incontrovertible and, in this case, it is obviously better that HIV patients have access to
ARVs than not. Similarly with Live Aid, despite the debates over its superficiality and
excessive display, the hundred of millions of dollars earmarked for development projects
in East Africa is difficult to dismiss.
There are criticisms nonetheless commenting on the objectification of Africa by
the (RED) Campaign: “Profligate consumption, corporate growth, and shareholder profit
become the means to Africa’s redemption and to the personal salvation of these
sophisticates” (Hintzen 2008, 79). With an anti-capitalist flourish, the emphasis on
spending as a force for social good is declared an expression of “reified neoliberalism”
and “a convenient First World way of assuaging liberal guilt through shopping” (Youde
2009, 201). Finally, when the magazine Advertising Age tallied the numbers in 2007, the
balance sheets demonstrated over $100 million in marketing expenses by the
participating corporations, with Product (RED) taking in around $18 million (Frazier
2007). While $18 million is better than nothing, there remains a disproportionate nature
to the campaign that prioritizes marketing over the humanitarian objectives it espouses.
This trend is susceptible to criticism from many angles, but it has etched a deeply
significant impression into consumer culture and remains a fixture of the marketplace.
This phenomenon—the linkage of mass consumption and human rights—is
known by many names: ethical consumerism, political consumerism, cause-driven
marketing, “latte activism” (Quoted in Mortimer 2007), “compassionate consumption,”
“causumerism,” or “brand aid” (Richey and Ponte 2011). Labels and logos appear on
commodity goods, as producers catch up with consumer fashion. These visual indicators
signal to the consumer that it is morally acceptable to purchase the goods. I believe this
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pervasive shift in consumer culture has its roots in the events of the 1980s, when
consumer capitalism was hitting its stride, and celebrities sought to direct this energy
towards social and political problems. I am convinced of this because when Bono or
Sting or Peter Gabriel are interviewed and asked about the origins of their activism, they
each cite their involvement in the Secret Policeman’s Ball and Live Aid as foundational.
This is true of content as much as it is of form.
However, in the past thirty years, there has been a fundamental cultural shift that
is a product of the events of this earlier period. “Diego Scotti, vice president of global
advertising for American Express [a (RED) partner], explains: ‘In the 80s, having money
was the sign that someone was successful and prestigious. Today, paying attention to
what happens around you and not only being centred [sic] on yourself is reassuring for
your self-image, as well as how other people see you’” (Mortimer 2007). There remains a
status element to consumerism that now includes morality and political behavior. While
boycotting has a history that can be traced back at least to the Boston Tea Party,
“buycotting” is not the evasion of unethical business, but a predilection in favor of
businesses that tout their social responsibilities (Giridharadas 2009). Causes and issues
abound and range from labor conditions for workers to ecological impact: fair trade
coffee, conflict-free diamonds and minerals, and green resource extraction. Yet, this is
but a modest expression of commitment from consumers. Brand loyalty may compel
patterned purchasing, but should the fad drift with the breeze, the ethical and political
concerns that accompany mass consumption are certain to fade away.
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Voyeurism: Abu Ghraib Prison
Chapter 3 weaves a narrative about the effect of visual media culture on the
audience’s ability to mobilize for human rights. As technology advanced by leaps and
bounds, it became possible for viewers in the West to witness global events in real time
on their television screens, from the safety of their living rooms. While this presented the
possibility for cosmopolitan sensibilities to build bridges between Western spectators and
suffering strangers, there was also evidence that this very human and very tragic event—
suffering mediated through television—was transformed into a spectacle. Spectacle
produced two simultaneous effects: the audience member becomes alienated from that
subject on television, and the subject herself becomes objectified. In this context, the
human rights community demonstrated an ability to use graphic imagery as a means for
riling up an otherwise-apathetic audience, but, again, in an apolitical capacity. Coverage
succeeded in capturing static moments and discrete incidents, rather than exposing the
systemic qualities of the conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia: snapshots and highlight reels,
but no coherent plot. Therefore, the audience responded to the images with emotional and
moral responses, but not political ones. Political responses require a structural awareness
of the exercise of power that transcends feelings and even morals. Furthermore, these
episodes evidence the way in which spectacle is a readily co-optable phenomenon as all
actors involved attempted to exert control over the image—from Presidents Bush and
Clinton, to Somali soldiers and Serbian thugs (not to mention the mainstream media
outlets). Human rights organizations failed to assert propriety over the spectacle,
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allowing indignity to be the substance of spin and subjectivity. Graphic imagery
motivates a limited commitment that is beholden to the dictates of the news cycle and is
ill-equipped as a basis for the sustained and indefatigable resolve necessary to properly
address human rights crises.
The spectacle of suffering remains a common feature of mainstream news
coverage and made a notorious return to primetime in the scandal of detainee abuse at
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In 2004, a 60 Minutes II broadcast revealed to the world firsthand photographs of the brutal treatment of Iraqi detainees by American military
personnel. Seared into the memories of viewers, the images pictured nude captives in a
human pile; shackled prisoners covered in feces; cuffed detainees threatened by Belgian
shepherds; leashed, battered, bruised, and bloody Iraqis; and one prisoner hooded, caped,
and hooked up to electrodes positioned with his palms up, as if Christ-like. If the realities
of the photographs were insufficient to offend, American guards flanked many of the
subjects, smiling and giving gleeful thumbs-up. Reactions to the news enflamed the
politics surrounding a war that was about to erupt into sectarian civil conflict. The
photographs personified for many the aggression of the US invasion of Iraq, as well as
exposed the lack of oversight and discipline of the American military. A public debate
about torture raged in the wake of the scandal, but was largely limited to whether or not
the events at Abu Ghraib constituted cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; the
discussion expanded into the practices of interrogation and intelligence gathering
underway in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, and secret CIA black sites, all
operating under the auspices of the Bush Administration’s “war on terror.” Yet, despite
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the at-times vigorous debate and the disgust experienced by the audience, the question of
accountability remains virtually unanswered.
It is clear that the torture at Abu Ghraib prison was not perpetrated by a handful of
“bad apples” but is symptomatic of a culture constituted by rules of engagement properly
understood as lax, inconsistent, or non-existent. Evidence suggests that it was not
uncommon for interrogators to ask military police (MPs) to “soften up” detainees ahead
of interrogation sessions, despite many MPs, such as those at Abu Ghraib, never having
been trained in proper detention protocol. Furthermore, a context for this sort of behavior
was provided by a series of legal memos originating in the Office of Legal Counsel of the
Justice Department. These documents, known collectively as the Torture Memos, set out
standards of conduct for interrogators that effectively sidestepped international legal
norms of torture and permitted a range of practices, including waterboarding, the use of
stress positions, and sleep deprivation (Farer 2008, 99-111). In light of the fact that
torture was authorized directly by the Justice Department, governing the CIA and
Department of Defense, there has been no accountability for torture above low-ranking
soldiers. When asked about Abu Ghraib, or other instances of detainee torture, Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld roundly denied any prior knowledge, contrary to the
findings of the Taguba Report, the thorough accounting of torture at Abu Ghraib,
conducted by Army Major General Antonio Taguba (Hersh 2007).
A 2006 report authored by the Detainee Abuse and Accountability Project (or
DAA Project, a collaboration between Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, and
the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at NYU School of Law) uncovered that
torture was in fact a widespread practice carried out in the “war on terror”. The DAA
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Project examined over 330 cases in which detainees were either abused or killed in
custody of American military or civilian personnel (to include contractors). These cases
“involve more than 600 U.S. personnel and over 460 detainees,” yet no more than fiftyfour military personnel have been convicted in court martial and only forty have served
any prison time—and “no U.S. military officer has been held accountable for criminal
acts committed by subordinates” (Detainee Abuse and Accountability Project 2006). Of
these cases, "only about half appear to have been properly investigated" (Detainee Abuse
and Accountability Project 2006). In a 2011 investigation, the Detainee Abuse Task
Force, a military body established in the wake of Abu Ghraib, is exposed for high levels
of incompetence and corruption (Phillips 2011). The startling array of investigations
proves that torture was a pervasive feature of military conduct and extended well beyond
the “borderline” method of waterboarding, to include the foulest and most humiliating
treatment undeserving of detailed exposition. Yet, damning as this reporting is for the
civilian and military command of the “war on terror,” prosecutions of high-ranking
officials are conspicuously absent. What explains, then, the disconnect between the
horror of the photographs and the lack of accountability for those responsible?
If the spectacle of suffering were a force for human rights protection, then it
would motivate a repulsed audience to rally for a response. Instead, the spectacle of Abu
Ghraib operated in similar fashion to the spectacle of Bosnian concentration camps: as an
instance captured, and a system obscured. In 1992, at Omarska and Trnopolje, the
popular reaction to the images was to have those camps closed, rather than a thorough
examination of the campaign of extermination in its early stages. The glimpse into
brutality offered by the spectacle does not penetrate beneath the surface and does harm to
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the possibility of a coherent accounting of the problem; to use a colloquialism, the forest
is lost but for the trees. From the viewer’s perspective, the spectacle maintains distance
from the suffering subject as spectatorship and witnessing is transformed into voyeurism.
Voyeurism is a unidirectional act that objectifies its content and disengages the voyeur
from action. The spectacle, as transmitted through mass media, provokes emotional and
moral expressions that fail to transcend the medium or to translate into deeper political
commitments.
Brand Identity: Libya
In the analysis of the campaign to Save Darfur, a movement emerged as a
progressive synthesis of the previous moments, deploying celebrities and consumerism,
and leveraging visual media culture. Yet, through a strategy that is at once transcendent
and derivative, Save Darfur’s grassroots activism was outsourced to a host of corporate
marketing firms that executed an all-out advertising blitz to raise awareness, expose
wrongdoing, and exact political cost among elected officials. While this approach cast
Darfur as the humanitarian cause of the moment and produced noticeable policy shifts,
the nature of advertising is to rely on the audience’s identification with “the brand,” no
matter what the cost. In the case of Darfur, genocide was transformed into a brand name
despite the dubious circumstances surrounding the very declaration of genocide. I suggest
that the advertising initiative became an end unto itself and, in the process, distorted the
facts on the ground so as to maintain its branded narrative. On the audience side of the
equation, a brand identity is formed through the merchandising and advertising
campaigns, as bumper stickers and t-shirts became self-affirming products for supporters
to don. This is not to discredit the efforts expended and successes won by the movement,
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but to propose an explanation as to why activists did not ultimately see their objectives
accomplished. Save Darfur is appropriately compared to the Anti-Apartheid movement
for its broad civil society base and its effectiveness in motivating average people and
heads of state confront a massive human rights problem. However, if Save Darfur is the
model for future campaigns, an introspective account of its methods reveals the need to
re-think some core assumptions. In an attempt to motivate a political response, the
politically charged language of genocide figured heavily in movement literature, talking
points, and advertising. Yet, there is a sense in which Save Darfur’s approach resulted in
either an overly political or falsely political output.
This is reflected in the recent intervention in Libya and the rhetoric and
positioning that surrounded the military campaign. As the Arab Spring uprisings spiraled
from Tunisia and Egypt outward, a non-violent protest movement sprung up in Benghazi,
Libya. Over the course of a week, the protests turned violent when the police used force
to disburse the demonstrations. As the protests became enflamed, police presence
subsided and the movement occupied Benghazi, claiming it as the rebel capitol; indeed,
in a short span the protest movement evolved into a revolt against the dictatorial regime
of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi responded with a war mobilization and grave
threats against the rebels and their sympathizers: calling the protestors “cockroaches” and
“rats” and encouraging his supporters to hunt them down in their homes (The Economist
2011). A city of 700,000, Benghazi risked a thorough assault from the Libyan state that
endangered the lives of its civilians. Reacting to the threat against the rebel stronghold,
the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1970 and 1973, the first
condemning Gaddafi’s violence and the second authorizing the imposition of a no-fly
	
  

211

zone for the purpose of protecting civilians. A multi-lateral force lead by France, UK, and
US began enforcing the no-fly zone with an aerial assault on Libya’s retaliatory
capabilities, taking out communications systems and pocking runways. Yet, as the
conflict raged, the allied forces appeared to be providing tactical air support for the
rebels, rather than preventing crimes against humanity.
The intervention in Libya, presented to the international community as a
humanitarian act and an expression of the emergent Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
doctrine, doubled as a strategic campaign aimed at the removal of Colonel Gaddafi. As
clear as that is in the months following its initiation, early on, human rights language
helped sell the military operation to the public. Primary among the justifications for the
intervention, as indicated above, is the protection of civilians against the threats of terror
by the Gaddafi regime. Yet, there are two kinds of civilians in Benghazi: those that have
taken up weapons against the state, and those who have not, despite the comfort and
material support the latter might be lending to the former. However, as the airstrikes
intensified over Tripoli, targeting the residence of Gaddafi, the mantra of civilian
protection persists. It becomes reasonable when both kinds of civilians are subsumed
under the category of those requiring protection—since the future of Libya is dependent
upon the civilian combatants qua rebels. This is no longer the limited engagement called
up under Resolution 1973 and has morphed into an aggressive attempt to unseat a
dictator. However horrific Gaddafi is, and he is among the most heavy-handed, regime
change is not a human rights directive and, in this case, humanitarian discourse has been
manipulated to serve the interests of great powers.
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In the context of brand identity, the linkage between Darfur and Libya suggests
that labels such as “genocide” and “mass atrocities” are embedded with meaning that
resonates with the audience. If in Darfur Rwanda served as the historic backdrop,
Benghazi was cast as a Srebrenica in the making: an area able to be surrounded, full of
innocent civilians, at the mercy of a brutal army. Whether or not this is an apt comparison
is a worthwhile debate to have, but ultimately rests on counterfactuals and negative
events. Samantha Power, the journalist galvanized by Bosnia, now holds a prominent role
on President Barack Obama’s National Security Council and was a vocal proponent of
military action in Libya (Stolberg 2011). The cultural memory of Srebrenica bears
significant weight among policymakers, as well as home viewers, and was an effective
parallel case in convincing the American public and world of the value of the
intervention. Either the campaign prevented a large-scale massacre, as the Obama
Administration and others suggest, or this is a case of crying wolf to justify an aggressive
attack on a rogue state. Perhaps there are some that wish R2P to extend to these kinds of
cases, to justify a multilateral military effort to remove a notorious human rights violator.
But, if this is the case, then Iraq 2003 bears more of a resemblance to Libya than Bosnia
and, for that reason, should be a source of controversy for the human rights community.
However, instead of cautious pause and self-reflection, central organizations—
including the Genocide Intervention Network—were quick to call for military action and
flex their anti-genocide brand. There is no evidence that a genocidal threat was ever
issued from Gaddafi and for an organization with the word “genocide” in its name to
speak out on Libya is to falsely superimpose the brand of genocide where it does not
apply. Ultimately, the case of Libya—unresolved at the time of writing—demonstrates
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promise for quick action through a multilateral body on behalf of vulnerable civilians and
resolve to expend political capital in support of human rights. Yet, I fear that the currency
of human rights is limited and therefore dictates a budgeted approach. It will not be
possible to act in this manner in all cases (witness Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain), and while
acting infrequently is preferable to not acting, humanitarian interventions are best
reserved for cases of the worst magnitude. Long-term considerations weigh in favor of a
measured perspective that defends human rights interests against geopolitical co-optation.
The Darfur case teaches us that citizen advocates respond to appeals to tragic cultural
memories and brands that identify supporters as conscious, ethical and globally engaged.
But, commitments forged through such tactics have infamously lent themselves to
deceptive outreach practices and susceptibility to manipulation.
Conclusion: What Was Not and What Can Be
This project is a descriptive account of the emergence of a mass consciousness
revolving around human rights principles and the methods that were used to bring it
about. As well, a critical frame is employed to highlight the negative unintended
consequences produced by these strategies for recruitment, fundraising, and advocacy.
Ultimately, the conclusion drawn from the research suggests that popular culture is useful
in attracting supporters to ethical causes, but damaging to the possibility of politicizing
those supporters and transforming them into activists. The final analysis paints a picture
of the human rights movement as reliant on commercial platforms, but at their own
expense. Individuals that become involved in human rights campaigns do not constitute a
base of support for future campaigns, but are only bound to human rights principles in
superficial ways. In light of this conclusion, this section proposes a hypothetical history
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and an alternate future in which the human rights movement successfully politicizes its
supporters and is able to influence world affairs more effectively.
A politicized global human rights movement must come to terms with the series
of dialectics presented in this dissertation: other-regarding and self-determining
movements; charity and solidarity; and human rights and humanitarianism. As discussed
above, each of these binaries frame the relationship between the Western advocate and
the suffering stranger whose pain she hopes to alleviate. I contend this relationship drives
the motivations, expressions, and commitments of advocates and determines the
constitution of any mass movement that should materialize. If this relationship is defined
by distance and alienation, then a unilateral, charity-based effort will develop. If this
relationship is instead based on cosmopolitan obligations, an empowering solidarity
movement will take shape. The cases in the chapters provide evidence of both, but
demonstrate that, in an age of consumerism, we are more likely to witness charitable
gestures than solidarist stances.
Foremost, the other-regarding/self-determining distinction needs to be fleshed out
in the context of global human rights activism: while the movement is based on notions
of the former, the latter fosters a deeper sense of politicization among participants.
Therefore, the question remains, how does the human rights movement bridge this gap?
In the classic social protest model, politicization derives from the individual’s personal
experience and self-interest in the struggle (motivation), the participation in direct action
campaigns (expression), and the specific assumption of risk and threat in the process
(commitment). At a glance, these are not easily reproduced in the context of an otherregarding movement. There are examples of Westerners who take part in direct action
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and transplant themselves into harm’s way for the sake of the cause; American and
European supporters of Palestinian statehood are one such group that relocate to the West
Bank and Gaza Strip and actively engage in local protests. But, for the most part,
concerned people in the West do not take on threat of bodily harm or social repercussions
when the rights of strangers are in question. To reiterate a point made in Chapter One,
there are in fact examples of this in history, such as the Freedom Rides in the early 1960s
American South, but they are rare and were not transnational actions. Since this kind of
first-hand, risk-inducing experience is unavailable, what can serve as a substitute to
politicize those inclined toward these matters?
One response may suggest that it is actually impossible to politicize Western
audiences to the extent necessary to overcome geographic and psychological distance.
This is not an unreasonable suggestion. While we might like it to be otherwise, a humble
approach to human rights organizing may recognize these inherent limitations and opt to
pursue alternate paths. Perhaps the best we can hope for is a charitable reaction in which
resources are generated, awareness is raised, and elected officials are compelled to stake
out positions and acknowledge the problem, such as we saw in Save Darfur. In the case
of famine, for instance, maybe our objectives should be limited to emergence aid relief
and some modest development efforts, like water sanitation projects. Clearly it was silly
for Bob Geldof to strive to end poverty and were he to have set his goals lower, Live Aid
may be remembered as a greater success. Humanitarian hubris is that which most often
leads to the worst outcomes, signaling the need for a degree of self-restraint that
adventurous do-gooders rarely possess. The utopian and aspirational elements inherent in
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the principles of human rights certainly do not prescribe caution, but rather embolden the
courageous and the confrontational.
Whereas the argument for self-restraint and limitation may be reasonable, it is not
particularly satisfying, nor is it likely to have the desired impact in a time of crisis. This
being the case, how can human rights organizations politicize civil society while waging
campaigns for the rights of others? At the crux of this question is the advocate’s potential
to overcome the seduction of consumer culture and resist the tide of the news cycle, and I
believe this potential can be realized if the human rights movement comes to expect more
of its supporters. Throughout this broad narrative, tactics pre-figured the audience’s
response to be limited and disengaged. Expecting little, movement architects could take
pleasure in the progress made in the realm of consciousness, although the realm of
politics was noticeably deficient. Bringing these two arenas into alignment will allow
human rights organizations to capitalize on the promise of cosmopolitanism solidarity
embodied in the vociferous and impressive expressions evidenced in the chapters.
Because nothing of this sort had ever been demonstrated, it is understandable that
the campaigns required limited engagement from the public. In a sense, contemporary
human rights activism is far cry from the self-determining movements that preceded it
and to which it owes a debt. Because of the utilization of the popular culture model,
human rights supporters today can be involved without leaving the comfort of their living
rooms. While it is a benefit to be able to send a letter of protest via email, rather than
having to travel to an embassy, these kinds of processes also set a tone of the movement
as inherently removed and only inclined to participate so long as they are not
discomforted. This is at the heart of the problem. It was sufficient to ask the audience to
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give money to aid in Ethiopia. It corroborated the aims of the movement for viewers to
become upset at the site of graphic imagery of suffering. To have created a mass
movement for Darfur was a landmark in the recent history of human rights. In each of
these moments, however, the human rights community should have asked for more. Live
Aid could have had a political component that issued actions to address the real root of
the famine in the use of food as a weapon in war. The imagery of starvation in Somalia
and genocide in Bosnia could have provided the wherewithal to foment a grassroots
enterprise based on connecting the dots, rather than supplying fuel for a reactionary
emotional response. In Darfur, the advertising push should have been reigned in to
exploit the attention it had garnered, rather than be allowed to become the subject of
controversy. Once fits of energy had begun to percolate, the leaders of the movement
should have shifted objectives from the social and culture aspects of the campaigns,
triggering a political agenda derived from the principles of universal human rights.
On the one hand, this analysis sounds like “Monday morning quarterbacking” or
“sour grapes” hindsight of the highest magnitude because it is easy to read backwards
into history options that now are apparent. But that is not the goal of this research.
Instead, by engaging in “should haves,” I intend to bring perspective to opportunities
missed and possibilities squandered in order to improve future practice. This is not an
exercise in empty criticism for its own sake, but rather an attempt to explain how we got
to this point and how we make things better. There was and continues to be a steep
learning curve in the design and execution of human rights campaigning and the popular
culture approach is a natural one because it sought generally to generate consciousness
for human rights activism that previously did not exist—and in that goal these methods
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proved effective. However, aside from the Anti-Apartheid Movement, awareness never
surged into politicized activism. In these cases, there appears to be a lack of staging in the
campaigns to answer the question, once we have an interested public, what do we do?
The answer to this pivotal issue rests on our expectations of ordinary people’s
abilities to act on behalf of others; not just others in our own communities, but others on
the other side of the world. This research project demonstrates that ordinary people have
the capacity for compassion and solidarity of a cosmopolitan variety, but it is the
responsibility of movement leadership to properly leverage emotional and moral
engagement into political and politicized action. Contrary to popular myths, average
citizens—not lawyers, scholars, or diplomats—are not apathetic or detached; they are just
not engaged. If human rights principles are about anything, they are about hope that the
future can be better than the present; that oppressed people will claim their inalienable
rights, and that those fortunate enough not to need to claim rights will join those others in
their struggles. Professor Stephen Eric Bronner forcefully articulates the potential for
human rights to realize these goals and is worth quoting at length:
Human rights is useful only from the standpoint of critique and resistance.
It projects a form of solidarity that is more than legal and extends beyond
the limits of class, race, and nation…Human rights is a meaningful
concept only insofar as similarities are recognized between such different
individuals united by nothing more than the willingness to challenge the
constraints of tradition and the dictates of arbitrary power. Human rights is
predicated on an existential willingness to feel empathy and compassion
for the victim, the oppressed, and the disenfranchised. (Bronner 2004,
145-146)
Human rights has been called “the last coherent saving ideal” and “the last utopia” for the
motivational nature of its substance, in an age without compelling progressive ideologies
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(Rieff 2003, 120; Moyn 2010). Consumerism is conspicuous for the absence and denial
of ideology, in favor of a self-indulgent mantra that prioritizes the purposeless
accumulation of stuff. For this reason, this dissertation hinges on the constant tension
between the usefulness of commercialism as a platform for human rights and the negative
unintended consequences associated with the offspring of this rocky marriage.
Human rights activism demands investment by supporters that supersedes a
momentary flare up of emotion or outrage and it is the duty of the human rights
movement to cultivate and nurture a sense of ownership in the public. Citizen advocates
must develop a sense of propriety that is not delimited by an annual contribution or by
affixing a bumper sticker. Human rights engagement that links integrity with action can
be effective in fostering a “human rights culture” in a real sense by casting average
people in the roles of activists. The human rights movement consists of much more than
NGOs, philanthropists, journalists, and lawyers. The movement was built by the energies
of ordinary people concerned with the well-being of suffering strangers and, in order to
be successful, the movement must embrace and exploit these grassroots moving forward.
Through this embrace, however, the movement must shift away from the weak ties and
hollow bonds of its past and toward the politicized and principled promise of its future.
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